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Abstract    
It is often said that education is closely linked with democracy. This may refer to 
different things, however. It may refer to the idea that the educational system should 
be consistent with democratic values, for instance equal access. It may also refer to 
classroom practices that allow students to express their opinions and be at least 
partially in control of their school life. A third interpretation is as a preparation for 
future democratic participation. This involves teaching students common knowledge 
along with more specific democratic skills and values. This notion is often referred to 
as ‘education for democracy’, and this is the topic of the present dissertation. Here, 
education for deliberative democracy is investigated in a qualitative and explorative 
manner. The aim is to develop a comprehensive understanding of the specific 
knowledge, skills, and values that future citizens should acquire to be prepared to 
participate in deliberative democracy, and to identify the pedagogical practices that 
should be applied to achieve this.  
 
I investigated education for deliberative democracy in different phases, each phase 
corresponding with a different research focus. In the ‘pre-phase’, I addressed how 
scholars of political philosophy conceptualize deliberative democracy. According to 
the ideal of deliberative democracy, citizens and their representatives should justify 
their positions through public reasoning, in which they seek mutually justifiable 
reasons for the laws they impose on one another. It is not majority rule per se that 
justifies political decision but the reason-giving process that precedes voting, where 
citizens weigh arguments and alternatives against each other and strive toward mutual 
agreement. 
 
In ‘Phase 1 – Literature review’ I investigated how scholars of education describe and 
define the project ‘education for deliberative democracy’. What are the skills and 
values they advocate? Do these coincide with what scholars of political philosophy 
argue for? Furthermore, do they present ideas concerning how an education for 
deliberative democracy should be implemented? Two findings are particularly 
interesting. First, there is widespread agreement in the field about how future citizens 
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should learn deliberative skills and values – through participation in democratic 
deliberations. Second, the field contains a gap. Articles arguing for deliberative 
democracy as an educational aim on the one hand, and articles investigating 
pedagogical practices on the other, are often far removed from one another. The 
problem lies mainly at the pedagogical end of the spectrum, where articles 
investigating pedagogical practices often fail to ground their studies in the political 
definition of deliberative democracy. This causes them to lose their immediate 
relevance to questions related to education for deliberative democracy. Thus, when the 
argument is made that deliberation as a pedagogical method fosters certain skills and 
values, the question that remains to be answered is what makes these relevant for 
deliberative democracy (article 1).  
 
In ‘Phase 2 – Empirical study’, I conducted a short-term ethnographic study. I found 
that many classroom discussions appear to be examples of democratic deliberations, 
but when scrutinized, they are found to lack one or more crucial features. In these 
cases, they often include either a reason-giving process and a reflective process or a 
search for a conclusion, but usually not all three simultaneously. However, at other 
times, they may include all three aspects and qualify as democratic deliberations. In 
this regard, the type of question discussed is important because different types of 
questions are associated with different types of discussions. Discussions including 
reason-giving and reflection, but lacking a search for a conclusion, are structured 
around open questions, whereas discussions including a search for conclusion but 
lacking reason-giving and reflection are structured around closed questions. 
Discussions including all three aspects, however, are structured around questions with 
a ’suitable’ balance between openness and closeness. Based on this, a practical 
implication is articulated: in order to steer classroom discussions in the direction of 
democratic deliberations, teachers should pose questions open enough to give students 
the possibility to disagree on the matter while at the same time closed enough to give 
them the opportunity to reach a collective conclusion (article 2). Furthermore, I found 
that consensus as a criterion for classroom discussions can be problematic, according 
to teachers experienced in conducting classroom discussions. It can alter the pattern of 
viii 
 
communication in undesirable ways and cause emotional strain in students. However, 
by defining consensus as a regulative aim and a multifaceted concept with different 
meanings, I argue that many different types of agreements and disagreements can 
coexist and that it should be possible to retain consensus as an ideal in classroom 
deliberations without necessarily creating the negative side effects declared by the 
teachers (article 3).  
 
In the ‘concluding phase’, I formulated my version of an education for deliberative 
democracy. Grounded in the political understanding of deliberative democracy, I argue 
that an education for deliberative democracy should focus on teaching future citizens 
how to give each other reasons for the positions they hold, how to weigh different 
arguments and alternatives against each reason offered, and how to strive for mutually 
acceptable decisions on how to act. Furthermore, I argue that they should learn this by 
practicing democratic deliberations (in the classroom). In this regard, the teacher’s task 
is to moderate the classroom discussion, to reflect on a number of contextual factors, 
and to steer the exchange of ideas in the direction of democratic deliberations. This 
will give students the opportunity to practice giving reasons, reflecting over others’ 
statements, and striving for collective conclusions. This formulation can be regarded 
as a minimalistic model of an education for deliberative democracy. There are 
arguably other skills and values that are also important for deliberative participation. 
However, in order for such skills and values to be relevant in a deliberative sense, they 
need to be firmly connected to the core activity of deliberative participation. I 
therefore argue that even though this formulation is a minimalistic one, it is the 
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1. Introduction   
The term democracy means ‘rule of the people’. It refers to a form of governance in 
which ‘the people’ make the decisions regarding their shared society (Cohen, 1971). 
Democracy is an ideal that can be traced throughout the history of Western societies 
but perhaps is most notably found in the historic periods of the Enlightenment and 
ancient Greece. To further demonstrate the central role of democracy in our Western 
civilization, a number of our most famous philosophers, such as Socrates, Plato, 
Rousseau, Kant, Mill, and Dewey, to name only a few, all spent portions of their 
academic careers discussing democracy. During the 20th century, a worldwide 
consensus has been reached, establishing democracy as the preferred form of 
governance, and nowadays, when talking about the level of development of a country, 
democracy is frequently used as a point of reference.    
 
During the latter half of the 20th century, however, a growing dissatisfaction emerged. 
Scholars within the field of political philosophy began to criticize contemporary views 
of democracy, along with modern democratic practices, for failing to account for the 
original meaning of democracy. There is something wrong with democracy when it is 
viewed mainly as an arena where fixed preferences compete against each other and 
when democratic participation is defined largely by the practice of voting, they argued. 
Instead, public deliberations should be placed at the heart of democracy, a reason-
giving process in which citizens, along with their representatives, weigh different 
arguments and alternatives against each other. This will make citizens more actively 
involved in the governing of their own society, pluralism and moral disagreements will 
be more seriously addressed, and the legitimacy of democratic decisions will be 
enhanced (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Chambers, 2003; Gutmann & Thompson, 
2004; Held, 2006; Dryzek, 2010; Chappell, 2012). This conception of democracy 
became known as deliberative democracy, and during the 1990s, it became so popular 
within academic circles that there was talk of a deliberative turn in democratic theory.  
 
It is often said that education is closely connected to democracy. Democratic 




educational system should be consistent with democratic values, that everyone should 
have access to it, and that everyone, including representatives, parents, and citizens, 
should be allowed to influence its direction. It can also refer to day-to-day classroom 
practice, allowing students to ‘be heard’, to express their opinions, and to be at least 
partially in control of their everyday school life. This interpretation is closely linked to 
the children’s convention as formulated by the UN and UNICEF1. A third 
interpretation of democratic education is as a preparation for future democratic 
participation. This involves teaching students common knowledge and facts about the 
world along with more specific democratic skills and values. This interpretation is 
often referred to as education for democracy and it is from this perspective that the 
present dissertation takes its point of departure. As expressed by Amy Gutmann and 
Dennis Thompson (2004, p. 35), a democracy cannot thrive without a well-educated 
citizenry. This is especially true in the case of deliberative democracy since asking 
citizens to participate in public deliberations and to provide reasons for their opinions 
while at the same time reflect over the arguments made by others arguably demands a 
lot of the citizenry. Critics have even gone as far as to claim that deliberative 
democracy is a utopian project that is impossible to implement in the real world due to 
the shortcomings in ordinary citizens’ deliberative skills. However, the fact that such 
doubt exists only shows the importance of accompanying deliberative democracy with 
an education for deliberative democracy, an education that teaches the future 
generation how to participate in public democratic deliberations.  
  
1.1 Aims and research questions 
In this dissertation, I take a closer look at the concept of education for deliberative 
democracy. The overall aim of this project is to formulate a comprehensive 
understanding of such an education, from the aspect of its key focal points to the 
aspect of how it should be implemented. This aim is captured in the project’s 
overarching research question:   
                                                          





To prepare the next generation of citizens for deliberative democratic participation, 
what kind of knowledge, skills, and values do they have to acquire, and, what kind 
of pedagogical practices should be applied to achieve this?   
 
In order to capture and describe education for deliberative democracy 
comprehensively, I explore it from different angles. First, I look at the theoretical 
foundation of deliberative democracy as a democratic theory formulated by scholars of 
political philosophy. What constitutes deliberative democracy, its form of democratic 
participation, and what are the skills and values necessary for deliberative democratic 
participation? Second, I investigate educational assumptions made by scholars within 
the educational field. What skills and values do they argue for as vital for deliberative 
democratic participation and do these coincide with the skills and values expressed by 
scholars of political philosophy? Furthermore, do they have ideas about how an 
education for deliberative democracy should be structured, grounded in either 
empirical research or theoretical reasoning? For example, are there specific 
pedagogical practices that prove themselves favorable for the development of 
deliberative skills and values? Finally, I use self-collected empirical data to scrutinize, 
discuss, nuance, problematize, and further develop theoretical ideas and pedagogical 
practices related to an education for deliberative democracy. I believe that by 
examining education for deliberative democracy from these different angles, I create a 
comprehensive understanding of what it is and what it could be and should be.   
 
1.2 Research design and structure of the dissertation 
The research project that this dissertation is built upon was carried out in different 
phases. Each phase corresponds with a different underlying research focus. The results 
from these phases are distributed throughout different parts of the dissertation, in the 
synopsis and in the three research articles respectively. A visualization of this design is 







In the ‘pre-phase’, I addressed the question of how scholars within the field of political 
philosophy conceptualize deliberative democracy and deliberative democratic 
participation. I conducted a traditional (Petticrew & Roberts, 2006), or classical 
(Krumsvik, 2014), literature review where I started by reading one of the most 
influential and comprehensive formulations of deliberative democracy, Gutmann and 
Thompson’s Democracy and Disagreement (1996), and then used the ‘reference 
method’ to guide the process forward. Gradually, this shaped my understanding of 
deliberative democracy, which served as a foundation for the whole research project. 
The explicit description of this understanding is found in the second chapter of the 
synopsis and in the early parts of each article. 
  
During ‘Phase one – Literature review’, I turned to the question of how educational 
scholars understand and describe the project frequently referred to as education for 
deliberative democracy. I conducted a conceptual and critical review, aiming at 
identifying the main ideas and assumptions in the field, along with the main 
shortcomings and challenges (Petticrew & Roberts, 2006). I also incorporated aspects 
Table 1: Overview of the research project 'Education for deliberative democracy'
          Data and method               Aim and main research question            Article and title
           Traditional review                 What are the main ideas 
         Pre-phase                   of the field of                   of deliberative democracy according                   Synopsis 
           political philosophy       to the field of political philosophy? 
              What are the main ideas, 
           Phase 1      Conceptual literature review        assumptions, and controversies in         Paper 1. Education for
 Literature review   of the field of education for    the field of education for deliberative       deliberative democracy: 
      deliberative democracy               democracy, and what are the            mapping the field       
             shortages and challenges?
                What does a democratic  
      deliberation taking place inside a        Paper 2. Education for
     Qualitative observations                classroom look like, and what       deliberative democracy: a 
     of classroom discussions          distinguishes it from other similar         typology of classroom  
           Phase 2                     types of discussions?                  discussions
   Empirical study
      How can deliberative democracy’s 
   Qualitative interviews with          aim of consensus be formulated                Paper 3. Education for
   theoretical argumentations          in order to adress the criticism    deliberative democracy and  
                       it has been facing within               the aim of consensus
                the educational field? 
          In order to prepare the next generation of citizens for
          deliberative democratic participation, what kind of 
 Concluding phase        knowledge, skills, and values do they have to acquire,             Synopsis
         and, what kind of  pedagogical practices should be   




more commonly found in a systematic approach, such as a structured and focused 
search process, but carried out the analysis and the composition of the results in a less 
formalized way. A more detailed description of the research process is found in the 
third chapter of the synopsis. The results are presented and discussed in the article 
“Education for deliberative democracy: Mapping the field”. For the project as such, 
two findings are particularly important. First, the field of education for deliberative 
democracy is founded on the assumption that the skills and values necessary for 
deliberative democratic participation are learned through participation in democratic 
deliberations. Second, the field contains a gap in which articles treating deliberation as 
a political concept on the one hand, and articles treating it as a pedagogical concept on 
the other, talk past each other. The problem lies mainly at the pedagogical end of the 
spectrum, where articles investigating deliberative educative practices are frequently 
too far removed from the political understanding of deliberative democracy. The result 
is that the pedagogical research within the field fails to be of immediate relevance to 
an education for deliberative democracy.  
 
The aim in ‘Phase 2 – Empirical study’ was to bridge the gap identified in the previous 
phase, and to produce empirical research that explicitly connects findings of a 
pedagogical nature to the theory of deliberative democracy. I conducted a short-term 
ethnographic study (Pink & Morgan, 2013) that included four teachers, classroom 
observations, interviews, and informal conversations. I used Tomas Englund’s (2006) 
notion of deliberative communication as a theoretical framework. According to this, 
deliberative communication is communication in which (a) different views confront 
one another and arguments for them are articulated, (b) there is tolerance and respect 
for the concrete other and participants listen to each other’s arguments, and (c) there 
are elements of collective will-formation, a desire to reach consensus or a temporary 
agreement. Furthermore, (d) authorities and traditional views can be challenged and 
there are opportunities to challenge one’s own tradition, and (e) there is a scope for 
students to deliberate without teacher control (p. 512).This framework directed my 




interviews, and I used it actively during the analytical processes. I describe this 
research process in detail in the fourth chapter of the synopsis.  
The findings from phase 2 are presented in two of the articles. In the article 
“Education for deliberative democracy: A typology of classroom discussion”, I 
develop an empirically based typology of classroom discussions and use it to make 
salient the character of a democratic deliberation and what such a discussion might 
look like in a classroom. Additionally, I highlight the difference between democratic 
deliberations and other closely related types of discussions that appear to be examples 
of democratic deliberations but that lack one or more crucial features. Finally, I offer 
practical suggestions concerning how one can turn classroom discussions into 
democratic deliberations, and thus, how one can construct the desired deliberative 
learning situation in which students are given the opportunity to practice democratic 
deliberation. In the article “Education for deliberative democracy and the aim of 
consensus”, I defend consensus against the criticism that it is unfit as an aim in 
democratic education and unfit as a criterion for classroom discussions. Based upon 
Dryzek and Niemeyer’s (2010) typology of consensus and the idea that multifaceted 
conceptualization is what allows many different types of agreements and 
disagreements to coexist, I argue that consensus is unproblematic both as an aim in 
democratic education and as a criterion for classroom discussions. I also present a 
practical implication for how the idea of ’meta-consensus’ can allow us to reinterpret 
competitive and conflictual classroom discussions as deliberative learning situations in 
which students are allowed to practice turning them into productive democratic 
deliberations.  
 
In the final phase of the project, the ‘Concluding phase’, I revisited the overarching 
research question of the project concerning what kind of knowledge, skills, and values 
an education for deliberative democracy should focus on and what kind of pedagogical 
practices it should be based upon. This discussion is found in the final chapter of the 
synopsis, where I present and articulate my version of an education for deliberative 




centered on reason-giving, listening, and reflection. I also discuss limitations and 
possible shortcomings of this version. 
 
1.3 Methodological foundation    
The project is methodologically grounded in a constructivist research paradigm. This 
means that (social) phenomena are regarded as human constructions that are unique, 
specific, complex, and dynamic and should be studied as such, because breaking them 
down into smaller parts would mean losing the whole they represent (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 1994; Hatch, 2002; Merriam, 2009). This description suits the phenomenon 
of education for deliberative democracy. The latter is structured around abstract human 
ideas such how to organize society (democratic theory) and how to prepare future 
citizens for participation in that society (pedagogical ideas). Furthermore, it is a young 
phenomenon in a theoretical sense. The development of deliberative democracy as a 
democratic theory started during the 1980s, which means that education for 
deliberative democracy as a theoretical concept has to be younger than that. Studying 
this phenomenon in a broad and explorative manner therefore makes sense, because 
the groundwork of systemizing and organizing the thoughts represented within it has 
presumably not yet been conducted.  
 
While the aim of a constructivist approach is to study phenomena as complex wholes, 
qualitative research methods provide the means to do so. These methods allow 
researchers to ground projects in a broad and general wondering about a phenomenon 
and investigate them without breaking up their complexity or distorting their larger 
meaning, instead of having to rely on predefined hypotheses or clearly articulated 
research questions (Hatch, 2002; Brinkmann, 2012). They are characterized by a 
systematic search for meaning but the driving force is found in ‘abductive 
breakdowns’, because, it is from the moment when things fail to make sense, such as 
the theory used or the realities investigated, that the desire to search for meaning 
emerges (Brinkmann, 2012; Tavory & Timmermans, 2014). For example, when I 
discovered that consensus was criticized as an aim in democratic education and as a 




used. To restore the meaning of this criterion, I turned to an alternative notion of 
consensus and incorporated it into the formulation I used, and thus, created a new 
more nuanced version of the consensus criterion. Understanding a qualitative project 
in this manner, however, means that it will never be finished in an absolute sense 
because it will always be possible to dig deeper into the material and generate new 
occurrences of abductive breakdown. Thus, at one point, one simply has to decide that 
the understanding presented represents a meaningful description of the phenomenon 
(Tavory & Timmermans, 2014). 
 
Furthermore, understanding qualitative research in this way has implications for the 
knowledge produced – it needs to be considered as a product of construction rather 
than one of absolute ‘truth’ (Hatch, 2002), and the researcher needs to be regarded as a 
producer of that knowledge (Brinkmann, 2012). For instance, if I had decided to use 
another theoretical understanding of deliberative democracy, the investigation of an 
education for deliberative democracy would have been different. A different focus 
would have emerged, different breakdowns would have occurred, different research 
questions would have been articulated, and in the end, a different picture of the 
phenomenon of education for deliberative democracy would have been painted. Thus, 
the choices and decisions I made throughout the project shaped the knowledge product 
I produced. However, in a constructivist perspective, this does not necessarily pose a 
problem, because the point is not (necessarily) to prove one version of the 
phenomenon as more correct than another but rather to present a credible, reasonable, 
and trustworthy understanding of it – a version that makes sense, is reasonable, and 
useful. In other terms, a version that is valid and reliable in a qualitative sense (Kvale 
& Brinkmann, 2009). In order to do this, qualitative researchers need to describe what 
they have done and why, to provide users with enough insight into the research 
process to evaluate the choices made and conclusions reached in order to determine 
whether they are credible, reasonable, and trustworthy or not (Kvale & Brinkmann, 
2009; Brinkmann, 2013). I will elaborate further on my own process of knowledge 





In the spirit of constructivism, my aim in this dissertation is therefore to present a 
formulation of education for deliberative democracy that is credible, reasonable, and 
trustworthy. Furthermore, I hope that scholars, researchers, and classroom 
practitioners find it useful in some way, as a theoretical model or as a practical tool. 
However, I also invite the readers of this dissertation to critically examine and 
problematize the formulation of education for deliberative democracy that I put forth 
so as to continue the development of theoretical assumptions and classroom practices 




2. The theory of deliberative democracy 
The overreaching research aim of this dissertation is to investigate an education for 
deliberative democracy. However, in order to investigate an education for something, 
one first has to understand what that ‘something’ is. Naturally, my first aim was 
therefore to investigate, understand, and describe what deliberative democracy and 
deliberative democratic participation is. I attended to these issues in the ‘pre-phase’ by 
conducting a traditional literature review (Petticrew & Roberts, 2006). A traditional 
review, contrary to a systematic review, is a review that does not make use of 
systematic methods of inquiry but still aims at providing an overview of a field, 
concept, or phenomenon. I used the ‘reference method’ to guide my process. I started 
reading Gutmann and Thompson’s Democracy and Disagreement (1996), one of the 
most comprehensive formulations of deliberative democracy to date, and then 
followed the references that appeared to be significant and essential. By repeatedly 
applying this method, I gradually increased my understanding of deliberative 
democracy.  
 
In this chapter, I account for this understanding. First, I present the origin of 
deliberative democracy along with a short description of its most central 
characteristics. Second, I account for two different interpretations of deliberative 
democracy, the European view and the North American view. In this section, I account 
for their respective theoretical foundation, their different focus, and their different 
ideas of how to implement deliberative processes in existing societies. However, I also 
account for agreements that exist across the two branches. Third, I present some of the 
criticisms that theories of deliberative democracy have been facing and argue that the 
controversies underscore the need to accompany deliberative democracy with an 
education for deliberative democracy.  
 
2.1 The origin and essentials of deliberative democracy 
The deliberative conception of democracy developed during the latter period of the 




and refers to a view of democracy that places public deliberations at the center of 
democratic theory and democratic participation, a reason-giving process in which 
citizens, along with their representatives, weigh different arguments and alternatives 
against each other in order to weigh alternative courses of action. The word deliberate 
is derived from the Latin word libra and means ‘to weigh’ (Parker, 2003, p. 80). 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, scholars of political philosophy began to criticize 
contemporary liberal views of democracy along with modern democratic practices. 
There is something wrong with democracy when it is mainly understood as an arena 
where fixed preferences compete against each other via mechanisms of aggregation, 
and when democratic participation is primarily defined by the practice of voting 
followed by majority rule (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Chambers, 2003; Gutmann 
& Thompson, 2004; Held, 2006; Dryzek, 2010; Chappell, 2012). They argued that by 
limiting democratic participation to the process of selecting representatives, the people 
is not involved enough in the governing of their own society. Furthermore, it 
contributes toward making the people uniformed and biased (Held, 2006; Fishkin, 
2009; Chappell, 2012). They also argued that this view fails to sufficiently address the 
complex issues of pluralism, moral disagreement, and democratic legitimacy 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Bohman, 1998; Habermas, 1998; Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2004; Dryzek, 2010; Chappell, 2012). In relation to democratic legitimacy, 
majority rule is insufficient because decisions based upon it can only be said to 
represent the will of the ‘winners’ and not the will of the people (Bohman, 1998; 
Habermas, 1998; Eriksen & Weigård, 2003). Regarding moral disagreement, the 
practice of voting is inadequate because to only allow the people to select among pre-
established alternatives means that the many different viewpoints, arguments, and 
positions existing in society are not taken into consideration (Gutmann & Thompson, 
1996; 2004). Contrary to the voting-centered view of democracy, they argued for 
public deliberations to be placed at the center of democratic theory and democratic 
practice. By focusing on the communicative process of reason-giving that precedes 
voting, a period during which different positions and alternatives are thoroughly 




society, pluralism and moral disagreements can be more seriously addressed, and the 
legitimacy of democratic decisions can be enhanced.  
 
By the mid-1990s, deliberative democracy had become so influential that there was 
talk of a deliberative turn in democratic theory (Dryzek, 2002; 2010). Some of the 
most comprehensive formulations were articulated during this period, by scholars such 
as John Dryzek (Discursive Democracy), Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson 
(Democracy and Disagreement), and Jürgen Habermas (Between Facts and Norms). 
Since then, the interest in deliberative democracy has only continued to increase with a 
constant growth in publications devoted to discussing the theoretical foundation of it, 
empirical studies investigating practical implications of it, and actual political 
practices demonstrating it. With such an expansion, however, comes the end of 
comprehensive models and the deliberative conception is nowadays mostly developed 
by smaller contributions from a growing number of scholars and researchers (Dryzek, 
2010).  
 
2.2 Two branches of deliberative democracy 
Deliberative democracy developed in two different branches, the European branch and 
the North American branch, and can broadly be divided accordingly. The European 
view is referred to as such based upon the centrality of Jürgen Habermas’ theory, but is 
also represented by scholars located outside of Europe, such as John Dryzek. The 
North American view is based upon John Rawls’ political liberalism and notion of 
justice, and is represented by scholars such as Amy Gutmann, Dennis Thompson, 
James Fishkin, and Joshua Cohen. Both approaches see public deliberation as the 
solution to modern-day democratic challenges but have different starting points for 
arriving at this solution (Chappell, 2012). They also have slightly different approaches 








2.2.1 Habermas (the European view)  
Habermas is one of the most influential theorists of deliberative democracy. However, 
he seldom uses the phrase deliberative democracy but instead tends to use terms such 
as deliberative politics, procedural mode of democracy, and discursive democracy. His 
formulation of deliberative democracy is based upon two (historic) democratic models, 
the liberal model and the republican model.     
 
The liberal model of democracy  
The liberal model of democracy stems from the Enlightenment (Held, 2006). It grew 
out of the process in which the people challenged the position and power of the church 
on one side, and of absolute monarchies on the other, and demanded freedom of choice 
and the opportunity to pursue life as they saw fit according to their own preferences in 
religious, economic, and political affairs. For the liberal model, however, the question 
has always been how to reconcile the centrality of individual rights with the concept of 
the state as a structure of power. How can individuals pursuing their own private 
interest reach collective decisions about their shared society? Many historic 
philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbs, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill, contributed in 
the construction of a solution to this problem. They argued that authority was to be 
given by the people to the government for pursuing the interest of the governed. The 
people should select their own governors who in turn should represent the people and 
their interests, and if these interests were not met, the people should then dispose of 
the government in question and select a new one. This paved the way for modern 
liberalism and representative government. As modern societies continued to develop, 
so did the formalization and institutionalization of liberal and representative 
governing, both in theory and in practice (Held, 2006). Today, the liberal model is 
often considered the prototype of democracy.  
 
According to Habermas (1996), however, the liberal interpretation contains some 
problematic aspects. First, the view of the democratic process, as a power struggle 
between different competing private interests where citizens select the 




is problematic. It means that the state only will be a compromise between different 
competing interests, and not a constituted whole. Furthermore, the centrality of 
individual rights and the focus of allowing citizens to live life as they see fit without 
interference, creates a distance between the private and the public that is too great. 
According to Habermas (1996), this makes the liberal model struggle with the 
essential democratic aspect of how to construct a common will for the society as a 
whole. In order to address these problems, he turns to the republican model.  
   
The republican model of democracy  
The republican model is the classic model of democracy that flourished in ancient 
Greece and that is found in the writings of Plato and Aristotle (Eriksen & Weigård, 
2003; Held, 2006). It had a revival during the 11th century in Italy and during the 
Renaissance and is found in the works of Rousseau. However, it was later replaced by 
the liberal model. In this view, the democratic process is defined as a process of public 
discourses or deliberations in which every citizen has an equal right to speak their 
mind, where the decisions made derive from the better argument, and where the aim is 
to formulate a collective will based on the common good (Held, 2006).  
 
According to Habermas (1996), this model preserves the original meaning of 
democracy in terms of the institutionalization of a public use of reasons exercised by 
autonomous citizens striving to construct a collective will. However, it is not without 
problems, especially not in relation to modern pluralistic societies. In ancient Greece, 
the deliberations and the reasons used were grounded in an already established cultural 
consensus. The creation of the collective will was therefore rather unproblematic 
because citizens largely shared the same values. Today, however, this is less likely, 
which means that getting people to agree with one another is more challenging. 
Furthermore, in the Greek communities, the private sphere and the state were closely 
connected, and private interests were often the same as public interests. Thus, while 
Habermas (1996) argues that the liberal model presents a view of the private and the 
public as too far apart, he also argues that the republican model presents a view of 




(1996; 1998) strives to find a suitable balance between the positive aspects and the 
problematic features of these two classical models. In many ways, his conception of 
deliberative democracy can therefore be understood as an integration of the liberal 
model and the republican model.   
 
Deliberative democracy  
When formulating his notion of deliberative democracy, Habermas (1996) takes the 
republican view of the democratic process as a process of public deliberation in which 
autonomous citizens use reasons to construct a collective will, and locates it at the 
center of his model. By this, he presents a more harmonious view of democracy than 
what the liberal model offers.   
   
However, as shown, the republican model contains some problematic features in 
relation to modern pluralistic societies. First, public deliberations and public decisions 
cannot be grounded in an already established cultural consensus. In order to solve this 
problem, Habermas turns to the idea of rationality, although not the positivistic 
interpretation of rationality of the early and mid-20th century as the product of certain 
scientific methods, but as the product of a subject-to-subject communicative process 
(Rehg, 1998; Eriksen & Weigård, 2003). Habermas refers to this as communicative 
rationality. A communicative rationality is reached when people make true statements, 
have sincere intensions, and where the impact implied by the statement is right in 
regard to the normative context in question (Eriksen & Weigård, 2003, p. 36; 
Chappell, 2012, p. 54). This allows people to create their own rationality and to reach 
a higher level of inter-subjectivity that spans across cultural differences, and it allows 
them to fabricate their own institutions, norms, and laws (Habermas, 1998; Eriksen & 
Weigård, 2003). Furthermore, by ensuring that everyone cable of making a relevant 
contribution is included in the process, that everyone has an equal voice and is allowed 
to speak freely without internal or external constraint, and that the process is free of 
coherence (the ideal speech situation) (Chappell, 2012, p. 27), the norms and laws 





A second problematic aspect of the republican model is that direct participation in 
public deliberations seems unrealistic today. Modern societies are too large to permit 
everyone to participate directly in the making of every decision. Furthermore, it seems 
unreasonable to demand that citizens devote such large portion of their everyday life to 
democratic participation. Therefore, parliament and representation are necessary parts 
of modern democracies (Habermas, 1998). However, in order to preserve the 
democratic ideal of an active public realm of discussions, Habermas (1998) locates 
democratic deliberations within the public realm as well as in parliament. What he 
envisions is a weaker, or wilder, public realm of discussions generating the (many) 
more or less rational public opinion(s). The deliberations in the wild public are 
accompanied with lower criteria in relation to the ideal speech situation, in order to 
include more citizens, voices, arguments, and positions. Will-formation, on the other 
hand, is located within parliament. These deliberations are coupled with stricter 
criteria, which makes them less “wild” and places them closer to the ideal speech 
situation. Thus, in Habermas’ version of deliberative democracy, public deliberations 
serve as opinion-formation while deliberations inside parliament are associated with 
decision-making. It is crucial, however, that the representatives pay close attention to 
the people’s opinions, consider them and explicitly respond to them when making their 
decisions (Habermas, 1998). 
 
Habermas’ model of deliberative democracy, based on the placement of deliberations 
in the public realm as well as in parliament, has become known as the ‘two-track 
model’. Furthermore, the focus on the development of a complex and abstract social 
theory is an important characteristic of the Habermasian model and for the European 
view that stands in contrast to the North American approach.   
 
2.2.2 The North American view  
Contrary to Habermas and other scholars representing the European view, scholars 
within the North American school of thought have been less interested in developing 
elaborate social theories of deliberative democracy. Instead, they have studied micro-




theories of deliberative democracy. Furthermore, the theoretical foundation they use 
differs from that of Habermas. Whereas Habermas draws on two traditional models of 
democracy, the liberal model and the republican model, scholars of the North 
American view draw on the work of John Rawls and his notion of justice.    
 
Rawls asked the central democratic question of how a deeply pluralistic society can 
reach stable agreements to collective problems (Chappell, 2012). How can citizens 
who follow different doctrines of beliefs and have different conceptions of the good, 
make collective decisions in public matters? His answer to this question was that they 
should strive for an overlapping consensus. An overlapping consensus is reached when 
citizens can accept a norm, policy, or law based on their own competing, yet 
reasonable, comprehensive doctrine. In order to do so, however, citizens need to strive 
to use arguments that are acceptable to other reasonable citizens regardless of which 
doctrine they follow. Thus, they should strive to transform their private moral 
positions into public values that can withstand the test of scrutiny. Rawls argued that 
this process should take place in the public space (Chappell, 2012).  
 
Gutmann and Thompson  
Two of the most influential scholars representing the North American view are Amy 
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson. They continue where Rawls left off and in two 
highly influential works, ‘Democracy and disagreement’ and ‘Why deliberative 
democracy’, they argue that the best way to handle moral disagreements is by 
discussing them in public. Furthermore, as they provide arguments for why this is so, 
they simultaneously articulate criteria for how such deliberations should unfold.     
 
There are different types of moral disagreements in modern societies (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 1996). One type is moral disagreement over scarce resources. Some 
resources only exist in limited amounts, which means that not everyone can have an 
equal share or not have as much as they want. Another source of moral disagreement is 
disagreement over incompatible values. A common example is the case of abortion 




the unborn child. Both positions are morally justifiable but they cannot coexist 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). Gutmann and Thompson’s (1996; 2004) position is 
that all types of moral disagreements should be addressed through public deliberations, 
in which citizens and their representatives provide reasons and arguments for the 
different positions they hold and courses of action they suggest. This will solve some 
moral disagreements simply by virtue of providing for a better-informed public. Yet, 
even in cases where deliberations do not solve the moral conflict, the process is still 
valuable, because, it helps clarify what the disagreement is about and it helps citizens 
recognize the moral position and merit of the opponent’s claim. In the end, this will 
increase the likelihood that the decision made will be accepted, even when it is the 
product of a vote. Based on arguments such as these, Gutmann and Thompson (1996; 
2004) argue that public deliberations is the best way to deal with moral disagreements 
in pluralistic societies.  
 
In order to live up to their potential, however, public deliberations need to be framed 
with certain criteria. According to Gutmann and Thompson (1996), both procedural 
criteria (criteria for the deliberative process) and substantial criteria (restrictions on 
moral positions) are needed. The most fundamental procedural criterion is the reason-
giving requirement. Citizens and their representatives should provide each other with 
reasons for why they prefer one course of action to another. However, it is also vital 
that they strive to formulate these preferences in terms that are acceptable to other 
reasonable citizens, and that they are willing to listen to arguments presented by other 
similarly public oriented citizens. Gutmann & Thompson (1996; 2004) refers to this as 
the principle of reciprocity. Moreover, the reasons they use should be accessible to all, 
comprehensible and publicly stated, and address everyone affected by the decision. 
Finally, Gutmann and Thompson (2004) also stipulate that decisions made should be 
binding for some time, yet always open to re-investigation in the future. The purpose 






Substantial criteria, on the other hand, refers to restrictions on moral positions and 
democratic decisions. According to Gutmann and Thompson (1996), citizens have 
some predefined rights that are off limits to the democratic process, rights that cannot 
be taken away from them even through a democratic process. In ‘Democracy and 
disagreement’, they define three such rights: basic liberty, basic opportunity, and fair 
opportunity. Citizens should strive to make decisions (and use arguments) without 
violating each other’s possibility to live life as they see fit or depriving each other of 
the opportunity to do so. Furthermore, if a decision made has this effect, that decision 
should be considered unjust and illegitimate. The inclusion of substantial principles 
distinguishes their notion of deliberative democracy from Habermas’, which relies 
solely on procedural principles. In Habermas’ (1996; 1998) version, there are no 
epistemic restrictions on arguments, positions, or decisions. Instead, as long as the 
flow of relevant information has not been obscured, the decisions made should be 
regarded as reasonable and legitimate (Habermas, 1996). As long as the process 
follows the procedural guidelines, the decisions made are just and legitimate, in a 
democratic sense (Habermas, 1998). Gutmann and Thompson (1996) is critical of this 
aspect. 
 
Jürgen Habermas writes that “all contents, no matter how fundamental the action norm involved may be, 
must be made to depend on real discourses”… Habermas seems to imply that a provisionally justifiable 
resolution of moral conflicts in politics depends solely on satisfying the conditions of deliberation… 
Habermas and other discourse theorists try to avoid this implication by, in effect, building guarantees of 
basic liberty and opportunity into the ideal conditions of deliberation (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 17). 
 
The problem Gutmann and Thompson (1996) have with a purely procedural 
formulation of deliberative democracy is that it does not provide citizens with enough 
protection in terms of their basic individual rights. In their view, these rights are above 
the democratic process and to guarantee that they are not violated, we need substantial 
principles. This emphasis on individual values make Gutmann and Thompson’s (1996; 
2004) formulation of deliberative democracy more liberal than Habermas’, which in 





The focus on mid-level deliberations  
A second difference between the North American view and the European view is their 
respective focus. While scholars representing the European view have focused on the 
development of a grand social theory, scholars of the North American view have 
focused on the development of a ‘mid-level’ theory (Chappell, 2012).  
 
Scholars of the North American view have developed their conceptions of deliberative 
democracy by investigating real life examples of mid-level public deliberations such 
as the activity of civic associations, official town meetings, court deliberations, and 
statements from country leaders and the debates they generate. They embrace virtually 
any setting in which citizens come together on a regular basis to reach collective 
decisions about political issues – governmental as well as nongovernmental 
institutions. For instance, Gutmann and Thompson (1996; 2004) use a vast selection of 
real-life examples, spanning from cases such as court decisions to allow states to ban 
abortions in the third trimester to reason-given processes in which President Bush 
argued for an invasion of Iraq.  
 
Fishkin (2009), however, has gone one step further compared to Gutmann and 
Thompson and instead of analyzing only real life examples, he has created his own, 
known as deliberative polls. A deliberative poll is a real life gathering of a random 
sample of citizens with the aim of identifying how the public would think about an 
issue if they had the time and opportunity to think about it. The randomly selected 
sample is first asked a number of questions on the issue at hand. Their answer 
constitutes their original opinion and the baseline poll. They are then invited to a 
gathering over a weekend to discuss the issue further. A moderator leads the 
deliberations, experts on the topic are present, and a carefully balanced briefing 
material is handed out. The deliberations are also televised. Following the 
deliberations, the sample is once again asked to answer the original poll of questions. 
The change in opinion is thought to represent the sample’s considered opinion. 
Furthermore, Fishkin (2009) argues that because the sample is randomly selected and 




representative. Thus, the sample’s considered opinion is also the public’s considered 
opinion. 
 
According to Fishkin (2009), the problem of modern democracy is that the public is 
not participating actively enough and that it is uninformed. This makes for a public 
with little or biased information that can easily be manipulated. Instead, he wants the 
public to participate more actively, evaluate competing arguments, and in the end cast 
reflected and considered votes. According to Fishkin (2009), deliberative polls is a 
way to achieve all of this. It provides citizens with an opportunity to be selected for 
active participation, and because the process is televised, it gives the general public the 
opportunity to become better informed. Finally, it gives the governors of society an 
insight into the public’s opinion. Deliberative polls is a real-life example of how one 
can implement processes of deliberations in a real-life democracy. This leads us to the 
next topic: deliberative democracy and the representative system.   
 
2.2.3 Deliberative democracy and the representative system  
Theories of deliberative democracy have been criticized for being unrealistic and 
difficult to implement in real democratic societies. The size of modern societies makes 
it virtually impossible for every citizen to receive an equal amount of time to speak 
their mind concerning every decision that has to be made. Furthermore, not all 
problems are solved with deliberation and they can (often) lead to standoffs. Most 
scholars of deliberative democracy therefore argue that the representative system, 
along with practices of voting, are necessary in some way. The three formulations of 
deliberative democracy presented here, the two North American ones and Habermas’, 
have slightly different approaches to how deliberative processes should be 
implemented in existing democracies and of what their main function should be.  
 
Fishkin (2009) argues that deliberative processes (deliberative polls) should fill two 
functions. First, they should make citizens better informed, less easily manipulated, 
and more capable of casting reflected and considered votes. Second, they should 




on specific issues. Gutmann and Thompson (1996; 2004), on the other hand, have been 
less clear on this matter. In their work, they provide detailed analysis of a vast 
selection of real-life deliberative examples such as small mini-publics where the 
participants make actual decisions, mid-level mini-publics that serve as opinion-
formation, and deliberations on a national level where state leaders address the larger 
public. This has helped them to develop specific criteria for public deliberations. 
However, it has also made them slightly inexplicit regarding the role and function of 
such deliberations. Should they generate public opinions or should they serve as 
decision-making procedures? Should they primarily take place in smaller mini-public 
samples or should they be used for interactions on a larger national level, and if so, 
should every citizen serve as one voice or should groups speak on behalf of 
individuals? It has even made Fishkin (2009) criticize one of their examples, the case 
of an Oregon health care consultation, because it lacks a random representative 
sample. Now, there are different functions for public deliberations and if the aim is not 
to arrive at a representative opinion, having a representative sample is perhaps not as 
crucial as Fishkin argues. However, the mere fact that Gutmann and Thompson are the 
object of such criticism is an indicator that their position regarding the role and 
function of public deliberations in representative governing is a little too vague.  
 
In Habermas’ (1998) two-track model, deliberations are vital in both decision-making 
and in opinion-formation. Deliberations in the wild public, among citizens, are 
supposed to generate the many more or less rational public opinions. Deliberations 
inside parliament among representatives, on the other hand, are linked with decision 
making. At first glance, having public deliberations serve as opinion formation seems 
similar to what Fishkin proposes. However, Habermas (1998) is critical of the North 
American focus on ‘mini-publics’. In his view, this focus can disconnect deliberative 
democracy from the bigger ideal of having an active public generating opinions and 
creating issues, contrary to solely having citizens state their opinion on pre-determined 
issues. Habermas (1998) envisions a public that, on its own, organizes deliberations 
anywhere possible, that is engaged in public matters, and that influences the 




scholars representing the mid-level approach have criticized Habermas and the 
‘macro-level approach’ for failing to provide enough guidelines for how and where the 
public deliberations are supposed to unfold. According to them, this makes their 
approach more realizable. At the same time though, they have also started to gradually 
incorporate macro-level elements in their formulations of deliberative democracy. For 
instances, in the book “Deliberative systems”, John Parkinson and Jane Mansbridge 
(2012) argue in favor of smaller instances of deliberative forums, along with non-
deliberative processes, being conceived of as clusters of deliberative processes in a 
larger deliberative system. For example, groups working with an agenda trying to 
promote their own interest might at first glance fall short of the criterion of being 
deliberative in a discussion, but placed within a larger picture, they can act as a 
statement or as an argument input in a larger public debate.  
 
2.2.4 Overarching agreements across the two branches 
Despite the differences between the two branches such as their different theoretical 
foundation and focus, the disagreement on whether to include substantial criteria or 
not, and the different ideas of how to (best) implement deliberative processes in the 
representative system, there are vital aspects scholars within the both camps largely 
agree upon. 
 
First, they all agree that public deliberations should be placed at the heart of 
democracy and that they are the solution to many challenges of modern-day 
democracies. Voting per se does not disappear, but is given a more complex and richer 
interpretation. Voting-centered views see democracy as an arena where fixed 
preferences compete via fair mechanisms of aggregation, while scholars of 
deliberative democracy focus on the communicative process that precedes voting 
(Chambers, 2003). Furthermore, they agree that public deliberations provide a more 
legitimate way to deal with questions of moral disagreements and pluralism, and that 
they increase the legitimacy of democratic decisions. It is not majority rule per se that 
gives democracy its legitimacy but the process of giving defensible reasons, 




such as these, scholars of deliberative democracy therefore claim that public 
deliberations increase the overall quality of democracy (Held, 2006). 
 
Second, they also largely agree on the core procedural features of a public 
deliberation. Habermas argues that it is important that everyone who is able to make a 
relevant contribution be included and have an equal voice, that everyone can speak 
freely and honestly without internal or external deception or constraint, and that 
everyone should use arguments relevant to the issue at hand (Chappell, 2012; Eriksen 
& Weigård, 2003). According to Gutmann and Thompson (1996; 2004), participants 
should strive to formulate their preferences in terms that are acceptable to other 
reasonable citizens while they simultaneously strive to listen to the arguments 
presented by other similarly oriented individuals. Finally, Fishkin (2009) claims that it 
is essential that reasonable, accurate, and relevant information is included, that 
arguments offered by one perspective are answered after consideration of the other 
perspective, and that the arguments and reasons presented are considered on their 
merit regardless of which participant offers them. Thus, according to scholars of both 
branches, a public deliberation is a discussion in which everybody can participate 
equally, where different points of view are presented and supported with reasons that 
everyone can understand and accept, and where they all listen to each other and reflect 
upon the different arguments put forth. 
 
Third, scholars of both branches also agree to a high extent on the main purpose of 
public deliberations: they should be directed towards some form of collective will-
formation, or opinion-formation related to a will-formation. For a public deliberation 
to be pertinent in the sense of “relevant to deliberative democracy”, it has to involve a 
strive towards some sort of solution to a common problem (Habermas, 1998; Gutmann 
& Thompson, 2004). This is the political aspect of a public deliberation, that the 
participants are in some way trying to reach an agreement to act upon, because, a 
discussion could be deliberative without being connected to democracy. In a 
philosophical deliberation, for instance, participants use arguments and reasons in a 




collective decision to act upon. As shown above, however, there are disagreements on 
whether public deliberations among citizens should be connected to actual processes 
of decision-making. For example, both Habermas (1998) and Fishkin (2009) mainly 
argue that public deliberations are opinion-formation and the actual process of 
decision-making is located elsewhere. Furthermore, taking into account Parkinson and 
Mansbridge‘s (2012) perspective, a process that does not meet the high standards of a 
democratic deliberation could still be considered relevant to deliberative democracy on 
a larger scale. Yet, if we look at the ultimate prototype of a democratic deliberation, 
scholars within both branches argue that this includes striving towards collective will-
formation in some sense. 
 
2.3 Criticism of deliberative democracy 
In the final section of this chapter, I account for two types of criticism of deliberative 
democracy, one claiming that it is flawed as a theory of democracy and another, 
claiming that it is utopian and, if not impossible, at least very difficult to implement in 
a real democratic society.  
 
Claimers of the first type can choose either to do as Iris Marion Young (2000) does 
and reformulate the theory of deliberative democracy to counteract for the flaws 
identified, or do as Chantal Mouffe (2000) does and argue against it altogether. 
According to Young (1996; 2000), many formulations of deliberative democracy 
include structural inequalities. The type of communication advocated favors certain 
types of citizens, particularly white men with higher education, and disfavors others, 
particularly women and minorities. Young (2000) therefore argues that deliberative 
democracy needs to operate with other, or additional, criteria in order to counter the 
unjust conditions that exist in real-life democracies. For instance, she (1996) suggests 
that communication types such as greeting and rhetoric should be included. If citizens 
are to resolve conflicts together, they need to establish a relationship of trust and 
respect, and greetings is a way to do this, especially when citizens differ in many 
ways. Rhetoric is used to broaden the idea of what rational speech is and of what type 




view, many formulations of deliberative democracy operate with a clear distinction 
between emotions and rational thinking. However, just because something is said with 
anger, hurt or passion does not make it any less true, she argues. By focusing on 
aspects such as these, Young (1996; 2000) argues that more types of reasons, 
perspectives, and in the end, citizens could be included in public deliberations, and 
thus, that the structural inequalities existing in theories of deliberative democracy 
could be weakened.   
 
According to Mouffe (1999; 2000), the main problem with deliberative democracy is 
not just that it excludes certain types of people from democratic participation, but that 
its focus on rational arguments and agreements (consensus) suppress any real 
possibility for disagreement. By this, the most fundamental and essential aspect of 
democracy – disagreement and confrontation – is left out of the equation, she argues. 
Furthermore, by leaving out the opportunity for confrontation and dissensus, 
deliberative democracy favors those in power, disfavors marginalized people, and 
conceals informal oppression. Mouffe therefore claims that deliberative democracy 
fails to address pluralism sufficiently. In order for a democratic theory to take 
pluralism seriously, she (2000) argues that the idea of a rational consensus needs to be 
abandoned along with the idea of the public sphere as a zone stripped of power 
relations. Instead of striving for consensus in public communication, she maintains, 
people should strive to 
 
 …construct the “them” in such a way that it is no longer perceived as an enemy to be destroyed, but an 
“adversary”, i.e. somebody whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend those ideas we do not put 
into question. This is the real meaning of liberal democratic tolerance... (Mouffe, 2000, p. 15).     
 
In Mouffe’s view, the very nature of politics is conflictual and it should not be 
regarded in any other way. Now, there might be some truth to the point made by 
Mouffe, but as I claim (grounded in Dryzek and Niemeyer’s (2010) argumentation) in 
“Education for deliberative democracy and the aim of consensus”, there has to be 
more to democracy than purely processes of disagreement, confrontation, and 




solutions to common problems. Herein lies one of the greatest weaknesses in Mouffe’s 
(1999; 2000) theory: it does not really provide any standards or procedures for how 
democratic decisions are to be made. Dryzek and Niemeyer (2010) point this out. 
  
…to agonists we say this: if you do not like the standards we have proposed, tell us what you will accept, 
and exactly how they differ from those of deliberative democracy. And if you refuse to specify any 
standards at all, and celebrate only disruption, then accept your diminished relevance to core questions of 
democratic theory and practice (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2010, p. 113). 
 
The second type of criticism directed towards theories of deliberative democracy is of 
a more empirical nature: deliberative democracy, although a nice ideal, is utopian and 
difficult to implement in a real society. One such criticism, the one claiming that 
modern societies are two large for every citizen to receive an equal amount of time to 
speak their mind in regard to every decision that has to be made, has already been 
accounted for above with the reference to the representative system. However, 
claimers of the second type of criticism also argue that ordinary citizens lack the 
willingness and capability to participate reflectively. Based upon empirical studies, 
they argue that theories of deliberative democracy ask too much of ordinary citizens in 
a cognitive sense (Chappell, 2012). In real-life, people tend to engage in deliberations 
with people of the same opinions rather than people with different opinions (Sunstein, 
2000). Such deliberations usually lead to a reinforcement of each individual’s initial 
opinion, based either on a desire to maintain a reputation within the group or on 
acquiring additional arguments for the initial position. Furthermore, it also makes the 
group as a whole develop an even more extreme version of that opinion (Sunstein, 
2000). Empirical data such as this do not support the promises made by deliberative 
democracy but rather suggests that ordinary citizen are swayed by things other than 
reasons, are driven by self-interest, and are reluctant to change their minds. 
Furthermore, groups do not seem to form opinions or make decisions based upon 
reflective reasoning but are instead plagued by phenomena such as groupthink, peer 
pressure, and conformity (Chappell, 2012). In response to this criticism, Fishkin 
(2009) argues that deliberative polls weigh up for many of these flaws, because they 




includes experts and a carefully balanced briefing material. However, not all public 
deliberations can receive the amount of external control that deliberative polls do.  
 
Above, I claimed that there are two ways to address the fact that deliberative 
procedures do not live up to their promises; one can either redefine the outer 
boundaries of deliberative communication (as Young does) or present an alternative 
theory of democracy (as Mouffe does). Additionally, there is a third way. If citizens 
are incapable of participating in public deliberations in the desired way, one could try 
to teach them, and this is the problem with the empirically based criticism of 
deliberative democracy, it is grounded in a static view of people as being unable to 
learn. Instead, I argue that just because someone is unable to do something does not 
mean that the individual is incapable of learning how to do it. For example, if one 
conducted studies with the aim of determining whether humans can swim, the result 
would probably be very different if one used a sample that has been taught how to 
swim in comparison with one that has not. The same can be said about deliberative 
democratic participation. If one teaches (future) citizens’ skills and values that are 
relevant for participation in public deliberation, the likelihood of them being able to 
participate would increase. The second type of criticism presented here really 
highlights the need to accompany deliberative democracy with an education for 
deliberative democracy. If one aims at developing more deliberative practices in 
exciting democracies, one should also focus on teaching future citizens how to 







3. Investigating an education for deliberative 
democracy – ‘Phase 1 – Literature review’  
Having established an understanding of deliberative democracy as a democratic 
theory, my next aim was to investigate an education for deliberative democracy. I 
started this investigation in ‘Phase 1 – Literature review’, by conducting a conceptual 
and critical literature review to identify how educational scholars describe and define 
the project ‘education for deliberative democracy’. What skills and values do they 
argue for as vital for deliberative democratic participation and do these coincide with 
the skills and values expressed by scholars of political philosophy? Furthermore, do 
they have ideas about how an education for deliberative democracy should be 
structured grounded in either empirical research or theoretical reasoning?   
 
In this chapter, I account for ‘Phase 1 – Literature review’. I begin by describing the 
concept of a conceptual and critical literature review. I then describe my process of 
working with the literature, including the process of searching the databases and article 
selection, the process of analysis, and the construction of a meaningful whole. 
Following this is a short account of the results and description of how they gave the 
next phase, ‘Phase 2 – Empirical study’, its direction and focus. Finally, I conduct a 
short discussion of the research process of the literature review.   
 
3.1 A conceptual and critical literature review  
A general aim of a literature review is to provide a researcher, a research project, or a 
research field with important information about what has been done and what needs to 
be done (Boote & Beile, 2005; Maxwell, 2006; Boote & Beile, 2006). The review I 
conducted in Phase 1 is most accurately described as a conceptual and critical 
literature review. I aimed at synthesizing the knowledge within the field of education 
for deliberative democracy in a less formalized way, in order to provide a general map 
of its main ideas, assumptions, shortages, and challenges (Petticrew & Roberts, 2006). 
Thus, I never aimed to accumulate all the results within the field, nor did I attempt to 




(Petticrew & Roberts, 2006). However, I incorporated ideas more common in a 
systematic approach, such as a semi-structured and focused search process, which 
makes this review more structured and systematic in comparison with the traditional 
review of the ’pre-phase’. 
 
3.2 Conducting the review  
My work with the literature can be divided into three separate yet overlapping stages: 
searching the database(s) and article selection, process of analysis, and the 




3.2.1 Stage 1: Searching the database(s) and article selection  
In January of 2013, I started searching the databases ERIC (Educational Resources 
Information Center), JSTOR (Journal Storage), and Google Scholar. The aim of these 
searches was to get an initial sense of the field (rapid review) (Petticrew & Roberts, 
2006). I found that JSTOR and Google Scholar were unsuccessful in detecting 
additional articles of interest compared to ERIC. I therefore decided to solely rely on 
ERIC. There is of course, the possibility that there are articles of relevance not 
detected by ERIC but it is the most comprehensive database available to educational 
researchers. One can therefore argue that searches made within it yield a sufficiently 
comprehensive selection of articles to satisfy the aim of a conceptual review. I started 
conducting the searches in ERIC in February. I employed a semi-structured process of 
trial and error, where I used numerous combinations of words and phrases I thought 
could identify articles of relevance. After a short while, however, I decided to set the 
word deliberati* as a necessary criterion and combined it with other potentially 
Table 2: Overview of 'Phase 1 - Literature review' 
                            Stage 1                              Spring/summer 2015                                Stage 2             Stage 3
             Early winter/spring 2013          Summer/fall 2013             Fall/late winter 2013
           Phase 1    
 Literature review           Searching the database (ERIC)       Organizing the ideas and 
                  and article selection:       Qualitative analysis with        writing the first draft 
                          (1200 abstracts to        a conceptual and critical      of paper 1: Education for
              99 articles to 67 articles)                      focus        deliberative democracy:  




relevant words such as education, school, democra*, classroom, dialogue, and 
discussion. This gave me 1200 peer-reviewed articles, all of which had deliberati* in 
either the abstract or the title, or as a keyword, and seemed pertinent to the review. A 
screenshot of this is presented below.    
 
Figure 1: Screenshot of searches conducted in ERIC (Educational Resources Information Center)    
 
 
Next, I wanted to reduce the number of articles to a more manageable amount. I read 
all abstracts numerous times. In this process, I used deliberati* and democra* as 
criteria for inclusion and exclusion. However, not in the same manner as I used 
deliberati* in the search process, where I used the word itself as the necessary 
criterion. This time, I used them in the form of concepts. First, I focused on whether 
the abstracts used deliberati* in the correct sense relative to democracy. What this 
means is that I included abstracts that used words such as public discourse, public 
reasoning, citizenship, political participation, and so on, even if they lacked the word 
democra*, because, I interpreted such words as closely related to (deliberative) 
democracy. At the same time, I excluded abstracts that used deliberation 
synonymously with a dialogue or discussion connected to the development of 
students’ reflective capabilities, if they lacked an explicit connection to democracy. 
Second, I focused on whether or not the abstracts addressed the project of an education 
for deliberative democracy, as I understood it (as an education preparing future 
citizens for future deliberative participation). This prompted me to exclude a number 
of abstracts that focused on the question of how to use deliberative practices in the 
governing of schools. By reading all the abstracts using these criteria, I narrowed 




99 articles using the same criteria as described above, which allowed me to further 
reduce the number of articles from 99 to 67. Thus, the final number of articles selected 
for the review was 67, all explicitly addressing an education for democracy with 
deliberation as a central aspect. As shown below in figure 2, most of them were 
published during the past decade, which indicates that the field is a relatively young 
field in an academic sense. Furthermore, the articles were spread out over a large 
number of journals, which demonstrates the need for a comprehensive map of the 
field2.  
 
Figure 2: Article distribution (67 articles)     
 
 
3.2.2 Stage 2: Process of analysis 
Having identified the articles to include in the review, my next objective was to 
analyze them and to look for systematic patterns among them (Hatch, 2002). When it 
comes to qualitative research, it is often argued that the process of analysis starts as 
soon as one starts collecting data, because, one immediately tries to understand and 
systematize the material one is working with (Hatch, 2002; Silverman, 2014; Tavory 
& Timmermans, 2014). While this is true, I conducted the more explicit analysis in 
three different readings.   
 
                                                          
2 The title of each included article is found in the reference list of the article “Education for 




The first reading was an explorative reading where I focused on finding the overall 
meaning of each article. I wanted to get an initial sense of what the articles were 
saying and to see if there were any immediate rough categories in which I could place 
the articles. I read all 67 articles from start to finish and wrote a short summary (half a 
page) of each one. I found that there were different approaches within the field. Some 
articles approached the question of an education for deliberative democracy from a 
theoretical and philosophical position where they argued either for or against 
deliberative democracy as the aim of democratic education (30 articles). Other articles 
approached it from an empirical standpoint where they used either qualitative methods 
to investigate deliberative educative practices (24 articles), or quantitative methods to 
determine the effect of such practices (13). However, beyond this I struggled to create 
any meaningful categories.  
 
For the second reading, I therefore altered my approach. This time, instead of trying to 
find the overall meaning of each article, I tried to identify smaller discourses within 
each article. I uploaded every article into the software Nvivo. Nvivo, among other 
things, allows you to highlight passages of text and organize them in ‘nodes’. Thus, 
passages one thinks represents the same discourse, theme, position, and so on, can be 
grouped together in the software. I read the articles electronically, highlighted the 
passages I thought might represent different discourses, and organized them in nodes. 
However, I (once again) struggled to organize the material in a meaningful way. 
Whereas I managed after the first reading to create only three categories, I had the 
opposite problem this time: I created too many discourses. Before having read all 67 
articles, I had generated 19 themes and discourses as divergent as form of governance 
versus way-of-life, deliberation as an aim in education, deliberation versus other forms 
of communication, the role of the teacher, where should educative deliberations 
appear, and teacher perceptions. I therefore withdrew from this approach before 
having read all the articles this way. 
 
Qualitative researchers often experience breakdowns in understanding. There are times 




2014). At this point in the review process, I had encountered such a breakdown. The 
articles seemed to address the same project (education for democracy with deliberation 
as a key aspect) but at the same time appeared too divergent to be organized in a 
meaningful way. I started questioning the process of article selection. Was the criterion 
I used not accurate enough? In trying to make sense of the ‘failed’ attempts at 
organizing the literature, I started glancing at the short summaries I wrote during the 
first reading. I noticed that most included references to specific skills and values (to be 
learned). Furthermore, many also included references to pedagogical assumptions for 
how these skills and values were to be learned. Thus, in one way or another, most 
articles seemed to address one, or both, of the two questions: ‘what should be learned’ 
and ‘how should it be learned’. This became my focus for the third reading – to look 
for answers to these two questions. I read every article and summary with the question 
‘what should be learned’ in mind, highlighting the passages of interest with a 
highlighter marker in a paper copy of each article and summary (instead of using 
Nvivo), and then followed the same procedure with the question ‘how should it be 
learned’. This resulted in a vast amount of qualitative data (highlighted passages) 
saying something about which skills and values scholars within the field emphasized 
as necessary for deliberative democratic participation, and which pedagogical 
assumptions they made concerning the development of them.   
 
3.2.3 Stage 3: Organizing the ideas and creating a meaningful 
whole 
The final stage was to organize the analyzed data into a meaningful whole (Hatch, 
2002). What did the field of education for deliberative democracy say about what 
skills and values to teach future deliberative citizens, and what did it say about how 
such an education should be carried out? In this process, I physically placed all articles 
in the three rough categories I identified during the first reading: theoretical and 
philosophical argumentations for (or against) deliberative democracy (30 articles), 
qualitative investigations of deliberative educational practices (24 articles), and 





I started with the articles in the theoretical and philosophical category. These articles 
primarily concerned the question ‘what should be learned’. They frequently 
emphasized skills such as reasoning skills, critical thinking skills, and the ability to 
listen to others as important, as well as values such as tolerance and respect. There 
were two different ways of talking about them. One group of articles (16) talked about 
them as skills and values to be used in political decision-making, while the other (14) 
talked about them in a broader sense, as a way for fellow citizens to treat each other at 
all times. From this, I claimed that there were two different conceptions of deliberative 
democracy present within the literature, one seeing it as a political ideal and one as a 
way of life. In order to decide in which category to place each article, I used the most 
typical example of each conception as a prototype and assessed the other articles 
against it. Of course, not every article suits these conceptions equally well but to a 
greater or lesser degree, they all fit one or the other. Furthermore, had there been 
articles not suited for either one, I would have considered creating additional 
conceptions. 
 
I then moved on to the articles in the second and third rough category – the 
pedagogical categories. Among them, there was an overwhelming pedagogical 
concordance on the question ‘how should it be learned’: the skills and values 
necessary for deliberative democratic participation were assumed (best) learned 
though participation in deliberative practices. More or less every article operated with 
this assumption. However, I also wanted to incorporate the question ‘what should be 
learned’ into the analysis of these articles. What skills and values did they focus on, 
and did they coincide with the skills and values emphasized by the political conception 
or the way-of-life conception found in the theoretical articles? Furthermore, were there 
any differences in educational practices related to either the the political conception or 
the way-of-life conception?  
 
Among the articles using qualitative methods (24), skills such as decision-making 
skills and explorative skills (e.g., being able to look at things from different 




noticeable similarities between these skills and the skills emphasized by the political 
conception. However, the ‘qualitative articles’ often relied on a quite broad and vague 
definition of deliberation. My conclusion was therefore that connecting them to the 
political conception seemed farfetched. I made a short attempt at constructing 
additional conceptions of deliberative democracy based on the qualitative articles but 
was unable to find a systematic pattern. Instead, I reached the conclusion that the 
qualitative articles relied on such broad definitions of deliberation that the connection 
to deliberative democracy as a theoretical concept became unclear. I then went on to 
the articles using quantitative methods (13). Among them, the desired outcome was 
frequently described as general political skills, knowledge, and values. Thus, even 
though they emphasized different skills and values compared to the articles using 
qualitative methods, the unclear connection to deliberative democracy as a theoretical 
conception was apparent here as well. Thus, their connection to deliberative 
democracy as a theoretical concept was also unclear. 
 
3.3 Results and conclusion 
In qualitative research, it is often difficult to distinguish where one stage of the 
research process concludes and another begins. I have therefore already presented 
some of the results in the description of how I organized the literature. I identified two 
different theoretical conceptions of deliberative democracy, a political conception and 
a way-of-life conception. Furthermore, I found that articles empirically investigating 
educational practices tend to rely on general definitions of deliberative democracy and 
deliberations, which makes it difficult to link them with either conception found in the 
theoretical articles. This is discussed in detail in the article “Education for deliberative 
democracy: Mapping the field”. For now, let us focus on the conclusions that I used to 
give the project’s next phase, ‘Phase 2 – Empirical study’, its direction.  
 
First, I consider the field’s tendency to construct new conceptions of deliberation and 
deliberative democracy problematic. For example, the way-of-life conception is a 
reconstruction of deliberative democracy based on John Dewey’s notion of 




versions, but within the field of political philosophy, Dewey is rarely, if ever, used as a 
source of inspiration. I argue that the construction of alternative versions of 
deliberative democracy (only) contributes toward making the field ambiguous and it 
becomes difficult to compare the different articles to each other.  
 
The problem of not solidly grounding educational articles in the political conception of 
deliberative democracy is even more evident, however, in articles empirically 
investigating deliberative practices. They often rely on such a broad and vague 
definition of deliberation that the connection to deliberative democracy as a theoretical 
concept becomes unclear. The result is that deliberation becomes a conception in its 
own right, in the form of deliberative pedagogy, not necessarily connected to 
deliberative democracy. The problem is that when it is argued that the pedagogical 
method of deliberation fosters certain skills, it is an open question as to what makes 
them relevant for deliberative democracy. Thus, a gap has been created between the 
theoretically driven articles and articles empirically investigating pedagogical 
practices, where the latter fails to be of immediate relevance to questions of an 
education for deliberative democracy. My aim for the next phase of the project was to 
address this problem. I wanted to produce empirical research that was of immediate 
relevance to questions of education for deliberative democracy.  
 
3.4 Methodological considerations  
Before moving on, however, let us pause and reflect over the research process of the 
literature review, because, it can serve as an example of the projects underlying 
constructivist approach, where (scientific) knowledge is understood as a product of 
construction rather than a product of absolute ‘truth’ (Hatch, 2002).  
 
For example, during the process of article selection, I used the criterion of whether or 
not ‘deliberati* was used in the correct sense relative to democracy’, to determine if an 
article should be included or excluded. However, in doing this, I relied on the 
understanding of deliberative democracy that I had developed during the ‘pre-phase’. 




theory largely affected my perception of the articles I considered relevant to the review 
and those I considered irrelevant. Furthermore, during the process of analysis, I 
identified two conceptions of deliberative democracy within the theoretical articles. 
However, without a prior knowledge of the deliberative conception and of Dewey’s 
conception, identifying these would have been difficult. Thus, my pre-established 
understanding of different democratic conceptions influenced what I was capable of 
identifying in the material. Moreover, had my prior knowledge included other 
conceptual perceptions of democracy, perhaps I would have identified those instead. A 
final example of how I steered the review and the knowledge produced in a certain 
direction, is when I concluded that the political conception was the ‘correct’ 
interpretation of deliberative democracy and that the way-of-life conception was the 
‘incorrect’ one. Once again, in doing this, I relied on my already established 
understanding of deliberative democracy as established during the project’s ‘pre-
phase’.   
 
These examples illustrate how I (as a researcher) affected, steered, and constructed the 
product of knowledge produced in the review. However, the fact that a researcher 
constructs the knowledge does not have to be a problem. The important thing is to 
provide users of the information with enough insight into the process of knowledge 
construction, to allow them to evaluate whether the choices made and conclusions 
reached are credible, reliable, and trustworthy (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Based 
upon this line of reasoning, I argue that while I could have made other decisions along 
the way, such as using other criteria for article selection, analyzing the articles with 
different questions, and organizing the literature in a different way, I still paint a 
picture of the field of education for deliberative democracy that is reasonable, credible, 




4. Investigating an education for deliberative 
democracy – ‘Phase 2 – Empirical study’   
Having conducted a literature review of the field of education for deliberative 
democracy and identified a gap within it, my next aim was to bridge this gap by 
producing empirical pedagogical research of immediate relevance to questions related 
to an education for deliberative democracy. I did this by conducting an empirical 
study. 
 
The empirical study that is Phase 2 can be divided into four different stages. In the first 
stage, I developed the design, applied for approval from NSD (Norwegian Centre for 
Research Data), and contacted schools and teachers. In the second stage, I collected 
and transcribed the data. In the third stage, I conducted the first set of analysis, 
organized the data a meaningful way, and wrote the first draft of the article “Education 
for deliberative democracy: A typology of classroom discussions”. In the fourth stage, 
I conducted a secondary set of analysis and wrote the first draft of the article 
“Education for deliberative democracy and the aim of consensus”. A visualization of 
this process is presented below. In this chapter, I account for these four stages. In 
addition, I also conduct two short discussions, one concerning ethical considerations 
made during the study and one concerning the validity and reliability of the results. 
 
 
Table 3: Overview of 'Phase 2 - Empirical study' 
                            
                                     Stage 1                                                    Stage 2                            
                          Winter/spring 2014                       Spring/summer/fall 2014   
                       Collecting data from four 
         Developing the design, seeking approval          cases/participting teachers in the form of 
          from NSD, and recruiting participating schools       classroom observations, qualitative interviews, 
           Phase 2                                    and teachers                     and informal conversations,
  Empirical study                          and transcribing the data
  
                                     Stage 3                                                    Stage 4                            
                            Fall/winter 2014                          Spring/summer 2015   
    Conducting the first set of analysis and writing    Conducting secondary analysis and writing the      
         the first draft of paper 2: Education for    first draft of paper 3: Education for deliberative 
        deliberative democracy: a typology of classroom             democracy and the aim of consensus




4.1 Stage 1: Developing the design, seeking approval, 
and contacting schools    
I started working with the first stage of ‘Phase 2 – Empirical study’ in January 2014. 
During this stage, I worked with three aspects of the study simultaneously: developing 
the design, getting approval from NSD, and recruiting participating schools and 
teachers. These aspects are closely related to each other. The approval from NSD is 
based on a sound and accurate description of the design as is the recruiting of teachers 
suitable for the project.  
 
4.1.1 Developing the design  
In an empirical study, it is common to make use of a literature review for designing the 
project. The review I conducted revealed that the field of education for deliberative 
democracy contains a gap where articles empirically investigating practices related to 
an education for deliberative democracy fail to ground their work sufficiently enough 
in the theory of deliberative democracy. This precludes them from immediate 
relevance to an education for deliberative democracy. However, the review revealed 
that there is an overwhelming pedagogical agreement within the field – future citizens 
learn the skills and values necessary for deliberative democracy by participating in 
democratic deliberations. I located these findings at the core of my study – the gap as 
the overall aim, and the pedagogical agreement as an underlying assumption.    
 
Based on the pedagogical assumption of the field, I decided that the focus for Phase 2 
would be to investigate classroom discussions through the lens of deliberative 
democracy. However, so as not to fall into the same problematic position I claim many 
other empirical studies in the field do – namely, the loss of their connection to 
deliberative democracy as a democratic theory – I carefully chose a formulation of 
classroom deliberation clearly and solidly grounded in the theory of deliberative 
democracy as my theoretical framework, that of Tomas Englund (2006). According to 
Englund (2006), deliberative communication is communication in which (a) different 




there is tolerance and respect for the concrete other, and participants listen to each 
other’s arguments; and (c) there are elements of collective-will formation, a desire to 
reach consensus or a temporary agreement. Furthermore, (d) authorities and traditional 
views can be challenged and there are opportunities to challenge one’s own tradition, 
and (e) there is a scope for students to deliberate without teacher control (p. 512). I 
used this formulation as a theoretical framework during data collection and data 
analysis.  
 
I also, however, wanted to keep the broad and explorative approach I used during the 
earlier phases of the project. I wanted to be able to spend a few weeks with each 
participating teacher to follow them around, observe their classroom practices, conduct 
formal interviews, engage in informal conversations and not be restricted to a pre-
determined number of observations or interviews. I wanted stay with each teacher for 
as long as I found necessary to yield data of interest (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). 
Furthermore, I wanted to be able to go back and forth between the different 
components of the study and to gradually narrow the focus as the study progressed. I 
therefore framed the study as a short-term ethnography. The idea behind ethnography 
as a research approach is that one gains valuable insight into a phenomenon by 
spending time in a field or a context using different (qualitative) methods. The 
difference between a traditional ethnography and a short-term ethnography is mainly 
that a short-term ethnography is temporally constrained, that is, it is carried out in a 
shorter, more compressed time period (Pink & Morgan, 2013). This approach allowed 
me to be explorative within the boundaries of Englund’s (2006) theoretical framework 
and to approach each teacher as a case (Brinkmann, 2012). 
 
Within this broad and explorative approach, however, it is possible to distinguish 
specific qualitative methods such as qualitative classroom observations, semi-
structured interviews, and informal conversations. During classroom observations, I 
revealed to the students my role and my reason for being there. However, I did not 
take on the role of the teacher but remained on ‘the outside’ seated in the back of the 




of the group. The observations can therefore be categorized as partial participant 
observations (Merriam, 2009). In the methodologically of empirical research, the role 
of the observer is considered important because the presence of the observer might 
affect the participants and the data generated (Hatch, 2002; Merriam, 2009). As true as 
this might be concerning the validity and trustworthiness of the results, the important 
thing is not necessarily to ascertain whether the data are affected but instead that the 
data are used appropriately. During observations, I used a pen and a notebook in which 
I described the classroom practice I witnessed, wrote down personal reflections, 
possible analytical perspectives and further directions of the study. I also used two 
sound recorders to capture the classroom discussions in detail. The interviews I 
conducted with the teachers were semi-structured interviews. I used open-ended 
questions, or broad topics of conversation to explore the teachers’ opinions, 
interpretations, and viewpoints (Hatch, 2002; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Merriam, 
2009). Each data collection period began with a ‘first interview’ in order to (1) get to 
know the teachers in question and to establish a good relationship with them, (2) 
describe the overarching project ‘Education for deliberative democracy’ and ‘Phase 2 
– Empirical study’, and (3) discuss Englund’s (2006) criteria. Furthermore, in addition 
to the numerous informal conversations I engaged in, I conducted a second interview, 
which I grounded in questions developed during the process of data collection. The 
combination of interviews and informal conversations allowed me to record some 
conversations in detail, because I used a sound recorder during interviews, and to 
follow up on some ideas immediately. 
 
4.1.2 Seeking approval 
I applied for approval from NSD by describing the project similarly to the way I have 
described it above. I explained that I was going to use a pen and a notebook along with 
sound recorders. I opted not to use video recordings based on ethical assessments of 
aspects that might have made the process of data collection more difficult. 
Furthermore, I explained that students who were uncomfortable with me observing and 
recording them in class would be given the option to discontinue participation. Finally, 




Although getting approval from NSD took longer than I first had envisioned, it was 
still a rather straightforward process.  
 
4.1.3 Contacting schools and teachers 
To identify participating schools and teachers I used a purposeful sample (Brinkmann, 
2013). I explicitly looked for teachers interested in democracy and education and in 
classroom discussions. I did not look for teachers interested in education for 
deliberative democracy specifically, because I had previously found the deliberative 
conception to be absent in the Norwegian national curriculum, and teachers appeared 
to be unfamiliar with it (Samuelsson, 2011; 2013). I started by reading online profiles 
of schools to see if any of these matched my focus. Simultaneously, I also asked 
colleagues of mine if they knew of any teachers or schools suitable for my project. The 
first teachers I contacted, although they were interested in the project, lacked the time 
required for participation. However, they referred me to other teachers that might be 
interested in participating. After a month or two using this snowball method, I had four 
teachers willing to participate in the study, all interested in democracy and education 
and extensively experienced in leading classroom discussions: Patrick, Margaret, 
Evelyn, and Susan.   
 
These four teachers were all teaching at schools located on the west coast of Norway, 
in or just outside one of the bigger cities in the region. They taught various subjects in 
schools with different profiles. Patrick taught at several different schools, in various 
grade levels, in various subjects. In addition, he led seminars where he taught other 
teachers how to conduct classroom discussions. Margaret was the head of her own 
class of fifth graders, and thus did all of her teaching in that class, which involved 
subjects such as math, English, Norwegian, religion, and social science. Evelyn taught 
English, social science, and math to students in grades six to nine at a school with a 
large amount of ethnic diversity. In addition, she was engaged in activities related to 
the student council. Finally, Susan taught psychology, English, and religion to upper 
secondary students at a parochial school. These teachers were all interested and 




background in ‘philosophy for children’ and to some extent used this idea as a 
foundation for conducting classroom discussions. Susan and Evelyn, however, can be 
described as more self-taught. They were all unfamiliar with the concept of 
deliberative democracy prior to participating in this study.  
 
4.2 Stage 2: Data collection 
In stage 2 of the empirical study, I carried out the process of data collection. I did this 
in two periods, one in the spring, including Patrick’s, Margaret’s and Evelyn’s cases, 
and one in the fall, including Susan’s case.  
 
4.2.1 Patrick’s case 
The first teacher I met with was Patrick. I conducted the first interview at my office. 
We talked about the overarching project ‘Education for deliberative democracy’, the 
empirical study of Phase 2, and of his interest in classroom discussions. He talked 
about his background in ‘philosophy for children’ – the pedagogical method of using 
Socratic dialogues to develop children’s reasoning skills – and described strategies he 
used when leading classroom discussions. We also talked about Englund’s (2006) 
criteria for classroom discussions. For Patrick, the first two criteria made sense. 
However, he regarded the consensus criterion as problematic because in his opinion, 
aiming at it can turn classroom discussions in undesirable directions. The interview 
lasted for an hour and 45 minutes. Towards the end, we looked at possible dates for me 
to visit him in his classrooms. Due to his schedule, we decided to postpone this until 
fall. However, when that time came, I had already collected so much data from the 
other three cases that I decided not to conduct any classroom observations with 
Patrick. The first interview is thus the only data from Patrick’s case.   
 
4.2.2 Margaret’s case  
I met Margaret for the first time the same week as I met Patrick. Data collection with 




classroom on four occasions, and was involved in a number of informal conversations 
and email-conversations. This case yielded 200 pages of transcribed data.  
I conducted the first, 40-minute interview at her school. We talked about Englund’s 
(2006) five criteria and, similar to Patrick, she was hesitant about the consensus 
criterion3. During this interview, she also described her class, which consisted of 25 
students, her classroom, along with strategies she used when leading classroom 
discussions. For example, she had organized the desks in her classroom in smaller 
groups, each group comprising three to four students, to make it easier to engage the 
students in group discussions. The following week, I observed her classroom for the 
first time. During my first day of classroom observation, I listened to several small-
group discussions and I found them interesting. One was about the difference in need 
between a baby and a child their own age (12); another was about how to solve to the 
mathematical question, 344 divided by 4 (used as an example in article 2). In both 
discussions, I thought the students reasoned with each other in a sincere manner; they 
seemed to listen to each other, and they seemed to respect each other as well as 
differences of opinions. The second day involved fewer interesting discussions. The 
students did not engage in the same kind of discussion as the day before. Instead of 
listening to the discussions, I started to reflect on my impressions so far – on the type 
of questions that seemed to generate discussions and why the discussions were less 
interesting today than the day before. Furthermore, why did I interpret the way they 
interacted with each other as respectful and genuine? I waited a week before I met 
with Margaret again for a third day of classroom observation. The third day featured a 
few interesting discussions involving the whole class. One discussion was about how 
to solve a hypothetical problem of how to make pancakes for a group of friends if they 
had lost the recipe. Another was about an actual ‘problem’ of what to do at a class 
party (used as an example in article 3). In both cases, I thought the question that was 
posed was interesting and I found that both questions gave the students an opportunity 
                                                          
3 The critique of the consensus criterion is discussed in detail in the article “Education for 





to both disagree and reach solutions. The fourth day, like the second day, did not yield 
any discussions of interest as far as I was concerned. Once again, I used the time to 
reflect over what I had witnessed so far. I also started preparing for a second interview 
to be held later that day. During this interview, we talked about our experience so far. 
Moreover, she described an assignment the class had worked with during the previous 
week on a day when I was not there. They had taken the weekly test in groups. The 
test involved questions such as, “How was the Norwegian constitution developed?” 
and “Why was it important?”. I thought these questions really provided the students 
with an opportunity to present different ideas while simultaneously asking them to 
collectively formulate an answer, and thus, was eager to witness a similar activity later 
on. Margaret and I kept in touch during the summer and fall exchanging words via 
email. We kept the possibility open for conducting additional classroom observations. 
However, just as with Patrick, when that time came, I had collected so much data that I 
my desire to start working with what I already had was greater than the desire to 
collect more data (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Thus, I did not meet Margaret again for 
yet another session of data collection. 
 
To summarize the discussions I witnessed in Margaret’s classroom, some were 
conducted in smaller groups and some involved the whole class. Some started in 
smaller groups but then culminated in discussions involving the whole class. Some 
were of an explorative nature without striving for conclusions, some pursued the 
intention of reaching an agenda (such as identifying alternatives to put up to a vote), 
and some were used to make the students reach a conclusion that was pre-determined 
by Margaret. The data collected from Margaret’s classroom, added to the data from 
her two interviews, provided me with essential source data for this empirical study.  
 
4.2.3 Evelyn’s case  
Following data collection with Margaret, I met with Evelyn. Contrary to Patrick and 
Margaret, Evelyn did not have a background in philosophy for children. She explained 
that she used her classroom discussions to introduce students to national and global 




aware of these issues and to inculcate a desire to make a difference. Evelyn was not 
the head of her own class as Margaret was, but moved from one classroom to another 
teaching English, social science, and math to various classes from grade six to nine. 
The classes varied in size but all of them included fewer students than the 25 in 
Margaret’s class. In all classes I attended, the students were seated in small groups.  
 
The process of data collection with Evelyn lasted for two weeks. I conducted two 
interviews, observed her in her classrooms on two occasions, and was engaged in a 
few informal conversations and email-conversations. The case yielded 60 pages of 
transcripts. The reason for the lower number of transcripts compared to Margaret’s 
case is because I did not use a sound recorder in Evelyn’s classrooms. It will be 
recalled that in all classes, I had given the students and their parents the option to leave 
the classroom if they were uncomfortable with me observing and recording them. In 
Margaret’s class, none expressed such a desire, but among Evelyn’s students, three 
students said they did not want to be recorded. During our first interview, Evelyn and I 
talked about how to handle this. She suggested that I would give her a hint whenever I 
wanted to start to record something, at which time she would ask the relevant students 
to leave the classroom. However, I did not want the students to leave their own 
classroom just because I wanted to record a conversation. Furthermore, I did not want 
to alter the flow of a good discussion by creating a pause. I therefore chose not to use 
sound recorders in Evelyn’s classrooms. This means, however, that the data collected 
from Evelyn’s case contains fewer detailed transcriptions of classroom discussions.  
 
For my first day of observation, I attended a combined sixth and seventh grade English 
class. Evelyn tried to engage the class in a discussion but ended up doing most of the 
talking herself.  It had been a hectic few weeks for me going from one case to another 
with little time to reflect in between. Following this day of classroom observation with 
Evelyn, I therefore decided to spend the next couple of days at my office to sort out 
my impressions. For example, I found the classroom climate to be different in 
Margaret and Evelyn’s classrooms. Evelyn’s classrooms were louder and the students, 




her classroom climate seem more boisterous compared to Margaret’s. This made me 
think about what it meant to treat each other with respect. Furthermore, it got me 
thinking: what would have happened if one of Margaret’s students were placed in 
Evelyn’s classroom; would he or she be comfortable there? During one of our 
conversations (we had later on), Evelyn explained that she was aware of this 
characteristic and tried to remain attentive to ensure that the students were not 
offended. I waited until the following week before I met Evelyn for a second day of 
observation. This time, I attended a ninth grade social science class. The topic for this 
class was human rights, and the pedagogical method was classroom discussion. The 
discussion followed the same pattern as the discussion I had witnessed the previous 
day with Evelyn doing much of the talking. However, towards the end of class she 
asked the students how they wanted to continue working with the topic. This question 
instantly got the students engaged and almost everyone had an opinion about it. Based 
upon this experience, I started to elaborate on the idea that perhaps the question asked 
is a crucial factor for how classroom discussions unfold (this is used as an example in 
article 2). The summer break was approaching and I decided to conclude this period of 
data collection with Evelyn with a second interview. The aim was to continue data 
collection in the fall. However, just as with Patrick and Margaret, this did not happen 
because of the amount of data I had collected when that time came.  
 
During the summer, I transcribed the data collected from the first three cases. From 
this, I got a sense that many of the discussions I had witnessed, which I considered to 
be examples of classroom deliberation at the time I witnessed them, were perhaps not 
deliberations at all. I started to develop an idea of where to go with the material and a 
specific focus for the second period of data collection – to specifically look for 
discussions fulfilling the three core criteria of Englund’s (2006) formulation of 
deliberative communication: (a) reason-giving, (b) reflection, and (c) consensus.   
 
4.2.4 Susan’s case 
I collected data from Susan’s case at the start of the fall of 2014. I observed her 




engaged in many informal conversations. The case yielded 200 pages of transcripts. 
Susan taught in different classes at an upper secondary school and, like Evelyn, she 
therefore moved from one classroom to another. During my time with her, I met two 
different classes, one class of juniors and one of seniors.  
 
For my first day of classroom observation, I attended English and psychology. In 
English, I witnessed ten senior students discussing the concept of beauty (excerpts 
from this discussion are used in article 2). However, there were mainly two male 
students along with Susan doing most of the talking. Still, I found this discussion to be 
interesting because of the way they reasoned, responded, and interacted with each 
other. They clearly stated their opinions, they gave reasons for their position, and they 
questioned each other’s ideas. It therefore seemed relevant to me in conjunction with 
Englund’s (2006) criteria. Later the same day, I observed a psychology class that 
involved both the senior class and the junior class. They were involved in a number of 
different dialogical activities. For example, Susan asked them to construct a timeline 
of the development of psychology as a field. This exercise consisted of working in 
small groups at first, each group assigned to a specific period of time. They were then 
asked to compile the different periods so as to construct a complete timeline. I thought 
this exercises was perfect in terms of letting the students construct something together 
and to reason with each other. However, for some reason the discussion never really 
unfolded. Compared to the English class, there were fewer presentations of different 
perspectives and fewer confrontations of different ideas. For my second day of 
observation, the following day, I attended the same English class once more. They 
continued the previous day’s discussion, following the same pattern as the day before. 
I waited a week before I met with Susan again for a third day of observation. This 
time, I attended religion and psychology lessons. As far as I was concerned, neither 
class yielded any interesting data related to Englund’s (2006) criteria. For my fourth 
day of observation, I observed English once again. This time, they discussed a blog 
they were going to write, a discussion that did not really take off in any interesting 
direction. After my fourth day of classroom observation, I felt I had a sense of how the 




with an interesting informal conversation. We agreed to keep in touch and that I would 
contact her again if I needed to conducted any more observations or interviews with 
her.  
 
4.2.5 Concluding the process of data collection 
There are different indicators for when to stop collecting data in a qualitative project. 
These do not include, however, the amount of data collected nor the number of hours 
spent interviewing or observing per se (Brinkmann, 2012). This would be categorized 
as ‘qualitative positivism’ and represents a misinterpretation of the explorative aim of 
qualitative research (Kvale, 1997). Instead, proper indicators emerge when a study, or 
a case, starts to reproduce itself, or when one starts to find the same data repeatedly 
(Brinkmann, 2012). Another indicator is when the amount of data collected starts to 
feel overwhelming. Too much data means jeopardizing the possibility of conducting 
in-depth analysis (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Brinkmann, 2013). Having finished 
collecting data at Susan’s school, both indicators were present.  
 
4.3 Stage 3: The first set of analysis and the first draft of 
article 2   
It is commonly held that in qualitative research, the process of analysis starts before 
the actual analytical process takes place (Hatch, 2002; Maxwell, 2005; Brinkmann, 
2013). This is because all the decisions made along the way steer the project down 
certain paths. The decisions made during the ‘pre-phase’ determined my view of 
deliberative democracy, which in turn affected how I regarded the literature field of an 
education for deliberative democracy. In Phase 2 specifically, the process of 
transcribing the data from the first three cases largely influenced the direction of the 
study. I got a sense that many of the discussions I had witnessed that I thought 
represented examples of classroom deliberations, perhaps lacked one or more crucial 
features. This influenced the focus of my attention for the second period of data 




discussions that fulfilled the three core criteria of Englund’s (2006) formulation of 
deliberative communication: (a) reason-giving, (b) reflection, and (c) consensus.   
I used printouts of all transcripts and read them from start to finish up against 
Englund’s (2006) core criteria – (a) reason-giving, (b) reflection, and (c) consensus). I 
highlighted those passages I considered relevant with a highlighter pen. For example, 
in the transcripts from Patrick’s interview, I marked all passages I could identify where 
either he or I talked about the criteria, where he described classroom practices related 
to them, or where he in some way argued for or against any of them.      
 
It is not all dialogue I have with my students where I do exactly what you describe here. There are perhaps 
some dialogues of that character, where I want an open dialogue but at the same time want them to 
practices giving reasons for their positions, listen to each other’s opinions, and to reach a conclusion… 
(p.11). 
    
and: 
 
Yes, and that is an aim of mine with this type of dialogue, that they feel as a part of something bigger and 
that it is ok not to reach a conclusion. When it is like ‘oh but it is just starting to get fun’ and ‘we were just 
starting to go somewhere’, that is a good place stop… we do not have to reach a conclusion regarding for 
example power, that is not the aim. The aim is to start questioning the concept… (p.17). 
 
In the first example, he states that he sometimes conducts classroom discussions that 
include processes of reason-giving, reflection, and striving for a conclusion. However, 
in the second example he argues that it is sometimes preferable not to strive for a 
conclusion but to only focus on reasoning and listening. From the observational data 
and the transcripts of classroom discussions, I highlighted all passages where I thought 
the core criteria were displayed. In the extract below, for example, from one of the 
discussions in Margaret’s classroom, I consider all three core criteria to be present to 
some extent 
 
Margaret – Ok, can you try to reach an agreement, because you all have different opinions, but can you try 
to find out how long you, as a ten-year-old, wait for different things? 
Hanna – Ok, should we start with sleep or with food? 




Hanna – Ok, food 
Adrian – A couple of hours 
Sara – Maybe 
Hanna – Yes 
Tobias – Three hours, three hours 
Hanna – Yes, two to three 
Tobias – Two if you are in a restaurant or something like that… 
Adrian – But if you are very hungry, then your stomach can really hurt 
Tobias – … then you have to wait and then you can perhaps wait for… 
Hanna – One hour 
Adrian – Yes  
Tobias – Yes, an hour before there is food on the table… 
Hanna – Yes 
Tobias – … if you are at a fancy restaurant, but that’s one thing 
Hanna – At home, you can wait for three hours but then… 
Sara – Two hours maybe… 
Tobias – If you are hungry in the morning, for example, if you are hungry in the morning…. 
Hanna – But it’s not three hours 
Tobias – …in the morning and you would rather do something else than eat, you think it is boring to eat, 
than you can wait for a very long time… (pp. 34–36). 
 
In this discussion, the students articulate different opinions, they listen to each other, 
they reflect and respond to each other’s statements, they seem willing to change their 
initial positions, and they show a desire to work towards some form of agreement.  
 
Having identified a number of interesting passages showing both the teachers 
viewpoints regarding Englund’s (2006) criteria and numerous exemplifications of how 
they manifested themselves in classroom discussions, I wanted to systemize this. I 
created a new document for each case (except Patrick’s) including only highlighted 
passages. In addition, I wrote a small one-page summary of my initial impressions of 
each case and attached it to each document. This resulted in a 52-page document for 
Margaret’s case, a 27-page document for Evelyn’s, and a 53-page document for 
Susan’s.  
 
I decided to hold off on the interview data for the time being and instead focused on 




criteria. Searching through the newly composed documents for this, I found that many 
of them included criteria a and b or criterion c. I decided to construct a continuum on 
which I placed the marked discussions. On one side I placed the discussions 
characterized by a strong sense of reason-giving and reflection (a and b) but that 
lacked a drive to arrive at a conclusion (c). On the opposite side, I placed discussions 
that showed a clear direction towards a conclusion (c) but lacked a genuine reason-
giving process (a and b). In between, I located discussions that included all three core 
criteria and defined them as democratic deliberations. Thus, in addition to identifying 
examples of classroom deliberations and showing what these (might) look like in a 
classroom setting, I also clarified the difference between these and other closely 
related types of classroom discussions that lack one or more crucial features in relation 
to democratic deliberations (inside classrooms). Furthermore, I also noticed that the 
different types of discussions were structured around different types of questions – 
open and closed questions. The discussions lacking the (c) consensus criterion were 
organized around questions that were too open. They allowed students to disagree but 
gave them little guidance toward making a conclusion. The discussions lacking the (a) 
reason-giving criterion and the (b) reflection criterion, on the other hand, were 
organized around questions that were too closed, which clearly gave students a 
direction but provided them with few opportunities to genuinely disagree. Democratic 
deliberations were organized around questions with a good balance between openness 
and closeness. From this, I outlined a practical pedagogical implication, namely that to 
steer classroom discussions in the direction of democratic deliberations, the teacher 
should pose questions that allow students to genuinely disagree on the matter but that 
also guide them toward a conclusion. I shall return to a more detail explanation of 
what this means later.  
 
4.4 Stage 4: Secondary analysis and the first draft of 
article 3   
Having finished the analysis of the observational data and having composed a first 




classroom discussions”, it was time to start working with the interview data. The 
corpus contained statements and opinions regarding Englund’s (2006) three core 
criteria. I once again worked with the newly composed documents, the 52-page 
document for Margaret’s case, the 27-page document for Evelyn’s, and the 53-page 
document for Susan’s. However, this time I also included Patrick’s interview. Thus, I 
did not go through all transcripts again from scratch but continued where I left off 
when I decided to move along with the observational data. My initial impression from 
the interviews was that the teachers seemed to regard the reason-giving criterion and a 
reflection criterion as sensible criteria with which to frame classroom discussions, but 
that they were skeptical of framing them with the consensus criterion. Based upon this 
impression, I decided to look closer at the passages I had highlighted concerning the 
consensus criterion. Below are a few examples:   
 
In many ways, if democracy is present it’s going to be confrontational, isn’t it? Cause if we’re all passive 




It is an exploration, exactly, but never consensus, because I think that means to compromise and I am not 
going to compromise. I have spent a lot of time reading, being at school myself, thinking, and talking and I 
am not going to just throw that out to compromise. But I don’t expect them to compromise either, to give 




… but in regard to choices, thoughts about important aspects in life, and opinions, and so on, I don’t think 




That can be difficult . . . I do not want to force anyone in the classroom to agree that “this” is the only right 
thing . . . I think it is important that those who reserve the right to disagree should be given time and space 
to reflect on why they disagree but not be forced into making decisions then and there . . . I cannot really 




death whether everybody agrees or not. I think agreement is difficult to achieve and striving for it only 
makes the discussion artificial (Evelyn, p. 9). 
 
I organized their concerns of consensus in four categories: ‘view of democracy’, 
‘desired learning outcome from participation in classroom discussions’, ‘democratic 




As I began to formulate my ideas in the third article, however, I decided to use only 
the pedagogical critique of consensus. I reasoned that the interviewees’ expertise was 
in how to lead classroom discussions, not how to make democratic decisions. I 
systemized their pedagogical critique of consensus and concluded that, according to 
these four teachers, aiming at consensus in classroom discussions can bring about 
many unwanted side effects such as undesirable patterns of communication and 
emotional strain in students. The understanding of deliberative democracy I had 
developed during the ‘pre-phase’, however, locates consensus at the heart of 
democratic deliberation. Furthermore, since I operate with the pedagogical assumption 
Figure 3: Findings from the secondary analysis 
         View of democracy    Desired learning outcome       Democratic critique       Pedagogical critique
1. Freedom of speech is a right 1. Critical thinking 1. Democracy is about more 1. To strict criteria means that
2. Everyone has a voice and 2. Be able to make reflected     than consensus, it is about     many discussions relevant 
    the right to an opinion     decisions     living with disagreement     in a democratic sense, will 
3. Democracy is about living 3. Reason, listen, and justify     and tolerating that others     'fall out'
    with disagreement     opinions     have different opinions 2. If a discussion has to lead to
4. Without confrontation there 4. Become enlighted in regard 2. One is not suppose to     a conclusion, the question
    is no democracy     to the different positions      agree on 'big' questions     of power comes into play
5. Civic engagement is     and perspectives available 3. Consensus means to     because students will then
    nessesary     in different matters     compromise and it is wrong     try to get it 'their way'
6. Critical thinking is 5. Learn that not all questions     to ask people to 3. If students are forced into
    important     have correct answers     compromise their beliefs     agreeing with a teacher,
7. Decisions are made by 6. A desire to want to make  4. It is wrong to force people     they can loose the respect
    voting practices     a difference     into agreements. One has to     for that teacher
7. Understand that everyone     be allowed to have an 4. It can be difficult to create 
    has the right to an opinion     opinion and others need to     a safe classroom climate
8. Be comfortable expressing     respect that     if students are expected to 
   their own opinions     reach consensus, it becomes
9. To tolerate others      difficult for them to express
    opinions     their opinions 
5. They should not feel that 
    their opinions are a burden,
    they need to be allowed to
    express them without being




that students should learn the necessary deliberative skills and values by practicing 
democratic deliberation, I was reluctant to abandon consensus as an aim for classroom 
deliberations. The aim for the third article was therefore to try to formulate a version 
of consensus that could be used as an aim in classrooms without having to cause the 
negative side effects cited by the teachers. I tried different formulations of this 
objective, such as Rawls’ (1987) notion of an overlapping consensus and Gaus and 
Vallier’s (2009) notion of convergence but decided to use Dryzek and Niemeyer’s 
(2010) typology of consensus. Based on this, I argued that consensus should be 
considered a multifaceted concept that allows for many different types of agreements 
and disagreements to coexist, and therefore, will not necessarily foster undesirable 
patterns of communication in classroom discussions. 
 
I finalized the first draft of the third article “Education for deliberative democracy and 
the aim of consensus”, during the summer of 2015, tying together a one-and-a-half-
year-long empirical study that involved the processes of developing the design, 
collecting and transcribing the data, analyzing the data, and formulating the results in 
two articles.  
 
4.5 Ethical considerations  
Ethics can refer to many things in research, such as responsibility for the quality of the 
work produced and the responsibility one has in relation to one’s colleagues. However, 
it is most commonly associated with the responsibility one has for individuals 
participating in research (Alver & Øyen, 2007). In this section, I offer a brief 
discussion about how I handled the aspect of informed consent in the empirical study 
of Phase 2. Informed consent refers to the idea that no research should be conducted 
involving individuals who have not explicitly agreed to participate. Furthermore, their 
decision to participate has to be based on valid and relevant information concerning 
the study in question, and the decision has to be made without any form of pressure 






4.5.1 Teachers and informed consent  
Regarding informed consent and the teachers participating in the study, I emailed a 
description of the overall project and of the empirical study of Phase 2 before we met 
for our first interview. During the first interview, I once again described the project 
along with the aim and focus of the empirical study. I explained that my intention was 
not to evaluate them as teachers, but rather to observe their classroom practices for the 
purpose of using these as examples in a discussion of issues related to an education for 
deliberative democracy. To further emphasize the non-evaluative focus, I pointed out 
that since deliberative democracy is not a formal aim in the Norwegian curriculum 
(Samuelsson, 2011; 2013), they could not be expected to ensure that this objective was 
met. Finally, I emphasized that I regarded them as experts in leading classroom 
discussions and therefore was interested in their opinions on the matter. By this, I 
strived to be as explicit as I could concerning the nature of the study. However, there 
are potential ethical dilemmas involved.   
 
I promised the teachers that I would not evaluate their classroom practices. Yet, when I 
summarized my findings in the second article, I used phrases such as ‘lacking 
important aspects related to democratic deliberations’ and ‘which diminish the 
students’ opportunity to practice at the necessary deliberative skills and values’, when 
referring to some of their classroom discussions. Because the Norwegian educational 
system does not ask them to ensure democratic deliberations in their classrooms, I did 
not consider these statements to be evaluations of the teachers’ performance. However, 
from the teachers’ perspective, it is possible that they found the statements evaluative. 
The question of evaluation might be even more penetrating when it comes to article 3. 
During the interviews, I told the teachers that I regarded them as experts and that I 
genuinely was interested in hearing their views on Englund’s (2006) criteria. Yet, 
when they expressed a concern about one of them, I ended up arguing with them. In 
my view, I treated their opinions with a genuine respect, because, based upon their 
concern, I reformulated the consensus criterion. I used their practical experience to 




possible that this could be interpreted as breaking the promise to treat the teachers as 
experts.    
 
Having raised these concerns, it might be worthwhile to point out that after I had 
finished each article, I emailed a copy to each teacher and received nothing but 
positive feedback in return. Nevertheless, this discussion shows that even if one 
carefully attends to the aspect of informed consent, ethical dilemmas may arise.  
 
4.5.2 Students and informed consent  
Turning to the case of students who participated in the study, one might consider 
whether they should have a say concerning their involvement in the study. I observed 
them in their classroom and I recorded their voices. However, I did not collect any 
sensitive information about them. In fact, I knew nothing about them, not even their 
names, let alone whose voices I heard on the recordings. One can therefore argue that 
they belong to a category not subject to providing informed consent: 
 
In some cases, research can be conducted without the use of informed consent if the individuals are not 
participating actively or when the information collected is of a non-sensitive form (NESH, 2009). 
 
To support the claim that I perhaps was not under obligation to get their informed 
consent: I did not place them in a situation they would not have found themselves in 
anyway. I investigated educative practices that would have occurred even if I were not 
there. Nevertheless, I relied on Fossheim’s (2009) interpretation of informed consent – 
that it is a question of genuine respect for the participants and giving the students, or 
their parents in the cases where they were under 18, the option to withdraw from the 
classroom. Among Margaret and Susan’s students, no one had any reservations, but in 
Evelyn’s class, three students said they did not want to be recorded. As mentioned, in 
order to address this situation, Evelyn suggested that I could give her a hint whenever I 
wanted to start recording something, in which case she would ask the students with 
reservations to leave the classroom. From my conversations with NSD, however, I had 




responsible for creating an equivalent pedagogical assignment for them in another 
facility. In addition to not wanting to ask students to leave their classroom on my 
behalf, I therefore decided not to make sound recordings in Evelyn’s classrooms.  
 
However, since so few students had objections to participating, one might wonder how 
they personally interpreted the words voluntary participation, particularly considering 
how it was presented to them. The students were given the opportunity to decline to 
participate by their teachers. I gave the informed consent sheet to the teachers and 
asked them to pass it along to the students and the parents. Furthermore, I did not 
collect the informed consent sheets but asked each teacher to inform me if anyone had 
declined to participate. I do not doubt that the teachers gave the information to their 
students nor that they genuinely respected the students’ choice of whether or not to 
participate. However, there is a possibility that information coming from schools 
might appear to be mandatory since schools often ask students to participate in 
activities they would not participate in voluntarily. Yet, considering the nature of the 
study, I think this might be more a theoretical example of how careful one needs to be 
about informed consent than a serious ethical dilemma.  
 
4.6 Validity and reliability 
Before moving on, let us revisit the methodological question of validity and reliability 
first addressed on pages 6–7. In qualitative research, the aim is to explore complex and 
dynamic social phenomena and to investigate what meaning people bring to their 
experience. This usually takes place in natural settings in order to investigate the 
uniqueness and complexity of the phenomena assumed lost in more controlled settings 
(Hatch, 2002; Merriam, 2009). Furthermore, qualitative researchers use themselves as 
the tool for collecting and analyzing the data (Befring, 2007). 
 
4.6.1 Validity and reliability as reflexivity and transparency 
The features of a qualitative researcher described above have led researchers from a 




qualitative research (Hatch, 2002; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). According to their 
view, qualitative research is too biased to produce scientific knowledge (Hatch, 2002). 
Qualitative researchers affect the phenomena they study too much; different qualitative 
researchers register the same phenomenon differently, and the knowledge they 
produce is impossible to generalize. Qualitative researchers have responded to this 
criticism by claiming that positivistic criteria such as internal validity – the ability to 
control the effect of independent variables – and interrater reliability – registration by 
different researchers of the same phenomena in the same way – are unsuitable for 
qualitative research. In a qualitative perspective, it is difficult to see how breaking 
down complex phenomena into supposedly discrete dependent and independent 
variables can reveal anything of interest regarding complex social phenomena (Hatch, 
2002; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Furthermore, qualitative researchers need to be 
close to the phenomena they investigate because the only tool sophisticated enough to 
truly understand human beings and human interaction is the human mind (Brinkmann, 
2013). Some qualitative researchers have gone as far as to totally ignore questions of 
validity and reliability, while the more common approach is to operate with an 
understanding of validity and reliability that better captures what qualitative research 
is about (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009).  
 
The most common way to redefine validity and reliability in qualitative terms is to 
refer to them as trustworthiness and reasonableness (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). The 
aim in a qualitative sense is to demonstrate that the understanding of the phenomena 
presented is a reasonable and trustworthy version of it. In order to achieve this, 
qualitative researchers need to be both reflective and transparent. By critically 
reflecting upon every aspect of the project and all steps along the way, such as what 
research questions to ask, how their presence affects the data collected, and how their 
pre-determined understandings affect the conclusions drawn, they will have a reflected 
opinion about the knowledge produced (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). However, this is 
not enough; they also need to make the process of knowledge construction transparent 
to the reader (Brinkmann, 2013). By transparently describing what they have done and 




and by this, evaluate if they are credible, reasonable, and trustworthy or not (Kvale & 
Brinkmann, 2009). Thus, with the concepts of reflexivity and transparency, the quality 
of qualitative research can be evaluated.  
 
4.6.2 The process of knowledge construction in Phase 2 
The aim of redefining validity and reliability as reflexivity and transparency is to 
better capture what quality in qualitative research is. In qualitative research, the 
knowledge produced is a product construction (Hatch, 2002) and the researchers are 
the producers of that knowledge (Brinkmann, 2012), because all choices and decisions 
made throughout the project determine the end product. On that note, let us look at 
how I constructed the knowledge produced in Phase 2 and how the decisions I made 
led me down specific paths. 
 
When I designed Phase 2, I used Englund’s (2006) formulation of deliberative 
communication as a theoretical framework. This framework affected the data I was 
able to generate and determined what fell outside of my scope (Maxwell, 2005). For 
example, research questions such as – ‘How do Englund’s (2006) three core criteria 
manifest themselves in practice?’, ‘What does it look like when 12 year olds show 
each other respect in discussions?’, and ‘Are there places where deliberative 
communication is more likely to occur than others?’ – would all be understood within 
the outer boundaries of Englund’s (2006) idea of deliberative communication. 
Furthermore, during the process of transcribing the data from the first three cases, I 
decided to focus on identifying classroom discussions that fulfilled Englund’s (2006) 
three core criteria. The data collected at that point could have steered me in other 
directions but I chose this path. A final example is found in how I addressed the 
teachers’ criticism of the consensus criterion. Based on their criticism, I could 
probably have rejected the aim of consensus as a criterion for classroom discussions 
entirely and argued that classroom discussions simply would be better off without it. 
However, based upon my idea of deliberative democracy, I chose to defend it and 




process I relied on Dryzek & Niemeyer’s (2010) formulation of consensus, which 
shaped the alternative version in a specific way. 
 
These examples illustrate how I as a researcher shaped the knowledge I produced in 
Phase 2. Thus, the findings and results, along with my practical pedagogical 
suggestions, should all be considered as a product of my construction. Defining 
scientific knowledge as a product of construction, however, does not imply that 
“anything goes” and that all possible constructions are equally reasonable. Instead, it 
emphasizes the importance that I account for my reasoning as thoroughly as possible 
in order to let others evaluate my empirical investigation of classroom discussions in 
relation to an education for deliberative democracy (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; 
Brinkmann, 2013). In conclusion, let me therefore state that I hope recipients of the 
knowledge I display find it both reasonable and trustworthy, and not the least, useful in 





5. Results, findings, and practical implications  
In this chapter, I present the main findings along with the practical implications from 
the two phases ‘Phase 1 – Literature review’ and ‘Phase 2 – Empirical study’ as 
presented across the three articles “Education for deliberative democracy: Mapping 
the field”, “Education for deliberative democracy: A typology of classroom 
discussions”, and, “Education for deliberative democracy and the aim of consensus”. 
 
5.1 Article 1: Education for deliberative democracy: 
Mapping the field 
In Phase 1, I investigated how educational scholars understand and describe the project 
education for deliberative democracy. Two findings are particularly important. First, 
the field of education for deliberative democracy contains a widespread overall 
agreement about how future citizens should learn the skills and values necessary for 
deliberative democratic participation – they should learn them through participation in 
democratic deliberations. Second, a number of different understandings and 
conceptualizations of deliberative democracy and democratic deliberations 
characterize the field. The field, which at first glance appears to be coherent, is on the 
contrary characterized by a number of significant, underlying disagreements. 
Furthermore, there is a gap between theoretically driven articles arguing for 
deliberative democracy as an educational aim and articles empirically investigating 
pedagogical practices related to this aim. The main problem lies at the pedagogical end 
of the spectrum where articles investigating deliberative educative practices are 
frequently too far removed from the political understanding of deliberative democracy, 
making the empirical research lose its immediate relevance to questions related to an 
education for deliberative democracy. The problem is that when it is argued that the 
pedagogical method of deliberation fosters certain skills, it is an open question as to 
what makes them relevant for deliberative democracy.  
 
Based upon the analysis of the field, I suggested that scholars empirically investigating 




ground their research more solidly in the definitions of deliberative democracy 
formulated by scholars within the field of political philosophy.  
 
5.2 Article 2: Education for deliberative democracy: A 
typology of classroom discussions 
In Phase 2, I attempted to bridge the gap I identified in Phase 1 and aimed at producing 
empirical research of immediate relevance to questions related to an education for 
deliberative democracy. In order to solidly ground my empirical research in the theory 
of deliberative democracy, I used Englund’s (2006) formulation of deliberative 
communication as a theoretical foundation. This formulation directed my focus during 
classroom observations, it was an explicit topic of conversation during teacher 
interviews, and I used it actively when I analyzed the collected data. 
 
From my classroom observations, I found that there were many examples of classroom 
discussions that appeared to be examples of democratic deliberations but, under closer 
examination, lacked one or more crucial features. Based on this finding, I created an 
empirically based typology of classroom discussions and placed the discussions 
showing different characteristics along a continuum. On one side, I placed discussions 
characterized by a strong sense of reason-giving and reflection but that lacked a drive 
toward a conclusion. On the opposite side, I placed discussions characterized by a 
clear direction toward a conclusion but that lacked a genuine reason-giving process. In 
between, I located discussions showing all three aspects and defined them as 
democratic deliberations. This allowed me to exemplify what democratic deliberations 
inside classrooms can look like at the same time as it allowed me to differentiate them 
from other closely related types of discussions. Finally, based upon the typology of 
discussions I created, I also articulated a practical implication for teachers to use in 
their classrooms. In order to steer classroom discussions in the direction of democratic 
deliberations and to let students practice democratic deliberation, teachers should pose 
questions open enough to give students the possibility to disagree on the matter while 




conclusion. This will provide them with an opportunity to practice giving reasons for 
their opinions and reflect over others while at the same time being involved in a 
process that strives toward a conclusion. 
 
5.3 Article 3: Education for deliberative democracy and 
the aim of consensus  
In addition to observing classroom discussions in Phase 2, I conducted interviews with 
the teachers whose classrooms I had observed. They all expressed a concern about 
having classroom discussions aim at consensus. According to them, aiming at 
consensus can alter the pattern of communication in undesirable ways and cause 
emotional strain in students. However, since consensus is an integral part of 
deliberative democracy, I was reluctant to totally abandon it as a criterion for 
classroom deliberations. Instead, my aim became to formulate a notion of consensus 
that could reconcile both the teachers’ concerns and the definition of deliberative 
democracy from which I was working.  
 
Grounded in Dryzek and Niemeyer’s (2010) typology of consensus, I formulated a 
defense of consensus as a criterion for classroom discussions and argued that by 
viewing consensus as a multifaceted concept with many meanings, one can retain 
consensus as an ideal in classroom deliberations without necessarily creating the 
negative side effects declared by the teachers. Furthermore, based upon Dryzek and 
Niemeyer’s (2010) typology of consensus, I also articulated pedagogical implications 
to be used in practice. In a deliberative educative sense, the ultimate goal is to make 
the students practice reaching unanimous agreements on how to act (preference 
consensus). However, other types of consensus are also valuable to practice striving 
towards. For example, if a deliberation starts to fall apart or turns into a competition, 
participants in the deliberation can direct their attention on reaching a normative meta-
consensus. By focusing on understanding and acknowledging the different viewpoints 
present in the deliberation, they can keep the deliberation productive. Transferring this 




discussions as deliberative learning situations. By having students aim at reaching a 
normative meta-consensus in cases where the deliberation has turned ineffectual, they 





6. Discussing a formulation of an education for 
deliberative democracy 
In this final chapter of the synopsis, let us take a look at the project that started out as a 
broad and explorative investigation of an education for deliberative democracy and see 
where it ended up. What are the thoughts about an education for deliberative 
democracy I present in this dissertation? What skills and values do I argue for as 
essential and what pedagogical practices do I propose we use? Let us look at the 
formulation of an education for deliberative democracy I propose in this dissertation 
along with my reasons for it. 
 
In this chapter, I begin by describing and discussing the desired learning outcome 
before describing the pedagogical methods and implications I propose we use to 
achieve this. Following this is a short discussion of what it means to be a competent 
deliberative citizen before I end the chapter by connecting the minimalistic 
pedagogical model proposed to the challenges existing in the literature field of an 
education for deliberative democracy.  
 
6.1 Discussing the desired deliberative learning outcome   
Based on the understanding of deliberative democracy I developed in the ‘pre-phase’, I 
argue that the most essential aim of an education for deliberative democracy is to teach 
students how to participate in, and co-construct, democratic deliberations. After all, 
since public deliberation is placed at the heart of deliberative democracy, the process 
by which citizens, along with their representatives, give each other reasons for the 
positions they hold, weigh different arguments and alternatives against each other in 
order to reach mutual decisions on how to act (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Bohman, 
1998; Habermas, 1998; Gutmann & Thompson, 2004; Held, 2006; Thompson, 2008; 
Chappell, 2012), it should also be placed it at the heart of an education for deliberative 
democracy. This makes the educational aim proposed in this dissertation an individual 
one: to teach each student (or future citizen) the core skills and values needed for 




The next question is what these skills and values are. In order to determine this, I use 
Englund’s (2006) formulation of deliberative communication and extract three desired 
core skills and values needed for deliberative democratic participation: the (a) ability 
to give reasons for one’s own position, the (b) ability to listen to and reflect upon 
others position, and the (c) ability to strive towards collective conclusions. But, what 
do these entail more specifically?  
 
6.1.1 Reason-giving and reflection as desirable learning 
outcomes 
A core aspect of the reason-giving process in democratic deliberations is the principle 
of reciprocity. According to this principle, participants should strive to formulate their 
preferences in terms that are acceptable to other reasonable citizens even if they have 
different worldviews (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; 2004). By striving to formulate 
arguments in reciprocal terms, the likelihood increases that participants are able to 
understand each other and keep the deliberation moving forward.  
 
Jennifer Hauver James (2010) has exemplified how destructive non-reciprocal 
arguments can be in deliberative processes. In a classroom deliberation about global 
warming that she conducted, two students argued that global warming was the doing 
of God and that any attempt to find a solution was therefore pointless, after which the 
deliberation fell apart. Disregarding the fact that they claimed that searching for a 
solution was useless, an important reason why the deliberation fell apart was the fact 
that their argument was grounded in an understanding of the world that the other 
students did not share – a religious worldview. To their fellow students, their argument 
did not make sense. The problem with this religiously based argument is that it in 
order to understand and accept it, one needs to accept an entire worldview. However, 
the question of reciprocal arguments is more complicated than just asking religious 
people to stop using religiously based arguments. In James’ (2010) example, the two 
students arguing from a religious perspective claimed that their fellow students were 
equally responsible for using arguments grounded in a specific worldview, that of 




ones, they argued, to have to abandon their core ideas just to keep the deliberation 
productive? The question of which worldview to use as a foundation for democratic 
deliberations is beyond the scope of this chapter, however. Let us therefore conclude 
that in a deliberative educative perspective, an important desirable learning outcome is 
to teach students to try to formulate their arguments in ways they think others can 
understand and possibly accept. Without understanding each other and each other’s 
arguments, it is difficult to keep deliberations productive. 
 
To develop an understanding of each other and each other’s arguments, however, it is 
important that participants not only try to formulate their own arguments in 
understandable terms, but also that they try to understand others as they articulate 
theirs. Participants in democratic deliberations need to be willing to listen to reasons 
presented by others and they need to reflect upon them. Furthermore, they need to 
maintain an open attitude to others as they try to explain why they might be wrong 
(Young, 2000). They need to be willing to subject their opinions to scrutiny (Gutmann 
& Thompson, 1996; 2004). In James’ (2010) example, the two students who argued 
from a religious position were unwilling to do this. They refused to have their 
positions evaluated and instead referred to them as coming from ‘the core of their faith 
and that it was therefore impossible for them to stand by and have their position 
questioned. They articulated their position and when asked about it, shut down and 
refused to engage in any further communication. In order to keep democratic 
deliberations productive, it is vital that participants engage with the arguments offered 
by others in a serious way and that they are willing to subject their own positions to 
scrutiny. Therefore, in a deliberative educative perspective, I would argue that a 
second important learning outcome is to teach students how to listen to each other, 
how to reflect upon each other’s arguments, and to have their opinions evaluated.  
 
6.1.2 Consensus as a desirable learning outcome  
In addition to being about presenting reasons for positions and reflecting upon those in 
order to develop an understanding, democratic deliberations are also about striving for 




1998; Habermas, 1998; Gutmann & Thompson, 2004; Held, 2006; Thompson, 2008; 
Chappell, 2012). This is the practical, political aspect of deliberation – that it is 
directed towards some form of collective will-formation, some agreement about what 
to do. Moreover, since deliberative democracy operates with the idea that a political 
order needs to be justified to and by everyone living under its laws (Chambers, 2003), 
it operates with an underlying ideal of consensus. Even if reaching actual consensus’ is 
virtually impossible in modern societies, scholars of deliberative democracy 
nevertheless argue that it is valuable as a regulative aim to strive towards (Dryzek & 
Niemeyer, 2010) because it encourages citizens and representatives to seek solutions 
across different belief systems and to use arguments they think other reasonable 
citizens can accept (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; 2004). 
 
The third desirable learning outcome in a deliberative perspective is to teach students 
to strive for consensual agreements in collective will-formation. Now, there are 
different types of consensus. I argue that the most urgent one to strive for is preference 
consensus – agreements on the actual decisions of ‘what to do’. Preference consensus 
does not imply that participants have to agree on aspects such as the underlying 
reasons for a preferred choice (a normative agreement) or which reason to value the 
most (epistemic agreement). Preference consensus is less invasive because it does not 
ask citizens to give up their values. However, in the example used above, we saw how 
important it is that participants in a deliberation recognize each other’s positions and 
arguments as legitimate. The students in James’ (2010) classroom were unable to 
continue the search for possible solutions to problems of global warming because 
neither party recognized the other perceptive as a legitimate position to reason from. 
They failed to reach a normative meta-consensus. A normative meta-consensus is 
therefore valuable because it helps to keep the deliberation productive, especially if 
participants are having a difficult time reaching a preference consensus. Thus, even 
though I argue that preference consensus is the most urgent type of consensus one 
needs to learn how to attain, other types are far from valueless. For example, in order 




conflictual, competitive discussions into productive deliberative discussions, learning 
to strive for a normative meta-consensus would be important. 
 
6.2 Discussing the desirable learning situation   
Having inquired into the desirable learning outcomes, let us look at the pedagogical 
idea of how to teach students these skills and values. At the very basic level, I operate 
with the idea that deliberative skills and values are learned through participation in 
democratic deliberations (in classrooms). The pedagogical idea is thus rather 
straightforward – to learn something, one must practice at it, and the more you 
practice, the better you become. Corresponding with the understanding of deliberative 
democracy presented above, I argue that classroom deliberations should include three 
requirements: (a) the reason-giving requirement, (b) the reflective requirement, and (c) 
the consensus requirement. If only one or two requirements are present, the conditions 
for democratic deliberations are not met, which means that the students are not made 
to practice at the core deliberative skills and values. However, if all three are present, 
they are given the opportunity to practice them and gradually develop them. The next 
question is how to create classroom deliberations that meets all three core 
requirements. In this dissertation, I propose several pedagogical implications that 
could be useful for steering classroom deliberation in the direction of democratic 
deliberations (deliberations that fulfill all three core requirements).  
 
6.2.1 The teacher as a reflective moderator  
In the article “Education for deliberative democracy: A typology of classroom 
discussions”, I propose the idea that the type of question discussed is important for 
establishing a communicative pattern that allows students to give reasons, reflect on 
others’ arguments, and work towards reaching common conclusions. It should be open 
enough to allow them to genuinely disagree on the matter but at the same time closed 
enough to clearly direct the deliberation toward a conclusion. A question that is too 
open gives them a genuine possibility to disagree but few opportunities to strive 




deliberation but few opportunities for disagreement. A question with the right amount 
of openness and closeness, however, gives them the opportunity to practice giving 
reasons, reflect on others’ arguments, and work towards a common conclusion. Yet, 
one classroom full of students does not behave exactly alike from one time to another 
and different students and different classrooms certainly do not behave exactly alike. 
One question directing one classroom discussion in a desirable direction will not 
necessarily have the same effect in another classroom or in the same classroom at 
another time. Thus, teachers leading classroom deliberations have to constantly reflect 
on the amount of openness and closeness of the question in order to find a suitable 
balance at any given time.  
 
I make a similar suggestion regarding questions of a controversial nature. In 
“Education for deliberative democracy: A typology of classroom discussions”, I argue 
that controversies should be approached with caution, postponed until the students 
have become more experienced at democratic deliberations, or gradually introduced 
after the desired communicative pattern has been established. When deliberating 
controversial issues, students are more likely to be emotionally attached to one specific 
position, which arguably makes it more difficult for them to listen to the arguments of 
others and to subject their own to scrutiny. A topic of less importance to their core 
identity, however, may make things easier. Furthermore, by focusing on less 
controversial topics, it might be easier to establish a communicative pattern 
characterized by reason-giving, listening, and reflection instead of one characterized 
by refusal to engage with others and their arguments (see Crocco et al., 2018). 
However, once the students become increasingly better at democratic deliberation, 
questions of a more controversial nature could be (re)introduced. Once again, this 
identifies the teachers leading classroom deliberations as reflective moderators, 
because determinations of what constitutes a controversial issue will vary. One topic 
considered controversial in one classroom at one point in time will not necessarily be 
considered controversial at another time and place or in another classroom. The topic 




not be considered a controversial topic in all classrooms. It is up to the teacher to 
ascertain what issues the class is able to handle at any given time.  
 
From this discussion, we can extract a main pedagogical implication proposed in this 
dissertation: teachers leading classroom deliberations should be regarded as reflective 
moderators who constantly need to reflect on a number of contextual factors in order 
to construct the desirable learning situation. For instance, if the students are having a 
difficult time moving towards a conclusion, perhaps the question discussed is too 
open. If it does not turn into a deliberation at all, perhaps the question is too closed. If 
the deliberation becomes too heated, perhaps trying a less controversial topic would 
help. This is how I argue that teachers leading classroom deliberations need to think.  
 
6.2.2 The first priority – establish the desirable form of 
communication  
From the discussion above, we can also extract a second main pedagogical 
implication: in a pedagogical sense, the argument can be made that the first priority 
should be to establish the desired form of communicative pattern. If students are to be 
educated for deliberative democracy by practicing democratic deliberation, the 
primary task should be to establish the desirable communicative pattern that includes 
the processes of (a) reason-giving, (b) listening and reflection, and the (c) search for 
conclusions.  
 
I argued above that one desirable deliberative learning outcome is the ability to 
formulate reasons in reciprocal terms. However, in a pedagogical sense it might be 
wise not to demand that students formulate their reasons in reciprocal terms too soon. 
If the bar is set too high too soon, concerning which type of reasons may be given, it 
might be difficult to get any type of discussion going. Students might shy away from 
making statements because they do not know how to formulate them ‘correctly’ or 
they might be afraid to receive negative feedback. The point is that if there is no 
classroom discussion, there is nothing for the student to practice. Thus, the first order 




one can start to gradually increase the demands on the types of arguments they use. 
Like the aim of consensus, decisions made through public deliberations are supposed 
to be deemed justifiable by everyone affected by them. However, in order to establish 
the desirable communicative pattern inside the classroom, it might be sensible to start 
by having students aim at any type of solution or conclusion instead of one that is 
supposedly deemed justifiable by everyone. Because, if the demands are too high, the 
deliberation might fall apart before the students get a chance to practice it.   
 
However, the story might be very different in terms of listening and reflection. 
Empirical studies of real-life deliberations suggest that it is important that participants 
display a willingness to listen to others as they articulate their reasons in order to 
establish a positive and productive interaction (Hess & McAvoy, 2015; Molnar-Main, 
2017; Sprain & Black, 2018). Thus, perhaps teachers need to place extra emphasis on 
this aspect in classroom deliberations. If one student comes up short in expressing their 
opinion in a clear and respectful way, others can make up for this by making an extra 
effort in listening. If someone falls short in making sense, others can help. It is the 
same basic pedagogical aim as described above – to create a communicative pattern 
that includes (a) reason-giving, (b) listening and reflection, and (c) a search for 
conclusion.  
 
Thus, the second main pedagogical implication states that if students are to learn how 
to participate in democratic deliberations by practicing it, the main vehicle for this 
should arguably be democratic deliberations in the classroom. This is grounded in the 
pedagogical idea that one should start at a basic level and then gradually increase the 
demands or the level of difficulty.  
 
6.2.3 A minimalistic model of classroom deliberation 
Responding to these suggestions, however, Lisa Weasel (2017) puts forth the 
argument that even if a teacher would manage to establish a classroom discussion that 
fulfilled all three core requirements, they would still not be guaranteed that a suitable 




examples I used in the article “Education for deliberative democracy: A typology of 
classroom discussions”, to display what a classroom discussion that fulfilled all three 
core requirement looked like:          
 
The discussion appears to be a dialogue between the teacher and two very vocal students, Adrian and 
Christian… both students are male-identified… not everyone seems comfortable with this format… a 
group of girls sitting in the front who have been quiet the whole time… Sara responds, saying, “I don’t 
know; it’s difficult to say what you think, to express your opinion”… Adrian has been dominating the 
discussion… the effect that has on shutting down others’ participation… girls, a group often marginalized 
in classroom discussions, were silenced… can actually work against the principles of deliberative 
democracy, as it further reinforces marginalized voices while allowing dominant perspectives to appear as 
consensual (Weasel, 2017, p. 2).  
 
Weasel’s (2017) argument is that even if a classroom discussion were to fulfill all 
three core requirements, it can still contain problematic features in relation to an 
education for deliberative democracy. For example, it can involve only a few students 
and even if they are deliberating in accordance with the three core requirements, others 
students might have a difficult time expressing themselves. In an educative sense, this 
would be problematic because those excluded would be deprived of the opportunity to 
practice giving reasons and articulating their opinions. Moreover, those participating 
would be practicing in a situation involving exclusion and marginalization. By letting 
them practice deliberations characterized by this, they would arguably be taught that it 
is possible to reach consensus and make decisions by dominating the conversation and 
suppressing other’s voices, which are arguably undesirable occurrences in a 
deliberative educative perceptive. Finally, those excluded could learn that their part to 
play in democratic deliberations is a passive one.  
 
Weasel (2017) therefore argues that the ‘minimalistic interpretation of democratic 
deliberation’ (p. 2) I present needs to be accompanied with additional requirements. 
Based on Young’s (1996) criteria for democratic communication, she argues that for 
instance ‘greetings’ should be included as a requirement in classroom deliberations. 
By giving participants in classroom deliberations the opportunity to present themselves 




acknowledgement could be established. This could make it easier for more students to 
participate verbally. Moreover, ‘rhetoric’ should be a requirement. This broadens the 
type of argument and speech that is considered appropriate in deliberation, which 
according to Weasel (2017) would lessen the risk of having problems such as ‘having 
someone dominate the verbal space with their aggressive speaking style’ (p. 3). With 
the inclusion of these requirements, Weasel (2017) argues that a more suitable form of 
classroom communication would be established. With the inclusion of additional 
requirements, however, we have not just redefined the desirable learning situation but 
also the desirable learning outcome. If we extract the desirable learning outcomes from 
the newly formed definition of the desirable learning situation, we see that students 
now are also expected to learn how to strive to include everyone in democratic 
deliberations, not to suppress other’s voices and opinions when engaged in 
deliberations, and not to dominate the conversation and solely push for their own 
agenda. 
 
I agree that even if a classroom deliberation were to fulfill all three core requirements, 
we still could find ourselves in an undesirable learning situation. Furthermore, I agree 
that if students, for instance, learn that it is possible to make decisions and promote 
one’s own agenda by dominating others in deliberations, we would have an 
undesirable situation in relation to an education for deliberative democracy. Thus, 
there are good reasons for including additional criteria that more accurately capture 
what a desirable deliberative process looks like. Moreover, adding to the equation: 
studies of real-life deliberations suggest that the way people approach one another and 
each other’s positions is extremely important for establishing a communicative 
interaction that contains reason-giving marked by disagreement (Sprain & Black, 
2018). Thus, I agree that we should not underestimate the importance of developing a 
social climate characterized by respect and inclusion in classroom deliberations. 
However, questions of inclusion and exclusion are not exclusive to deliberative 
democracy. Thus, to focus only on including everyone in the classroom is strictly 
speaking irrelevant in relation to an education for deliberative democracy, if what we 




managed to include everyone in a soccer practice, they would not practice democratic 
deliberation. Thus, it is important to recognize values such as respect and inclusion, 
both as desirable learning outcomes and as factors influencing the possibility of 
establishing a communication that includes (a) reason-giving, (b) listening and 
reflection, and (c) a search for conclusion. However, if we do not connect them the 
core activity of democratic deliberation, they lose their immediate relevance to an 
education for deliberative democracy.  
 
Based on this reasoning, I argue that the additional criteria proposed by Weasel (2017) 
constitutes a valuable contribution to the minimalistic model of an education for 
deliberative democracy that I have proposed. However, I still claim that in in order for 
such criteria, or aspects, to be relevant in a deliberative sense, they need to be firmly 
related to the core deliberative activity of reason-giving, listening and reflection, and a 
search for conclusion. 
 
6.3 A competent deliberative citizen 
A final question to be discussed in this chapter is how this minimalistic model 
corresponds with the broader project of education for deliberative democracy. Will it 
prepare students for future deliberative democratic participation? Our answer to this 
question will vary depending on what understanding of deliberative democracy and 
deliberative democratic participation we use. 
 
If we look back at the different theories of deliberative democracy presented in chapter 
2, we see that they have different ideas on how to implement deliberative practices in 
modern democratic societies. For example, if we use Fishkin’s (2009) formulation, 
deliberative democratic participation becomes primarily a matter of participating in 
deliberative polls. In deliberative polls, participants are asked to evaluate competing 
arguments and positions and consider their relevance and accuracy in relation to the 
problem at hand. Furthermore, they are asked to make a reflected and impartial 
suggestion concerning the decision of ‘what to do’. This understanding of deliberative 




practice in the classroom, and thus, we could argue that the proposed minimalistic 
model serves this understanding of deliberative democracy well. Habermas (1998) has 
a slightly different interpretation of how citizens should participate in a deliberative 
democracy. At the core of his formulation is a similar reason-giving process we found 
in Fishkin’s (2009) formulation. However, he distinguishes between deliberations 
inside parliament and deliberations in the public realm. The ones ordinary citizens are 
to participate in, those in the public sphere are coupled with lower criteria in relation to 
the deliberative process. Moreover, they are not connected to processes of will-
formation per se. Their main function is to generate (the many) public opinion(s). In 
this view, a deliberative competent citizen would not necessary have to know how to 
deliberate their way to actual decisions with people holding very different views. They 
would mainly be asked to formulate their ideas, positions, arguments, and reasons in 
understandable terms and then ‘present’ them to their representatives. Grounding an 
education for deliberative democracy in this understanding of deliberative democratic 
participation, could make us claim that it is more important to teach students to 
formulate their opinions clearly and, less importantly, teach them to strive for 
consensus. 
 
If we further broaden our idea of what deliberative democratic participation entails, we 
could claim that ordinary citizens do not even have to know how to deliberate per se in 
order to take part in a deliberative democracy. Gutmann and Thompson (1996), for 
example, made the point that the speeches made by Martin Luther King could be 
regarded as a contribution in a national deliberation. Because, King spoke on the 
behalf of a group of people, not every individual in that group had to participate 
verbally in the national deliberation to have his or her opinion heard; they only had to 
pass it on to someone speaking on their behalf. If we would use this interpretation as 
our foundation for an education for deliberative democracy, we could say that students 
do not have to learn how to formulate their opinions in terms ‘others’ can understand. 
They only have to learn to make them understandable to someone who already speaks 
‘their language’. If we continue further down this road, and do as Parkinson and 




as an input in a public deliberation – we might argue that students do not even have to 
learn how to express their opinions in a reasoned or verbal form at all. They could 
express opinions through practices such as demonstrations, protests and boycotts.  
 
However, we are starting to drift away from the discussion of an education for 
deliberative democracy, and are instead talking about how to incorporate already 
existing democratic practices under the umbrella of deliberative democracy. We are 
also talking about how to include more citizens in a deliberative democracy that lacks 
the essential deliberative skills and values necessary for participation, and the 
opportunity to participate. These questions are not issues of an educational nature. 
Issues of an educational nature concern how future citizens are to be taught to 
participate in deliberative democracy. In that spirit and in this dissertation, I have 
argued, by referring to the core activity of deliberative democracy, that the most 
crucial skills and values in a deliberative sense are: the (a) ability to give reasons for 
one’s own opinions, the (b) ability to listen to and reflect upon others arguments, and 
the (c) ability to work towards common conclusions. By acquiring these abilities, I 
argue that students will possess the most essential skills and values needed for 
deliberative democratic participation. Put differently, without mastering these they will 
have a difficult time participating in democratic deliberations let alone contributing 
productively toward the establishment of additional deliberative practices. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
In this final chapter of the synopsis, I have given pedagogical and educational reasons 
for why I think we should use a minimalistic model for an education for deliberative 
democracy that centers on the absolute core of deliberative democratic participation. 
However, I also have a third reason. In the article “Education for deliberative 
democracy: Mapping the field”, I argue that a problem in the research field of an 
education for deliberative democracy is that empirical studies that investigate 
deliberative educative practices are not connected to the theoretical framework of 





The unclear connection to deliberative democracy is perhaps even more apparent in the quantitative 
literature. These articles are first and foremost interested in measuring the effect of participation in 
deliberations. However, deliberation is here understood as a pedagogical method designed to teach students 
general political skills, knowledge and values: “deliberation about policy and politics in the classroom 
increases students’ knowledge, efficacy, interest, and opinion arrangement” (Luskin et al. in: Latimer & 
Hempson 2012, p. 374)… the effect of deliberation is measured against general political skills, knowledge 
and values (see for example Gastil & Dillard 1999, Feldman et al. 2007, Gershtenson et al. 2010). Again, 
the results are interesting, but they are not of immediate relevance to deliberative democracy in particular 
(Samuelsson & Bøyum, 2015, p. 86). 
 
When deliberation as a pedagogical method is evaluated by its ability to develop skills 
such as general political skills, self-efficacy, and opinion arrangement, or when it is 
seen ‘as a way to teach students social skills such as taking responsibility for the 
consequences of one’s actions’ or emotional skills such as anger management’ 
(Samuelsson & Bøyum, 2015, p. 87), it is an open question as to how this is relevant 
for an education for deliberative democracy. It causes the results to lose their 
immediate relevance to an education for deliberative democracy. In a deliberative 
educative sense, why is it important to teach students skills such as self-efficacy? Self-
efficacy could be relevant for deliberative democratic participation, and thus, for an 
education for deliberative democracy, but it is not obvious by itself. The connection to 
practices of deliberative democracy need to be made explicit. I argue that the 
minimalistic model I propose can help do that. By connecting the more peripheral 
skills and values to the core activity of deliberative democratic participation, they can 
be given meaning. If self-efficacy would be explicitly connected to the process of 
reason-giving that strives for consensual conclusions, we can begin to discuss how 
these skills are relevant to participation in democratic deliberations.   
 
I have presented three different arguments for why we should place this kind of 
minimalistic model at the heart of an education for deliberative democracy. In a 
deliberative educative sense, it helps us identify the most essential and desirable 
learning outcomes. In a pedagogical sense, it helps us construct pedagogical practice 
of relevance for an education for deliberative democracy. Finally, it helps us bridge the 




theoretical articles arguing for deliberative democracy as the aim for a democratic 
education. It helps make peripheral findings more relevant to questions of an education 
for deliberative democracy. I would not argue that this approach to an education for 
deliberative democracy solves every question relevant to such an education, there are 
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Education for deliberative 
democracy: Mapping the field
Martin Samuelsson and Steinar Bøyum
The notion of deliberative democracy has been widely discussed in 
political theory the last twenty years. Deliberative democracy has also 
made an impression in educational research. Many who are interested 
in democratic education have started to ask how the skills and values 
characteristic of deliberative democracy can be taught and learned in the 
classroom. This work, however, is being done in different parts of the 
academic universe, and consequently the field of education for deliberative 
democracy can seem fragmented, which makes it difficult to achieve genuine 
progress. Building on a review of the literature, this article tries to structure 
the work in this field, by pointing out main lines of disagreement and 
differences in emphasis, as well as suggesting where work is needed to 
fruitfully translate the idea of deliberative democracy into an educational 
setting. Our main claim will be that there is a need for research on education 
for deliberative democracy that more thoroughly integrates the philosophical 
literature with empirical studies.
Keywords: education for democracy, deliberative democracy, deliberative 
pedagogy, literature review.
Introduction
Within political philosophy, deliberative democracy has been widely 
discussed during the last decades, even to the point that several authors 
now talk about a deliberative turn in democratic theory (Dryzek 2002, 
p. 1). Although ideas characteristic of deliberative democracy can be 
traced throughout the history of democratic thought, it is now most 
commonly associated with the work of contemporary authors like 
Jürgen Habermas, James Fishkin, Joshua Cohen, Amy Gutmann, and 
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Dennis Thompson. Deliberative democracy has also made an impression 
in the field of democratic education, where writers have started to ask 
how the skills, knowledge, attitudes, and values required by deliberative 
democracy can be taught and learned in the classroom. However, it may 
seem as though these two bodies of literature, deliberative democratic 
theory and deliberative democratic education, tend to talk past each 
other, to the detriment of both. The aim of this article is to investigate 
how and why this is so.
Deliberative democracy and education
Deliberative democracy can be seen as a response to some of the 
challenges facing both contemporary democracies and conceptions 
of democracy. How do societies deal with growing and deepening 
pluralism? How can citizens become more actively involved in the 
governing of their communities? How may democracies live up to the 
ideals of democratic legitimacy so that decisions really do represent 
the will of the people and not just the will of an elite? Supporters of 
deliberative democracy see public reasoning as a crucial part of the 
answer to these questions, and accordingly they place public deliberation 
at the heart of democratic theory and practice.
According to the ideal of deliberative democracy, citizens and their 
representatives should strive to justify their positions and decisions 
through public reasoning, in which they seek mutually justifiable reasons 
for the laws they impose on one another (Gutmann & Thompson 2004). 
In this way, deliberative democracy can usefully be characterised as 
opposed to voting-centred views of democracy. Whereas the latter see 
democracy as an arena where fixed preferences and interests compete 
via (hopefully) fair mechanisms of aggregation, deliberative democracy 
instead emphasises the communicative process of will-formation that 
precedes voting. In the deliberative view, a legitimate political order 
is one that can be justified to all those living under its law (Chambers 
2003). It is thus legitimised not by majority rule per se, but by the 
process of giving defensible reasons, explanations, and accounts for 
public decisions (Held 2006). Voting will still be needed, since even 
deliberation can lead to stand-offs, but deliberation takes the place 
of voting as the guiding idea of democracy.
Deliberative democracy lends itself nicely to educational treatment. 
Democracy in general “cannot thrive without a well-educated citizenry”, 
but that applies even more so to deliberative democracy (Gutmann & 
Thompson 2004, p. 35). The ability to give reasons for one’s views is 
not inborn, but has to be learned. This is especially so if it is held that 
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the reasons to be given in deliberation should be publicly acceptable, 
appealing to the common good instead of self-interest. Furthermore, 
the ability to listen carefully to others and to engage respectfully with 
views different from one’s own seems to be a capacity perfectly suited 
for development in the classroom. In short, deliberative democracy 
seems to require what Paul Weithman (2005) calls a deliberative 
character, a cluster of skills, attitudes, and values that both can and 
should be cultivated in the classroom. Hence, it is no surprise that 
the last decade has seen the appearance of a considerable body of 
literature which addresses education for deliberative democracy. It is 
perhaps no accident that one of the leading theorists of deliberative 
democracy, Amy Gutmann, is also a leading educational theorist. As 
Gutmann and Thompson (2004, p. 35) say, “an important part of 
democratic education is learning how to deliberate well.” It is plausible 
to assume that schools, as microcosms of society, are the best arena 
for children to learn this.
Yet just as there are conflicting conceptions of democracy, there 
are conflicting conceptions of democratic education. One’s view of 
democratic education will depend on one’s view of democracy (as well 
as of education), since different conceptions of democracy have different 
ideas of how citizens should participate in democratic society. And just 
as there are different ways to understand democracy, there are different 
ways to understand deliberative democracy, and this might lead to 
different ideas about what an education for deliberative democracy 
should look like, and which skills and values it should cultivate. In 
this article, we aim to highlight the main ideas and assumptions, as 
well as the main differences and disagreements characterising the field 
of education for deliberative democracy.
Method
It is difficult to get an overview of the field of education for deliberative 
democracy. It is located where many academic disciplines converge. 
Relevant work is being produced within fields such as philosophy, 
pedagogy, sociology, psychology, and others, and articles are being 
published in many different journals in different areas. Consequently, 
the various publications build on each other only to a limited extent. 
We therefore thought it necessary to perform a review of the literature, in 
order to take stock of where the field is now, and where it is headed. This 
article is thus based on what is called in the methodology of literature 
reviews a conceptual review. Unlike a systematic review, a conceptual 
review does not attempt to answer particular research questions by 
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summarizing the results of the existing literature, but instead strives 
to synthesize a particular field of knowledge in a less formalized way 
(Petticrew & Roberts 2006). The aim is to give a map of the field in 
question, its main ideas, assumptions, and controversies, in order to 
understand it better, rather than to summarize (all) its results. Yet 
our conceptual review also has aspects of what Petticrew and Roberts 
(2006, p. 41) call a “critical review”, in that we critically examine 
this literature, trying to point out its main shortages and challenges.
In our work with the literature, we limited the search process 
to articles detected with ERIC (Educational Resources Information 
Center). Articles in languages other than English are thus not included, 
nor are books and book sections. The reason for leaving out books 
and book sections is, beside pragmatic concerns, that the thoughts 
presented within these sources have usually been published in articles 
before being printed as books (Fernández & Sundström 2011). There 
may be articles of relevance not detected with ERIC, but it is the most 
comprehensive database available to educational researchers. The 
case can thus be made that it will yield a sufficiently comprehensive 
selection to satisfy the aim of a conceptual review: to present the main 
ideas and controversies in a field.  
The searches were carried out in February of 2013. In the search 
process, the search term deliberati* was set as a necessary criterion: 
all the articles in this review have deliberati* either in the abstract, the 
title, or as a keyword. This term was combined with other relevant 
words and phrases, such as education, school, democra*, classroom, 
dialogue, and discussion. This gave us 1200 peer-reviewed articles 
that seemed pertinent to the review. Many of these were not concerned 
with deliberative democracy, however, so after reading the abstracts, 
the number was narrowed down, first from 1200 to 99; and then, 
after reading the full articles, to 67; all explicitly about education for 
democracy with deliberation as a central aspect. Thus, the findings 
presented in this article are built upon the review of 67 articles, 
marked with an asterisk in the reference list. Most of these articles were 
published in the last ten years, indicating the relative recentness of the 
field. As mentioned, they were also spread out over a large number of 
different journals, thus demonstrating the need for a comprehensive 
map of the field.
General points of agreement
The field of education for deliberative democracy can be structured 
around two overarching points of agreement and three main lines of 
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difference and disagreement. We will focus on the lines of disagreement, 
since these are the most consequential, but we will nevertheless start out 
by stating the two general points on which the reviewed articles concur.
First, there is an underlying agreement in the literature that 
deliberative skills, knowledge and values are learned through 
practice. This amounts to a shared pedagogical assumption: it is 
by partaking in deliberative situations that students/future citizens 
learn the skills, knowledge and values necessary for participation in 
deliberative democracy. Technically expressed, there is an assump-
tion of parallelism between the object of learning (what is to be 
learned) and the method of learning (how to learn it). Even though this 
assumption seems eminently plausible (“to learn something you have to 
practice it”) and may to some even sound like a tautology (“deliberation 
is learned through deliberation”), it is not necessarily true in all areas. 
James Murphy (2004), for instance, refers to studies that seem to show 
that democratic skills and virtues are not learned, or at least are not 
best learned, by democratic education as it is typically conceived by 
theorists, but by the acquisition of traditional knowledge embedded 
in subjects like history and the social sciences. Hence, one should not 
dismiss out of hand the possibility that deliberative skills and values are 
best learned not by practicing deliberation, but by imparting historical 
and social scientific knowledge. Still, this possibility is not considered 
in the existing literature on education for deliberative democracy.
Second, there is a general agreement about what a deliberative 
situation is: a dialogue where different voices and perspectives can 
be heard and expressed, and in which the participants listen to and 
treat each other with respect. This is the common core of deliberation 
shared by major theorists like Habermas, Fishkin, and Gutmann and 
Thompson. A deliberative democratic process is one where everyone 
can participate equally, and where the participants listen carefully and 
respectfully to each other. It is also a process in which the participants 
articulate reasons that they think others can understand and accept, 
thus directing it towards some form of collective will-formation.
However, when this shared core of deliberation is transported 
into educational research, the agreement disappears. Different ways 
of talking about deliberation and education emerge, giving rise to 
multiple conceptions of deliberative democracy, as well as multiple 
ideas about the role of deliberation in education for democracy. What 
Dennis Thompson says about empirical studies of deliberative democracy 
within political science also applies to parallel studies within educational 
research:
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While claiming (correctly) that deliberative theories share a 
common core of values, the empirical studies actually adopt 
diverse concepts of deliberation and examine different 
consequences under a range of conditions. The variations 
make it difficult to compare the findings of the studies and 
relate them to the theories (Thompson 2008, p. 501)
In other words, beneath the agreement there lurks a confusing 
disagreement, to which we now turn.
Dimensions of disagreement/difference
The overarching difference in the field, and the most substantive one, 
is that between theoretically driven articles and practically/empirically 
driven articles. The theoretical articles are primarily concerned with 
deliberation as a political concept, while the practical articles are 
primarily concerned with deliberation as a pedagogical concept. 
There are also disagreements within the different camps. In the 
theoretical camp, there is a disagreement concerning the scope of 
deliberative democratic ideals. Here, articles range from what we 
have called “political conceptions” on the one hand and “way-of-life 
conceptions” on the other hand. Within the practical camp there is a 
wider range of differences than in the theoretical camp. The various 
articles have different assumptions about what a deliberative process is 
supposed to teach students, such as decision-making skills, explo-
rative skills, and general democratic skills. All of them, however, 
describe these skills as democratic skills fostered by participation 
in a deliberative process. 
We shall now explain the differences in the field in greater detail, 
starting with the overarching one, followed by a more detailed descrip-
tion of the variations within the main camps. Of course, it is not the case 
that all articles fall neatly into the categories we have constructed, but 
we still find it a useful and adequate map of the field, giving us what 
Wittgenstein (2001) famously called a “perspicuous representation”.
Theoretical vs. practical
The main division in the literature is between what we might call 
theoretical and practical approaches. The first body of work starts from 
a theoretical conception of deliberative democracy and reasons from there 
towards the skills and values future citizens should develop. The second 
set of articles starts from a pedagogical conception of deliberation, 
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that is, deliberation as a (classroom) practice, and moves from there 
towards the skills and values that participation in such practices 
is expected to generate. These latter articles are either qualitative 
investigations of deliberative pedagogy or quantitative empirical 
articles focusing on measuring the effects of such pedagogy. Based 
on these results, researchers in the practical camp are trying to 
answer whether deliberative pedagogy “works” or not, and which 
challenges and opportunities it opens up. 
This might at first seem a perfect fit: the theoretical and the 
practical articles meet halfway in a shared view of the skills and 
values essential to the practice of deliberative democracy, the 
theoretical articles justifying the necessity of cultivating these skills 
and values by grounding them in philosophical ideals of deliberative 
democracy; and the practical articles showing how these skills and 
values are best cultivated in the classroom. Yet even though the 
literature appears at first glance cohesive, beneath the surface it is 
considerably more fragmented and disjointed. The two sets of articles 
operate with seemingly similar words, concepts, and assumptions, but 
these are given different meanings within each set.
The main reason for this discontinuity is that within education, 
deliberation has become a conception in its own right, in the form of 
deliberative pedagogy, which is not necessarily connected to deliberative 
democracy. In other words, a gap has opened up between deliberation 
as a democratic concept and deliberation as a pedagogical concept. 
This distinction runs parallel to one formulated by Tomas Englund in 
relation to his concept of deliberative communication:
[There] is an important difference between deliberative 
communication and deliberative democracy. In the latter 
constellation, a close relationship to one or other formal 
democratic decision-making process is central, whereas deli-
berative communication does not presuppose this closeness 
(Englund 2006, pp. 506–507)
According to Englund, deliberative communication may be connected 
to a deliberative democratic ideal, but it can also be connected to other 
educational aims, such as the formation and transmission of values 
and knowledge more generally. Deliberative communication can thus 
be seen as contributing to either deliberative democratic aims or more 
general educational aims.
The distinction between deliberative democracy and deliberative 
pedagogy is not a problem in itself, but it becomes a problem when 
“deliberation” is used in both senses as though there were no distinction. 
82
Martin Samuelsson & Steinar Bøyum
Hence, when the concept of deliberation is placed within a pedagogical 
context, one operates with a general idea of deliberation that can fit 
into almost any conception of democracy. So when it is argued that 
the pedagogical method of deliberation fosters such-and-such skills 
or values, it is an open question what makes these skills and values 
relevant for deliberative democracy. We shall return to this overarching 
disagreement, which is our main concern, later in the paper, but first we 
shall go into greater detail about the differences within the two camps. 
Differences within the theoretical approach: political vs. way of 
life
There are significant variations within the two main approaches. As 
mentioned, the more theoretical articles start from normative ideals 
of deliberative democracy. However, the ideals employed differ, and 
thereby also their accounts of the skills and values that ought to be 
cultivated in education. The main dividing line is between those that 
see deliberative democracy as a political ideal, and those that see it 
as an entire way of life.
Political conceptions of deliberative democracy see it primarily as 
a way for citizens to make political decisions together. These concep-
tions are those that will be most familiar for people coming from the 
philosophical debate about deliberative democracy. Articles in this vein 
commonly take the works of Jürgen Habermas and/or Amy Gutmann 
as their points of departure. Reasoning skills, critical thinking, and 
the ability to listen to others are skills often emphasised, as well as 
values such as reciprocity, tolerance, and respect in the deliberative 
process (see for example Costa 2006, Englund 2006, Fitzpatrick 2009, 
Hanson & Howe 2011).
Now it should be mentioned that although most articles in this 
camp are supportive of deliberative democracy, there are also critical 
voices. The most common point of criticism in the educational literature 
on deliberative democracy concerns the role of emotions (see for example 
Ruitenberg 2009, Peterson 2009, Griffin 2012). Both Habermas’ and 
Gutmann’s views on the deliberative process are castigated for being 
overly rationalistic and for not taking sufficient account of the role 
that emotions could and should play within deliberation. This kind 
of criticism is succinctly put by Martyn Griffin (2012): 
Deliberative democracy … is built upon an assumption that 
citizens will be capable of constructing and defending reasons 
for their moral and political beliefs. However, critics of de-
liberative democracy suggest that citizens’ emotions are not 
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properly considered in this process and, if left unconsidered, 
present a serious problem for this political framework… There 
has been little consideration of how these capacities might be 
educated in children so that emotionally competent deliberative 
citizens can be created. In this paper, emotional intelligence is 
presented as an essential capacity that can fulfil this role for the 
deliberative citizen and deliberative democracy more generally 
(Griffin 2012, p. 517). 
This kind of criticism is usually grounded in the thoughts of Chantal 
Mouffe and radical democracy, which seems to have been quite influential 
in the educational literature. As a response, some authors try to modify 
and incorporate the role of emotions into the deliberative conception, 
while others instead argue for the ideas of radical democracy as the 
educational aim. It is not our aim here to defend deliberative demo-
cracy, but it should be noted that a prominent deliberative theorist 
like Thompson (2008, p. 505) claims that this criticism is based on a 
caricature of deliberative democracy: no major deliberative theorist 
has ever held that deliberators should rely on pure reason alone and 
avoid all appeals to emotion. Still, this type of criticism is frequently 
met with in the field of education.
Whereas political conceptions of deliberative democracy attend 
more narrowly to decision-making, what we have called way-of-life 
conceptions see deliberation and its attendant skills and values as 
constituents of a comprehensive moral ideal, a way people should behave 
towards each other in general (see for example Parker 1997, Yeager & 
Silva 2002, Laguardia & Pearl 2009). The important difference between 
the two types is thus one of scope. In the former, deliberation is seen as a 
process of political decision-making, whereas in the latter it is seen as a 
mode of communication that should ideally suffuse our ways of being 
and living together. In their exploration of how “children can learn to 
deliberate democratically”, Yeager and Silva (2002, p. 18) emphasise 
that although “an understanding of political democracy is important… 
we believe that there are broader meanings of democracy that stem 
partly from John Dewey’s notion of democracy…  a form of active 
community life – a way of being and living together”. As should be 
clear from the preceding quote, way-of-life conceptions are usually 
influenced by the work of John Dewey.
The difference in scope between the two could have different edu-
cational implications. The same core skills and values are emphasised 
in both: verbal reasoning skills, the ability to listen to others, to reflect 
upon their statements and arguments, attitudes of tolerance and respect, 
and so on. Yet the difference in scope means that these skills and values 
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have different meanings in the different conceptions. In the first, 
they are primarily issue-centred, and in the second they are more 
relation-centred. In the political conception, deliberative skills and 
values are justified instrumentally as strategies for (good) political 
decision-making. Reasoning skills, for instance, are seen as important 
for exploring different alternatives and different solutions in order to 
make the understanding of the problem and the subsequent decision 
as good as possible. Furthermore, values of tolerance and respect are 
connected with the idea that one should not have predetermined views 
about which solution, decision, or perspective best fits the situation 
one is in. In contrast, in the way-of-life conception these abilities are 
connected to the idea of deliberation as a way for people to interact 
and live together. Deliberative skills and values are thus not employed 
merely to explore different alternatives in order to come to the best 
possible solution, but are justified as manifesting a kinder and morally 
better way to treat one’s fellow citizens.
A further implication could be the treatment of controversial issues 
in the classroom. A discussion framed with the aim of educating students 
to “be sensitive to each other’s feelings” (James 2010, pp. 620–621) will 
typically be guided in a direction where the discussion is characterised 
by these values, whereas a discussion framed with the aim of teaching 
students to “challenge ideas” will typically be guided in a different 
direction, and allow for a more confrontational form of communication. 
This can be extended to the discussion of a safe classroom climate, which 
is a prominent topic of interest in the literature (see for example Minnici 
& Hill 2007, James 2010). A discussion framed by a political conception 
will be more likely to allow a confrontational discussion without inter-
preting it as an “unsafe classroom climate”, whereas someone viewing 
the very same discussion from a way-of-life conception might interpret 
it as “unsafe”. The point is that different conceptions of deliberative 
democracy would guide classroom practices in different directions, 
and give deliberative skills and values different meanings.
Differences within the practical approach
The difference in scope noted in the former section was within the more 
theoretical articles. We now turn to the articles within the practical 
camp. These start with a pedagogical conception of deliberation and 
move from there towards the skills and values participation is expected 
to generate. This part of the literature is difficult to structure, given the 
variation as to which aspects of deliberation are seen as most important, 
and thus which skills and values it ought to cultivate. In this section we 
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look at different ideas about deliberation as a pedagogical method, 
that is, diverging views both about what to emphasise in the delibera-
tion itself and about the educational benefits of that deliberation. We 
also intend to show how and why this is a contributing factor to the 
gap existing in the field. 
Within the practical camp, there are both qualitative and quantitative 
articles. The articles using qualitative methods are usually most interested 
in how to make deliberative discussions “work”, what possibilities 
and strategies exist for conducting them, and what the obstacles and 
difficulties are. A recurring challenge is that classroom discussions too 
often become confrontational, resulting in an unpleasant atmosphere 
(Minnici & Hill 2007, p. 202). These challenges are often linked to the 
question of how to maintain a “safe” classroom climate, a major topic 
of discussion in this part of the literature (see for example Minnici & 
Hill 2007, James 2010). Other challenges include how to get everyone 
involved and how to handle varying class sizes (see for example Parker 
2001, Beck 2005). Another topic of discussion is the role and potential 
of the Internet as an arena in which to conduct deliberative discussions, 
with several articles expressing enthusiasm for this possibility (see for 
example Holt et al. 1998, Hall 2008, Jackson & Wallin 2009), while 
others concentrate on the classroom (see for example Brice 2002, Beck 
2005, Reich 2007, Thornberg 2010). 
A desired outcome of deliberation is decision-making skills. 
By participating in deliberation students are assumed to learn 
skills necessary for making decisions together, essential skills in 
a competent democratic citizen (see for example Parker 2001, Beck 
2003, Beck 2005, Camicia 2010). A closely related desired outcome 
is explorative skills. According to this view, deliberation should teach 
students how to discuss and explore different issues together (see for 
example Parker 2001, Brice 2002, Jerome & Algarra 2005, Camicia 
2010). By exploring difficult topics together students are assumed to 
acquire democratic capacities such as being able to think logically, 
to argue coherently and fairly, and to consider relevant alternatives 
before making judgment (Brice 2002, pp. 67–68). Now, there are 
noticeable similarities between the skills and values emphasised in the 
qualitative part of the practical camp on one side, and the skills and va-
lues emphasised by the political conception described in the theoretical 
camp on the other. An important difference, however, is that within the 
pedagogically driven articles the description of deliberative democracy 
is often quite broad and vague, as is the description of deliberation as 
an educative process. An example is found in Beck (2003):
86
Martin Samuelsson & Steinar Bøyum
While the tools of deliberation are many, Parker and Zumeta 
(1999) reduce the eight steps of professional policy analysis to 
three steps that citizens should know. Their steps can be 
described as civic tools. They are: (1) problem findings – 
identifying and understanding public problems; (2) solutions 
generation and analysis – developing and analyzing policy 
options together; and (3) decision making – making policy 
decisions together” (Beck 2003, pp. 328–329).
This description of a deliberative process is so broad that the connection 
to deliberative democracy becomes unclear. When the argument about 
which desired skills and values participation in deliberation can be ex-
pected to generate is based upon such a vague definition, the immediate 
relevance to deliberative democracy becomes unclear. 
The unclear connection to deliberative democracy is perhaps 
even more apparent in the quantitative literature. These articles are 
first and foremost interested in measuring the effect of participa-
tion in deliberations. However, deliberation is here understood as a 
pedagogical method designed to teach students general political skills, 
knowledge and values: “deliberation about policy and politics in the 
classroom increases students’ knowledge, efficacy, interest, and opinion 
arrangement” (Luskin et al. in: Latimer & Hempson 2012, p. 374). 
Deliberative conversational skills are at times mentioned, but the effect 
of deliberation is measured against general political skills, knowledge 
and values (see for example Gastil & Dillard 1999, Feldman et al. 
2007, Gershtenson et al. 2010). Again, the results are interesting, 
but they are not of immediate relevance to deliberative democracy 
in particular.
The empirical studies, both qualitative and quantitative, do not for 
the most part address the concerns that are central in the theoretical 
work on deliberative democracy. The practical field’s use of broad 
and vague definitions of deliberation leads to multifarious notions of 
what the desired skills and values are, and thus, what deliberation 
ought to cultivate. The problem is that these vague definitions lead 
to reinterpretations of deliberative skills and values to the extent that 
it is possible to question what their connection to deliberative demo-
cracy is all together. It is though a gap threatens to open up within 
the literature, between a more specific political idea of deliberation 
and a more general idea of deliberation. 
An extreme example of how the very broad definitions of delibe-
ration employed in the practical field makes it possible to reinterpret 
the desired “deliberative” skills and values, is displayed in Dahlstedt et 
al. (2011). Here various educational programmes, such as Aggression 
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Replacement Training (ART), are described as educative in a delibera-
tive democratic sense:
Lately, a deliberative conception of democracy has gained 
influence in policy debates throughout Europe. Individuals are 
here seen to be fostered into responsible, mature – democratic 
– citizens by being involved in dialogue… This article analyses 
two pedagogical models… Social and Emotional Training and 
Aggression Replacement Training, both teaching students the 
art of democratic deliberation … The programmes, through 
the use of dialogue, aim at educating the pupils in one way 
or another to become deliberative subjects, characterized by 
a well-developed ‘social competence’ (Dahlstedt et al. 2011, 
pp. 399–400). 
Like Bergh and Englund (2014) we wonder what this has to do 
with deliberative democracy as conceived of by political theorists. 
This article is an extreme example of a general problem in the field: 
when deliberation is seen as a way to teach students different skills, 
as in this example social skills, like taking responsibility for the 
consequences of one’s actions, or emotional skills, like anger mana-
gement (Dahlstedt et al. 2011, p. 408), what makes these skills and 
values deliberative-democratic? Are the students learning specifically 
deliberative-democratic skills or just general skills, placed within a 
framework of deliberative democracy to earn legitimacy? 
Our main conclusion, and our main concern, about the state of 
deliberative education echoes the one made by Dennis Thompson 
(2008) in his survey of the relation between deliberative democratic 
theory and empirical political science: normative theorists and empirical 
researchers tend to “talk past each other” – the empirical studies often 
fail to engage with the theoretical ones, and vice versa. The empirical 
work would be more productive if it had a clearer idea of the distinctive 
nature of deliberative democracy, in contrast to general democratic 
ideas. Something similar goes for educational research on delibera-
tive democracy. The empirical studies employ diverse conception of 
deliberation, and moreover, conceptions that are so general that the 
connection between practical, pedagogical research and theoretical, 
philosophical research is lost. A tighter integration of pedagogical and 
philosophical work on deliberation would yield more fruitful research.
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Conclusion
Our survey of the field of education for deliberative democracy has 
shown that it is characterised by some consequential disagreements 
and differences in emphasis. Despite the underlying agreement that 
deliberative skills and values are learned through practicing delibera-
tion, and that the core of deliberation is a respectful dialogue where 
various voices are heard, there are also extensive disagreements. The 
most significant of these is the one between studies that are concerned 
with deliberation as primarily a political concept and studies that start 
from deliberation as a pedagogical concept. Within the first camp, 
articles range from what we have called “political conceptions” on 
the one hand to “way-of-life-conceptions” on the other hand. Within 
the second camp, there is a wider range of differences and articles 
have various ideas about what a deliberative process is supposed to 
teach students such as decision-making skills, explorative skills, and 
general democratic skills. 
All of these disagreements contribute to the impression of a 
disjointed field. On the surface they all seem to talk about the same 
thing, but different articles intend different things when using the 
same concepts. Different conceptions of deliberative democracy guide 
education in different directions, and the empirical articles are not 
investigating quite the same thing as what the theoretical field is ar-
guing for. Particularly problematic is the divergence between a narrow, 
political ideal of deliberation and a wider, pedagogical idea, and the 
way articles often slide from one use to the other, without seemingly 
noticing the difference, which makes the various authors talk past 
each other. The result is a field of literature in which it is difficult to 
compare the different articles, and difficult to evaluate, discuss and 
use the results and thoughts presented. As a consequence, work within 
this field fails to be cumulative: articles do not build on each other, and 
little progress is being made. In order to make the field more cohesive, 
a clearer attention to the distinction between deliberative democracy and 
deliberative pedagogy might be productive. Obviously, abstract ideals 
like those found within the philosophical literature on deliberative 
democracy will have to be operationalised into more manageable 
methods and objectives in order to be applied educationally, but 
still, it would be helpful to connect these operationalisations back 
to the political ideals, so that the latter are not simply left behind. By 
thus tending carefully to the interplay between philosophical ideals 
and pedagogical reality, genuine progress, both in a theoretical and 
practical sense, might be achieved.
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The idea of deliberative democracy has been widely discussed in political theory over the last two decades. It has also made an impression in the field of 
democratic education. Many who are interested in democratic 
education have started to ask how the skills and values assumed 
necessary for deliberative democratic participation can be taught 
and learned.
In a review of the field of education for deliberative democ-
racy, Samuelsson and Bøyum (2015) argue that it is characterised 
by both agreement and disagreement. There is an overarching 
agreement that students and future citizens learn the skills and 
values necessary for deliberative democratic participation by 
partaking in deliberative discussions. Yet the field is also marked 
by significant disagreements and differences in focus. The most 
important one is between studies viewing deliberation primarily 
as a political concept and studies viewing it primarily as a 
pedagogical concept. The first body of work starts from a theo-
retical conception of deliberative democracy and reasons from 
there toward the skills and values future citizens should develop. 
The second position starts with a pedagogical conception of 
deliberation, that is, deliberation as a classroom practice, and 
moves from there toward the skills and values that participation 
in it is expected to generate. This difference in focus and starting 
point only becomes a problem, however, when the pedagogical 
conception is not connected to the political idea of deliberative 
democracy. Thus, when it is argued that the pedagogical method 
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of deliberation fosters, for example, general social and emotional 
skills, it is an open question how and whether these skills are 
related to deliberative democracy. The result is a field in which 
empirical articles investigate something different than the 
theoretical field is arguing for and, thus, that the two bodies of 
studies tend to talk past each other.
The first aim of this article is to bring the more theoretical, 
political ideal of deliberative democracy closer to the pedagogical 
ideas of deliberation as a classroom practice. To do so, it is neces-
sary to flesh out the abstract criteria of democratic deliberation 
with a concrete pedagogical content, without removing oneself too 
far from the political conception of deliberation. Using four 
strategically chosen examples of classroom discussions, I develop 
an empirically based typology (Kluge, 2000) that seeks to make 
salient the character of democratic deliberation taking place inside 
classrooms as well as to highlight the difference between demo-
cratic deliberations and discussions that appear to be deliberative 
in the relevant sense but that lack one or more crucial features. In 
this way, I strive to bridge the gap between the abstract criteria of 
democratic deliberations and the discussions taking place in 
classrooms. A second aim of the article is to contribute to class-
room practices by pointing out how teachers can steer classroom 
discussions in the direction of democratic deliberation with the 
use of certain types of questions.
I begin by giving an account of the theoretical foundation of 
deliberative democracy, of democratic deliberations, and of the 
pedagogical idea of education for deliberative democracy. I then 
describe the empirical study on which the article is based, before 
presenting the typology of discussions found within the material. 
In this section, I also conduct a step- by- step analysis of representa-
tive examples of each type in order to show what a democratic 
deliberation might look like inside a classroom as well as to 
distinguish it from other closely related types of discussions. 
Finally, based upon the typology, I discuss possible implications for 
classroom practices in education for deliberative democracy.
Deliberative Democracy
Theories of deliberative democracy hold that the essence of 
democratic politics does not lie in voting and representation but in 
the common deliberation that underlies collective decision making 
(Chappell, 2012). At the core of these theories is the reason- giving 
requirement: Citizens and their representatives should justify to 
each other in a process of public deliberation the laws they impose 
on one another (Thompson, 2008). Whereas voting- centred views 
see democracy as an arena where fixed preferences and interests 
compete, deliberative democracy emphasises the communicative 
formation of will and opinion that precedes voting. In this view, 
democracy gets its legitimacy not through majority rule per se but 
through the process of giving defensible reasons, explanations, and 
accounts for public decisions (Held, 2006). In short, a legitimate 
political order is one that can be justified to all those living under 
its law (Chambers, 2003).
A number of different theorists have contributed to the 
development of the theory of deliberative democracy. It has mainly 
developed in two branches with slightly different focuses. The 
“European view,” led by Habermas, has focused on developing a 
macrolevel theory of deliberative democracy, while the “North 
American view,” influenced by Rawls’s political liberalism and 
primarily represented by Gutmann, Fishkin, and Cohen, has 
concentrated on exploring real- life examples of actual public 
deliberation. Despite differences in attention, however, there are 
some aspects of deliberative democracy that most scholars of 
deliberative democracy agree on. Two of them are highly relevant 
to this article: the essential features of a good democratic delibera-
tion and the purpose of such deliberation.
According to Habermas, a good deliberative process is based 
upon “the ideal speech situation,” a communicative situation 
where everybody can contribute, where they have an equal voice, 
and where they can speak freely and honestly without internal or 
external deception or constraint (Chappell, 2012). According to 
Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 2004), it is a reason- giving 
process in which participants use arguments accessible to all 
citizens and appeal to principles that all reasonable citizens could 
accept. Fishkin (2009, p. 34) sees deliberation as a process  
where arguments offered by one perspective are answered by 
considerations from other perspectives and where the arguments 
offered are considered on their merits regardless of which 
participant offers them. Thus, it is possible to discern a common 
core in these ideals of democratic deliberation. It is a discussion 
in which different points of view are presented and underpinned 
with reasons, and participants listen respectfully to each other 
and reflect on other participants’ claims and arguments.
There is also a rough agreement in the field about the 
purpose of a democratic deliberation. It is directed toward some 
form of collective- will formation. This is the practical, political 
aspect of deliberation: The participants are in some way trying to 
reach an agreement on how to act (see, for example, Habermas, 
1998). We may thus distinguish between deliberation in a narrow, 
political sense and deliberation in a wide, not necessarily political 
sense. This means that a discussion can be deliberative (in the 
wide sense) without being connected to an idea of democracy. 
For example, in what may be called an explorative deliberation, 
participants may discuss a certain claim or concept and use 
arguments and reasons to inquire into it, but without striving to 
reach a collective decision to act upon. In order for a discussion 
to be deliberative in the sense pertinent to deliberative democ-
racy, it also has to involve a striving for a collective- will forma-
tion, that is, some agreement about what to do.
Despite the overarching agreement in the field, there are also 
disagreements. For example, what is to count as a deliberative 
reason? According to Gutmann and Thompson (1996), a reason 
has to be guided by reciprocity in order to qualify as deliberative in 
a democratic sense. The principle of reciprocity asks citizens to use 
reasons other reasonable and similarly motivated citizens could 
accept, even if they have different worldviews. On the other hand, 
theorists like Young (2000) have argued that many formulations  
of deliberative democracy are too narrow. She argued that by using 
strict criteria for what counts as deliberative, one runs the risk of 
excluding from democratic participation certain types of reasons, 
perspectives, forms of conversations, and in the end, citizens. 
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Therefore, reasonableness should not be restricted to specific types 
of reasons but rather be defined as a willingness to listen to others 
and to maintain an open attitude to those who try to explain to you 
why you are wrong (p. 24). As should be clear, this discussion is not 
limited to questions about reasons alone but is also related to 
broader questions of democratic legitimacy, inclusion, and 
exclusion.
Similar disagreements can be found concerning the aim of 
democratic deliberation. Some have argued that deliberation 
should aim for a deep kind of consensus, in which citizens ideally 
agree on the course of action as well as on the reasons for it (Chap-
pell, 2012), while others, given the challenges of a modern, pluralis-
tic society, have argued for a relaxed notion of consensus, in which 
participants agree on the course of action but not necessarily on the 
reasons for it. Important influences for the latter position are 
Rawls’s (1987) notion of an “overlapping consensus,” Sunstein’s 
(1995) notion of “incomplete theorized agreements,” and Gaus and 
Vallier’s (2009) idea of “convergence.”
Education for Deliberative Democracy
Deliberative democracy has been criticized for being unrealistic: 
People are neither willing nor capable of participating in demo-
cratic deliberations (Englund, 2007). They are, so this criticism 
goes, driven by self- interest and are not willing to make decisions 
based on the idea of the common good and/or are too irrational 
and emotional to be capable of listening to reasons and arguments. 
Hence, they stick to the beliefs they already hold rather than being 
open to letting them be transformed in deliberation with others.
However, even if one assumes what is already doubtful, that 
this is true of the current situation, this criticism is based on a static 
view of people as unable to learn. If future citizens are taught to 
participate in deliberative democracy, the likelihood that they will 
be capable of doing so will increase. Furthermore, if citizens were 
capable of participating in democratic deliberations, the possibility 
of successfully implementing more deliberative practices in society 
would also increase, as would the opportunities for citizens to 
co- construct democratic deliberations on their own. Therefore, an 
education for deliberative democracy seeks to educate future 
citizens to participate in and to co- construct democratic delibera-
tions and is, thus, first and foremost interested in teaching them 
how to state claims, give reasons, listen to and reflect on others’ 
arguments, and strive toward finding a solution in collaboration 
with other participants.
Within the field of education for deliberative democracy 
there is a general agreement that future citizens learn the skills 
and values necessary for deliberative democratic participation 
primarily by partaking in deliberative situations, and not, for 
instance, by reading about deliberative democracy (Samuelsson & 
Bøyum, 2015). But what does this mean more concretely? The 
common core of democratic deliberation described so far seems 
too abstract to be applied directly in classrooms. Perhaps the 
clearest contemporary translation of deliberative democracy into 
a pedagogical conception is that by Englund (2006). A delibera-
tive educative situation, according to Englund, is one in which  
(a) different views are confronted with one another and 
arguments for them are articulated; (b) there is tolerance and 
respect for the concrete other, and participants listen to each 
other’s arguments; and (c) there are elements of collective- will 
formation, a desire to reach consensus or a temporary agreement. 
Two additional criteria are also formulated, stating (d) that 
traditions are allowed to be questioned and (e) that deliberative 
communication should eventually take place without teacher 
control. However, according to Englund, the first three criteria 
represent the inner core of deliberative communication. We may 
summarize these as three requirements: the reason- giving 
requirement, the reflective requirement, and the consensus 
requirement. The assumption is that by participating in classroom 
discussions following these criteria, students will have the 
opportunity to practice making arguments, giving reasons, 
listening to others, and so on, while at the same time being part of 
a collective- will formation process. By partaking in deliberative 
educative situations, students will, it is hoped, gradually become 
more and more competent at democratic deliberation.
However, as shown above, there are disagreements about the 
precise definition of deliberative democratic criteria. Furthermore, 
if one assumes, as this paper does, that future citizens learn 
deliberative skills and values by partaking in deliberative situations, 
specific features of those situations become important because 
different interpretations have different educational implications. 
Will the students be encouraged to strive toward a deep or a relaxed 
notion of consensus? Will they learn that a deliberative reason has 
to be accompanied by reciprocity, or should reasonableness rather 
be understood as merely a willingness to listen? In one sense, this 
article sides with Young (2000) in leaving the concept of reason 
open, since it does not take a specific stand on what is to count as a 
reason. By leaving the reason- giving requirement, along with the 
other two requirements, slightly open, I argue that it is possible to 
bridge the gap between theories of deliberative democracy on one 
side and empirical research conducted in classrooms on the other 
without losing the essence of deliberative democracy in the process. 
However, as I shall return to, this openness does not stop the 
students themselves from adopting stricter criteria for deliberation 
in particular contexts.
Yet even if we are now somewhat closer to fleshing out the 
abstract criteria of democratic deliberation, we still need to get a 
more concrete idea of what a classroom discussion that satisfies the 
three requirements actually might look like. In order to do this, it is 
important to distinguish democratic deliberations from discus-
sions that are similar but lack one or more characteristic features. 
Hence, the aim now is to bring the theory of deliberative democ-
racy and the ideas from deliberation as a classroom practice closer 
together, by analyzing examples of classroom discussions and by 
developing a practically useful typology.
Empirical Study
The data for the empirical study that this article is based on was 
collected during the spring and autumn of 2014. The method of 
collection was qualitative, since the main interest was an in- depth 
investigation of classroom discussions. Three different schools were 
visited, all located on the west coast of Norway, in or just outside 
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one of the bigger cities in the region. I accompanied one teacher at 
each school for approximately two weeks, observed their class-
room practices, conducted formal interviews with them, and was 
involved in informal conversations. The data contains samples 
from different grades (five, six, seven, eight, nine, and upper 
secondary) as well as different subjects (English, math, Norwegian, 
social science, and psychology). The profiles of the schools varied, 
with two of them being more ethnically diverse than the third. One 
school had a religious foundation, while the other two did not. The 
teachers were all interested in democracy as an educational aim, as 
well as in classroom discussion as a pedagogical practice. However, 
they were unfamiliar with the concept of deliberative democracy 
prior to participating in this study. Furthermore, even though the 
Norwegian national curriculum does include democratic compe-
tence as an explicit aim, the concept of deliberative democracy is 
absent. Nevertheless, as will be shown, it is fully possible that the 
discussions in the observed classrooms have democratic delibera-
tive characteristics, even if the teachers were unfamiliar with the 
concept at the time.
The loosely structured observation guide that directed my 
attention during data collection was based mainly on Englund’s 
three core criteria. Thus, I intentionally looked for discussions 
satisfying the reason- giving requirement, the reflective require-
ment, and the consensus requirement. During data analysis, a 
number of discussions seemed at first glance to be examples of 
democratic deliberations. However, upon closer analysis, signifi-
cant differences between them appeared, allowing for the con-
struction of a typology of classroom discussions relevant to 
education for deliberative democracy. In the following, I shall 
present this typology, illustrating each type with a representative 
example. As will be made clear, only the fourth and last is a case of 
democratic deliberation in the sense relevant to theories of 
deliberative democracy (which does not mean that the other three 
cannot be useful for teaching skills and values essential for 
deliberative democratic participation). Illustrating the first type is 
an example from a discussion about beauty, while the second type 
is exemplified by a mathematical discussion. The third type is 
illustrated with a discussion focusing on human rights, while the 
fourth and final type is exemplified by a discussion about how a 
class is going to work with a topic.
A Typology of Classroom Discussions
1. The explorative discussion.
The first type is a discussion with pervasive disagreement but with 
little striving toward consensus. To exemplify this, let’s look at a 
discussion taking place in an English class in upper secondary 
school. Ten students and one teacher were present during the 
discussion, which focused on the concept of beauty. The debated 
questions fluctuated from “Why is beauty important?” to “Is 
modern art beautiful?” At first glance, this discussion seemed to be 
an example of a democratic deliberation, since the students were 
presenting different viewpoints; they seemed to listen to each 
other; and they seemed willing to think about each other’s state-
ments and posed replies to them. In the following short extract, the 
teacher and two students discussed whether people in the Middle 
Ages could appreciate beauty in their everyday lives. The teacher 
argued that they did appreciate beauty, while the students argued 
the contrary.
Teacher: That doesn’t mean their whole universe was deprived of 
beauty.
Peter: No, but he [Rembrandt] painted city citizens who were more 
like merchants and people that at least had housing, but I 
mean, throughout history most of the population have not 
been that well off.
Teacher: But do you think they were completely deprived of 
moments where [they asked,] “What are the possibilities  
of life?”
Peter: I wouldn’t think so, but I don’t think . . . 
Tobias: Yeah, but we’re not that . . . 
Peter: [But I don’t think they] woke up and stopped and felt like, 
“Oh, wonder what’s going on. What am I doing here?” I don’t 
think many people woke up thinking like that in the morn-
ing. I think most of them just went straight to . . . 
Teacher: You guys, honestly, every day I practically wake up and 
it’s, I mean, [laughs] “What am I doing here?”
Several students: [laugh]
Teacher: “What are the possibilities of this day?”
Tobias: Yeah, like Peter said, it wasn’t any better; it was worse back 
then. In the big cities, if you go back a couple of hundred 
years, then you didn’t have sewers, so what people would do? 
They would dump the sewage out their windows, meaning 
you literally had sewage running through the streets. That’s 
not beautiful. You would wake up and: “Oh, there is sewage 
in the middle of the road.”
This type of discussion fulfills both the reason- giving and the 
reflective requirements. In the example above, different claims 
were put forward, such as “That doesn’t mean their whole universe 
was deprived of beauty” and “But I don’t think they woke up and 
stopped and felt like, ‘Oh, wonder what’s going on. What am I 
doing here?’” The different claims were underpinned with argu-
ments and reasons, for instance, “It was worse back then. In the big 
cities, if you go back a couple of hundred years . . . sewage [was] 
running through the streets . . . That’s not beautiful.” Furthermore, 
they listened to each other and responded to each other’s state-
ments: “But do you think they were completely deprived of 
moments where” and “Yeah, like Peter said.” This shows the 
presence of the reason- giving and the reflective requirements. 
However, the consensus condition is not fulfilled. There were 
instances when they were responding to each other, but overall the 
discussion was more an exploration of differences than a construc-
tion of a common understanding and a striving for consensus. This 
is not irrelevant for democratic deliberation. Indeed, Parker (2006) 
sees it as a vital precursor to a deliberative process. It is not in itself 
deliberative in the sense characteristic of deliberative democracy, 
however, since it is not channeled toward a resolution that can be 
made a basis for a collective act. Therefore, this type has the 
characteristics of an explorative discussion rather than a demo-
cratic deliberation.
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2. The problem- solving discussion.
The second type is a discussion with a clear striving for consensus but 
with little real disagreement. The representative example is from a 
mathematical discussion where 25 fifth- grade students were 
organized in groups of four trying to find the solution to 344 divided 
by 4. At first glance, this discussion seemed to be an example of 
democratic deliberation, because the students were discussing with 
each other, they listened to each other, and they seemed to collabo-
rate. Furthermore, this discussion satisfied the condition lacking in 
the previous example: the consensus requirement. Each group had to 
come to an agreement about the answer, and they were also explicitly 
encouraged to discuss how to arrive at the answer (e.g., should they 
start by dividing 300 by 3 or by dividing 44 by something), and so 
they had to agree upon the calculation as well.
Markus: So, do we know the answer?
Charlotte: What is 300 divided by 4? What is 100 divided by 4?  
Oh [sounds disappointed].
Erik: 20, 20 times 4 is 100.
Markus: No, 100 divided by 4 is 25.
Charlotte: 25 . . . [counting out loud by herself]
Erik: It’s 20!
Markus: It’s 25.
Erik: 20, 40, 60, 80, okay, fine.
Markus: 25 times . . . 
Erik: Okay, 25. I said, fine.
Charlotte: But I have 20 . . . 
Markus: Yes, do you understand?
Charlotte: . . . More, 100 divided by 4 is 25, so 100 . . . 25 times 3 is 75, 
then [sounds happy].
Markus: Yes, the answer is 70, ehm.
Charlotte: 75 and then add 11, 86.
Markus: Okay.
Charlotte: But that can’t be right.
Markus: Why not?
Charlotte: Oh [sounds happy], I just counted wrong, funny.
Markus: Yes, very [pretends to be laughing].
In this example, the consensus requirement is satisfied. They 
arrived at a collective answer for the group, and they agreed upon 
the calculation. However, this agreement was not reached by a 
deliberative reason- giving process. They disagreed about some 
calculations (“20, 20 times 4 is 100;” “No, 100 divided by 4 is 25”) 
and about the answer (“But that can’t be right”; “Why not?”). 
However, the discussion included few instances of genuine 
disagreement. They disagreed, but ultimately one of them turned 
out to be right, and the others turned out to be wrong. In this 
example, there was a right answer limiting the disagreement. They 
could have disagreed about the best way to conduct the calculation, 
as encouraged by the teacher, which could have resulted in a 
discussion with a less obvious correct answer, but this group ended 
up only explaining the calculation to those not understanding it 
yet. Therefore, this example does not include the reason- giving 
requirement and the reflective requirement, essential for a demo-
cratic deliberation.
Let us pause to compare the first two types. The explorative 
discussion fulfills the reason- giving and the reflective requirements 
but not the consensus requirement. Conversely, the problem- solving 
discussion fulfills the consensus requirement but not the reason- 
giving and the reflective requirements. Put sharply, the first is too 
open to count as democratic deliberation, and the second is too 
closed.1 Naturally, since the intention behind a typology is to enable 
us to see recurring patterns in a chaotic world, it has to be simplified 
somewhat. In reality, therefore, classroom discussions will be placed 
along a continuum from open to closed, with the two types looked at 
so far being located at opposite poles.
Note also that even if neither of the first two discussion types is 
deliberative in the sense pertinent to deliberative democracy, they 
might very well be educationally beneficial. For example, in an 
explorative discussion, the students can practice making state-
ments, using arguments, and reflecting upon other’s statements. In 
a problem- solving discussion, they can practice making decisions 
together using dialogue. This might be beneficial for the develop-
ment of the various skills, attitudes, and values that are necessary to 
participate in democratic deliberation.
3. The predetermined discussion.
The third type is also a discussion reaching a conclusion, while 
showing few instances of disagreement. Thus, it has similarities 
with the problem- solving discussion, but the starting point as well 
as the topic of the discussion is vastly different. Fifteen students in 
ninth grade, one teacher, and one teacher assistant, were discussing 
different topics related to human rights, such as the treatment of 
women, the death penalty, and euthanasia, over the course of one 
hour and a half. The teacher initiated the classroom discussion by 
presenting the content of three newspaper articles, but the discus-
sion was not limited to those stories. The teacher explained Sharia 
law to the students. She was interested in their thoughts about it 
and used the following story to get them involved in the topic.
Teacher: Has anybody heard of the two girls in India who were 
hanged? First they were raped, then murdered, and then 
hanged.
Christian: I saw a picture.
Teacher: The two girls were casteless; do you know what that 
means?
Class: No.
Teacher: In India, they have a caste system, which is a way to divide 
society into different classes, like in England where you have 
upper class, middle class, and working class. You can’t move 
from one class to another, not really, anyway, so you are stuck 
in the one you were born into. In India, you can be casteless, 
and these two girls were casteless. Two of the persons 
involved in this crime were police. This was not the first time 
something like this happened in India in recent years. Do you 
remember the girl on the bus who wasn’t allowed off when 
1 This has, of course, partly to do with the subject matter, mathematics, 
but note that in other cases, perhaps more so in higher education, a 
discussion about mathematics could certainly satisfy the reason- giving 
requirement.
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she wanted to and, instead, was brought farther along just to 
get raped by a group of men?
Class is silent.
Teacher: In India, it has become an attitude that girls are fair game. 
What do you think about this?
Class is silent.
Teacher [with a little more urgency in her voice]: You agree that 
rape is a bad thing?
Adrian: I think we all agree that rape is a bad thing.
At first glance, the topic seems ripe for democratic delibera-
tion. How should women be treated in modern society? How 
should the raping of women be dealt with? What legal system 
should be the foundation for a nation? The ensuing discussion, 
however, lived up neither to the expectations of the teacher nor to 
those of the democratic theorist. A democratic deliberation 
includes the consensus condition, but the problem in this type of 
discussion is that consensus is already there from the start, and not 
something to strive for: “I think we all agree that rape is a bad 
thing,” as Adrian said. The case of the Indian girls is both shocking 
and challenging; it might incite students to political action, but it 
does not generate a genuine deliberation. The dialogue is not one 
where different views are confronted with each other in order to 
collectively find the best argument. Rather, the only argument is: 
Rape is a horrible thing— there are no competing viewpoints. 
Surprisingly, therefore, this example has similar characteristics to 
the problem- solving discussion: The conclusion was preordained, 
and there was no real discussion. The statement put forward by the 
teacher— “You agree that rape is a bad thing?”— was intended to 
get the discussion going, but it was obvious that it was not really up 
for discussion. Thus, this example also includes few instances of the 
reason- giving requirement and the reflective requirement.
As in the two previous examples, there are aspects relevant to 
future democratic participation that students could learn from 
taking part in this discussion. For example, the students could gain 
insight into existing injustices and acquire knowledge about 
human rights, and perhaps they could be stimulated to engage 
politically with the treated issue. Yet the topic of this article is 
whether they participated in democratic deliberations in order to 
practice giving reasons, listening to and reflecting upon other 
points of view, and at the same time striving to reach a collective 
conclusion, and in this case they did not.
4. Democratic deliberation.
Right after the attempted discussion in the former section, the 
teacher asked the students how they would like to continue 
working with the topic. This question instantly turned the class-
room into a forum for democratic deliberation.
Teacher: How would you like to continue working with this topic? 
Because I think it is that interesting that we should continue 
with it. How would you like to approach it? I can see that not 
everybody has participated equally, and some of you haven’t 
participated at all.
Christian: Two teams and two sides in a debate, where one side is 
for and the other is against.
Teacher: A formal debate, a debate society, okay. That could be a 
good thing to have on your CV as well. For example, in the 
USA that is a pretty big deal.
Adrian: In the USA, math teams are also a big thing, but we don’t 
have to do those just because of that.
Teacher: But if we have two teams debating, do you have to believe 
the side you are on, or can you just pretend? Can you go into 
that role just for the sake of the debate?
Adrian: We have to be assigned the different positions.
Christian: If it is going to be a good discussion, it has to be 
something you stand for.
Adrian: You can argue a case even if you don’t personally believe it 
or agree with their arguments. You can always have pros and 
cons, understand them, and use them in order to disprove 
the other side. For example, if you are going to discuss rape, 
one side can say, “The way she dressed was the reason,” while 
the other side could answer, “That shouldn’t matter— you are 
not supposed to be raped anyway,” et cetera. In that way, you 
can use the arguments to disprove the other side.
Christian: I think everybody has similar opinions in here anyway.
Adrian: It could be a good exercise, to participate in a debate even 
if you’re just assigned a position, to argue in favor of some-
thing even if you don’t personally agree with that point of 
view.
Teacher: A defense lawyer, for example, he is supposed to do 
everything in his power to win, use evidence, find loopholes, 
et cetera, in order to get his client free, because that is his job. 
Do you have to go into a debate with emotions, or can you 
keep them out of it and be strictly analytical?
Adrian: Everybody has a price.
Teacher: But I’m thinking that maybe not everybody is equally 
comfortable participating in a debate. Some of you are shy, 
some of you will shut down, and some of you are disinter-
ested. [She turns toward a group of girls sitting in the front 
who have been quiet the whole time.] What do you think?
Sara: I don’t know; it’s difficult to say what you think, to express 
your opinion.
Teacher: Would it be easier to write it down?
Sara: Yes, that would be better.
Adrian: I would rather have the debate.
Teacher: In a debate, it is very important that everybody feels 
comfortable in order for them to participate. Take you 
[addresses Adrian], for example— not to point any fingers, 
but you are pretty straightforward with your opinions, and 
that is your right, but that can make other people insecure, 
shut down, and shy away from expressing their opinion.
Andrea: A debate is fine as long as the topic isn’t controversial.
Teacher: So, as long as the topic isn’t too controversial, it would be 
fine? So, what kind of topic would you like?
Adrian: Pensions, minimum wages.
Teacher: Remember [referring to a point made earlier], not every 
senior citizen has an easy ride just because they get a pension 
from the state. If we are going to discuss something like 
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pensions, you have to have the whole picture, and I don’t 
think we have that, so that will be too difficult a topic.
Teacher assistant: What about school? You can discuss how long 
pupils should have to be at school, how much homework they 
should have, et cetera.
Class: Yes!
In this example, three different smaller discussions were 
taking place: how to continue working with the topic; whether 
students should be assigned to sides randomly, or whether they 
need to believe what they are arguing for; and what the topic of the 
debate should be. All of them fulfil the three requirements for 
democratic deliberation.
Let us start by looking at the reason- giving requirement. In the 
discussion about how to work with the topic, two different points of 
views were presented, one in favor of a classroom debate and 
another in favor of writing down ideas individually. Both positions 
were underpinned with reasons, such as “That a formal debate is a 
pretty big deal in the United States” and “It could be a good 
exercise, to participate in a debate” on one side, and “Not every-
body is equally comfortable participating in debates” and “It’s 
difficult to say what you think” on the other. In the discussion of 
whether they should be assigned to sides randomly in the debate or 
should choose the side they support, different points of views were 
also presented, as well as different reasons for those positions: “If it 
is going to be a good discussion, it has to be something you stand 
for” and “You can argue a case even if you don’t personally believe it 
or agree with their arguments.” In the discussion concerning the 
topic of the debate, different suggestions, such as pensions and 
minimum wages, were put forth. An argument was presented 
against both of them: “If we are going to discuss something like 
pensions, you have to have the whole picture, and I don’t think we 
have that.” This shows the presence of a reason- giving process.
The reflective requirement is also fulfilled. The students 
displayed the willingness to listen to and reflect upon each other’s 
arguments and reasons. They were also willing to revise their 
positions based upon reasons: “A debate is fine as long as the topic 
isn’t too controversial.” Furthermore, new suggestions were also 
presented based upon skepticism to the original suggestions: 
“What about school? You can discuss how long pupils should have 
to be in school, how much homework they should have, et cetera.” 
Finally, the striving for consensus is displayed explicitly when 
Andrea tried to formulate a compromise that all parties could live 
with— “A debate is fine as long as the topic isn’t too controversial”— 
and when the whole class unanimously agreed upon the topic for 
that debate. Thus, all three requirements are present and satisfied. 
This is not to take a stand on the actual quality of the deliberation in 
this example, but it is nevertheless an example of a democratic 
deliberation taking place in a classroom.2
This example, besides being an example of a democratic 
deliberation, also shows the advantage of siding with Young’s 
(2000) strategy of leaving the specific content of “reason” open. By 
using less strict criteria, this class was presented with the 
2 For a more thorough discussion of the difference between quality of 
and criteria for democratic deliberation, see Thompson (2008).
opportunity to democratically deliberate about the criteria for a 
classroom debate, such as what role emotions should have, how to 
get everyone to participate, and whether the topic should be 
controversial or not. By relaxing the criteria for acceptable reasons 
on the theoretical level, the teacher opened up for the students 
themselves to discuss and negotiate the character and structure of 
deliberation on the practical level. Furthermore, the questions they 
raised were important for theories of deliberative democracy as 
well as for deliberative classroom practices.
In the field of deliberative democracy, the role of emotions is a 
highly debated topic. Leading theorists like Habermas and Gut-
mann are frequently being challenged and criticized for not placing 
enough emphasis on emotions. One such critical voice has been 
that of Young (2000), who has stressed that emotions should not be 
regarded as a flaw in people’s reasonableness but instead as a tool  
of reasonable persuasion and judgment. The discussion about 
emotions has also made an impression in the field of education for 
deliberative democracy, where critics of the Habermasian formula-
tion have used ideas from Mouffe and radical democracy to 
incorporate emotions into the formulation of deliberative democ-
racy (Samuelsson & Bøyum, 2015).
The class also discussed whether the topic of the debate should 
be controversial or not. This is an important question, not least to 
this paper. Hess (2009), a recognized name in the field of demo-
cratic education, has been one in favor of controversial topics. She 
has argued, with the use of empirical studies, that students increase 
their political tolerance and gain a better understanding of difficult 
political questions by taking part in controversial discussions. 
These results are highly interesting, and they are of importance to 
anyone involved in education for democracy. However, the concern 
of this paper is the development of the core skills of deliberative 
democracy, which is not what Hess has focused on. Deliberative 
skills are assumed learned through practice in democratic delibera-
tion, and in my material, as shown in examples three and four, the 
topic of conversation was not the decisive factor in whether a 
deliberative pattern of conversation was established or not.
Furthermore, in the framework of education for deliberative 
democracy, there might even be pedagogical reasons for postpon-
ing the use of controversial topics. A case can be made that highly 
controversial topics are more difficult to handle than less contro-
versial ones. For example, with highly controversial topics, students 
might be very emotionally attached to one specific position (again, 
the question of emotions) and might be mainly interested in getting 
their points across. These aspects, arguably more present in 
controversial discussions, could present challenges for creating the 
desired communicative pattern of reason giving, reflection, and 
collective- will formation. If the discussion instead concentrated on 
questions less controversial and emotionally charged, a deliberative 
communicative pattern might be easier to establish, and then, once 
the students gradually became better at democratic deliberation, 
more difficult questions could be introduced. The point is that if 
students are to be educated for deliberative democracy by practic-
ing at democratic deliberation, the primary task has to be to 
establish a communicative pattern of democratic deliberation— 
the topic of that discussion is of secondary interest.
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The main aim of the developed typology is to aid in distin-
guishing democratic deliberation from other closely related types 
of discussions taking place in classrooms. It is worth noting, 
however, that there are other typologies of classroom discussions 
aimed at democratic education. Parker (2006), for example, 
distinguishes between seminars and deliberations. Seminars are 
used to develop and explore meanings while deliberations are used 
for practicing decision making. However, my claim is that a 
discussion has to include both aspects to qualify as a democratic 
deliberation. Furthermore, his typology does not provide us with a 
nuanced enough picture to help distinguish democratic delibera-
tions from other closely related types of discussions. I argue that 
the typology presented in this paper does that to a greater extent.
Practical Implications: Turning Classroom Discussions 
into Democratic Deliberations
The examples analyzed in the previous section represent different 
types of discussions. At first glance, a number of the discussions 
found in the material appeared to be examples of democratic 
deliberation. However, upon closer examination, these could be 
placed along a continuum from open (disagreement) to closed 
(consensus). On one side are discussions with pervasive disagree-
ment but few instances of striving toward consensus (the explor-
ative type), and on the other side are discussions with a clear 
notion of consensus but few instances of genuine disagreement 
(the problem- solving type and the predetermined type). These 
discussions do not satisfy the three requirements for democratic 
deliberations. Yet located in between these two poles are discus-
sions that do satisfy them: democratic deliberations.
The different types of discussions do not just have different 
characteristics but are also structured around different types of 
questions. The explorative discussion, on one hand, is structured 
around an open question, such as “Did they appreciate beauty in 
the Middle Ages?” It has many open parameters, allowing the 
students to genuinely disagree and to present different viewpoints 
and perspectives. At the same time, it has several subjective, 
diffuse, and abstract parameters, making it difficult to strive for 
consensus. For example, what does it mean to appreciate beauty, 
and is it possible to know if people in the Middle Ages appreciated 
beauty or not? The problem- solving discussion and the predeter-
mined discussion, on the other hand, are structured around closed 
questions. The mathematical question “What is 344 divided by 4?” 
is directed toward a conclusion: finding the answer to the math-
ematical problem. However, this question has a correct answer, 
which makes it difficult to disagree. The discussion concerning 
human rights has a predetermined conclusion, namely, that rape is 
bad. This point of view is not up for discussion, and the students 
have few opportunities to disagree. A closed question directs the 
discussion toward a conclusion, an essential aspect of a democratic 
deliberation, but since that conclusion is predetermined, it makes 
it difficult to disagree. The democratic deliberation is placed in 
between these outer positions. It is structured around a question 
open enough to allow for genuine disagreement but at the same 
time closed enough to clearly direct the discussion toward a 
conclusion.
The clearest example of the importance of the question asked is 
when the ninth- grade class moved from a predetermined discussion 
about human rights to a democratic deliberation about how to work 
with a topic. The two discussions took place in the same classroom, 
in the same class, involving the same teacher and the same students. 
The one condition that changed was the question asked. By changing 
the question, the teacher turned the predetermined discussion into a 
democratic deliberation. By using a question that was open enough 
to allow for an actual disagreement (but not so open that it got 
difficult to come to a conclusion) and at the same time closed enough 
to allow for striving toward consensus (but not so closed that it got 
difficult to disagree on the matter), she steered the discussion in the 
direction of a democratic deliberation.
This is, however, a highly contextual matter. A question 
directing one classroom discussion toward a democratic delibera-
tion does not have to do the same in another classroom or at another 
time. Thus, finding a question with the right balance is up to the 
person (teacher) leading the discussion and is dependent on a 
number of contextual factors. It is important to emphasize, however, 
that finding the right question is only one of many factors contribut-
ing to the construction of democratic deliberation in classrooms and 
will not on its own turn every classroom discussion into a perfect 
democratic deliberation. Furthermore, even if patterns of demo-
cratic deliberation appear, it does not guarantee that every student 
participates, since there are many different reasons for why students 
could be left out. Thus, there are numerous obstacles in constructing 
deliberative democratic patterns of conversation in classrooms, and 
even if one succeeds at that, getting everyone involved might still be 
a challenge. The question of involving everyone is important in an 
educational sense. It is also, however, a question relevant for 
deliberative democracy in a wider sense. There may be contextual 
and structural factors required for a deliberation to fully qualify as 
democratic, as, for example, being at a certain level of equality, 
inclusion, and nondiscrimination in general. These questions are 
important and worthy of further discussion and investigation. In this 
article, however, the focus has been narrower, and in that context, 
finding a question with the right balance is arguably a crucial factor 
for constructing democratic deliberations in classrooms.
Conclusion
There are different ways of theorizing deliberative democracy, but 
scholars within the field agree upon the core of it: a reason- based 
public deliberation focused on reaching a collective decision. 
Therefore, an education for deliberative democracy is first and 
foremost interested in teaching future citizens how to state 
arguments, underpin them with reasons, listen to and reflect upon 
what others are saying, while striving to reach a collective conclu-
sion with the other participants. Based upon the pedagogical idea 
that deliberative democratic skills are learned through participa-
tion in democratic deliberations, I have in this article attempted to 
flesh out the abstract criteria of democratic deliberation. By 
creating an empirically based typology, I have shown what a 
democratic deliberation might look like inside a classroom, as well 
as distinguished it from other closely related types of discussions. 
Based upon this typology, I have also discussed possible 
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implications for classroom practices. The conclusion is that by 
posing a question that gives students the possibility to disagree on 
the matter, while at the same time giving them the opportunity to 
reach a collective conclusion, it is possible to steer classroom 
discussions in the direction of democratic deliberation.
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Abstract
The aim of consensus is essential to deliberative democracy. However, this aim has also been fre-
quently criticized. In this article, I present two different forms of criticism against consensus in demo-
cratic education. The first, articulated by scholars of education for democracy, claims that the aim of 
consensus fails to account for the conflictual nature of democracy and thereby disallows disagree-
ment and dissensus. The second, formulated by classroom practitioners, argues that it disrupts the 
pattern of communication in classroom discussions. I nevertheless attempt to defend consensus on 
both accounts by arguing that it is a multifaceted concept that allows for different types of agreements 
and disagreements to coexist and therefore will stand in the way neither of pluralism nor of dissensus. 
It also will not necessarily foster undesirable patterns of communication in classroom discussions.
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The very definition of the word democracy is “government by the people.” In a democratic society, people with different preferences and different 
beliefs are expected to collectively make decisions regarding their 
shared society. Such decisions should, according to proponents of 
deliberative democracy, largely be based on public deliberation. By 
placing public deliberations at the heart of democracy, the political 
order can be justified, they argue. However, they also argue that the 
political order should be justified to everyone living under its laws 
(Chambers, 2003). Deliberative democracy is, therefore, often 
conceived of as operating with a consensus- driven form of democ-
racy. However, scholars who question the deliberative conception 
of democracy have frequently criticized this aspect.
Deliberative democracy has been widely discussed in political 
philosophy the last decades, to the point that some scholars even 
talk about a deliberative turn (Dryzek, 2002). Naturally, delibera-
tive democracy has also been more and more frequently suggested 
as the aim of democratic education. In a review of the field of 
education for deliberative democracy, Samuelsson and Bøyum 
Martin Samuelsson is an assistant professor at Bergen University 
College, Norway. He has mainly investigated questions related to 
an education for deliberative democracy.
(2015) argued that there is an overarching pedagogical agreement 
in this field: Future citizens (should) learn the skills and values 
necessary for deliberative democratic participation by participat-
ing in deliberative democratic situations. By this line of reasoning, 
consensus becomes an integral part of both the educational 
practice and the educational aim. It becomes a part of the educa-
tional practice based on the logic that if future citizens are to 
practice at democratic deliberation in, for example, classroom 
discussions, consensus needs to be a part of those discussions 
(Englund, 2006; Samuelsson, 2016). It becomes a part of the 
educational aim in virtue of the fact that the ability to participate in 
discussions striving for consensus is seen as a necessary skill to 
master (Samuelsson, 2016). However, as deliberative democracy 
has been transferred to the educational context, the aspect of 
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consensus has again been criticized, this time by educational 
scholars. They argue that consensus dismisses all possibilities for 
pluralism and dissensus and is therefore an unfit ideal for demo-
cratic education. Furthermore, during fieldwork for a research 
project I conducted, I found that teachers with lengthy experience 
in leading classroom discussions were also very resistant to the 
idea of striving to achieve consensus in classroom discussions.
However, in this paper I defend consensus as an aim both in 
democratic education and in classroom discussions. My main 
argument is that consensus is both a regulative idea to guide us and 
a multifaceted concept that on its own does not dismiss all possi-
bilities for disagreement and, therefore, should not be considered 
problematic as an aim for democratic education or classroom 
discussions. Thus, even though consensus is derived from the 
deliberative conception and that aiming for it in democratic 
education might first and foremost serve a deliberative purpose, I 
argue that it nevertheless should be considered unproblematic to 
those favoring other conceptions of democracy as the aim of 
democratic education. Before mounting this defense, however, I 
give a brief presentation of deliberative democracy and its ideal of 
consensus, followed by an account of some of the scholarly 
criticism. Next, I provide a short description of the empirical study 
from which the pedagogical criticism is drawn and outline the 
main points of criticism. Finally, I formulate and present the 
defense for consensus, which I base on Dryzek and Niemeyer’s 
(2010) typology of consensus, and discuss how this nuanced 
formulation may be used to address some of the criticism it has 
been facing in democratic education.
Deliberative Democracy and Consensus
No conception of democracy has been more thoroughly discussed 
during the past three decades than deliberative democracy. 
Deliberative democracy, broadly defined, is any conception of 
democracy that places public deliberations at the core of democ-
racy (Bohman, 1998). A public deliberation is a process in which 
free and equal citizens give defensible reasons, explanations, and 
accounts for laws they wish to impose on their fellow citizens 
(Held, 2006). In this process, citizens and their representatives to 
the government are expected to argue for their own perspectives 
while at the same time carefully listening and responding to 
counterarguments made by others, regardless of who makes them 
(Fishkin, 2009). Thus, according to this view, the democratic 
process is, or at least should be, a process of social cooperation with 
the aim of communicatively reaching a collective decision about 
“what to do,” rather than a competitive process in which fixed 
preferences battle against each other (Chambers, 2003).
Theories of deliberative democracy have generally been 
critical of democracy as merely a practice of voting followed by 
majority rule. According to these theories, majority rule is 
insufficient when it comes to democratic legitimacy (Bohman, 
1998) because it enforces democratic decisions as the will of the 
“winners” rather than as the will of the people. Indeed, it is possible 
to argue that it actually coerces a portion of the population into 
submission rather than treating them as fellow citizens in a 
democracy. Therefore, theories of deliberative democracy argue 
that democratic decisions are legitimate if, and only if, they are the 
object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals (Cohen, 
1989, p. 22). However, a legitimate political order is not only one 
that is justified through a process of reason- giving but also one that 
is deemed justifiable by everyone living under its laws (Chambers, 
2003). Consensus is, therefore, embedded in this understanding of 
democracy as an underlying ideal, because, if every citizen should 
be able to accept the outcome of the decisions, and/or the reasons 
for them, the democratic process needs to aim toward some kind of 
understanding of consensus.
Early accounts of deliberative democracy contain the 
conviction that it is possible to achieve an actual consensus. 
Contemporary theories, however, have modified this ideal slightly, 
but most still hold that discussions should be oriented toward 
consensus even if it is not always obtainable (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 
2010). This redefines consensus as a regulative idea, an aim to strive 
for, rather than an endpoint always to be reached. By aiming 
toward consensual agreements, citizens and their representatives 
are encouraged to seek solutions across different belief systems 
(overlapping consensus) (Rawls, 1987), to use arguments other 
reasonable citizens can accept (reciprocity), and to use arguments 
accessible and applicable to everyone affected by the decision 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). This will solve some moral 
disagreements simply by making people better informed. How-
ever, some moral disagreements are more persistent, as are, for 
example, moral disagreements over incompatible values, to which 
there are no simple rational superior facts or arguments available. 
In such cases, the deliberative process can result in a deadlock that 
would require a vote, or compromise, to break the tie (Habermas, 
1998; Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). Yet even in such cases, the 
process of deliberation is valuable because it helps clarify what  
the disagreement is about, helps citizens and representatives to 
understand the problem better, makes them acknowledge the 
moral position(s) of the opposition, and ultimately, increases  
the possibility that the final decision will be accepted. Further-
more, contemporary theories of deliberative democracy also 
emphasize that the decisions made are always temporary and that 
the issues are always open to further investigation (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2004).
Despite the modification of consensus into a regulative idea, 
however, it is still one of the most frequently criticized aspects of 
deliberative democracy. The most insistent criticism comes from 
the perspective of radical pluralists, a notion favoring the confron-
tational nature of democracy (see, for example, Mouffe, 1996,  
1999, & 2000). According to this perspective, consensus is prob-
lematic because it conceals informal oppression and precludes any 
real opportunity for democratic disagreement. Furthermore, 
radical pluralists argue that deliberative democracy’s formulation 
of consensus often coincides with the interests of those in power 
and that if one continually strives for consensus, the views and 
interests of marginalized people will be excluded from democratic 
discourses (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2010). Therefore, by placing 
consensus at the center of democracy, one leaves the most funda-
mental and essential aspects of democracy— disagreement and 
confrontation— out of the equation and deprives people of being 
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democratic subjects. Based on arguments such as these, critics 
argue that consensus, rather than being a desirable democratic 
characteristic, is a symptom of a dysfunctional society laden with 
social pressure, conformity and marginalization.
Education for Democracy and Consensus
We now turn to the field of education for democracy where there 
are several scholars arguing for deliberative democracy as the aim 
of democratic education and for the placement of reason- giving 
skills, listening skills, and values such as reciprocity at the center of 
such an education (Samuelsson & Bøyum, 2015). However, there 
are also critical voices questioning aspects of the deliberative 
conception. They often base their criticism on the radical, pluralis-
tic view, and they quite frequently question the aim of consensus. 
Thus, the same objection that is found in the field of political 
philosophy is also found in the field of education. One such 
example is Ruitenberg (2010):
Mouffe and Rancière agree that the currently dominant framework of 
deliberative democracy does not sufficiently recognize the constitutive 
nature of disagreement. The deliberative conception of democracy and 
democratic citizenship emphasizes rational deliberation leading to 
political consensus. For Moffue and Rancière, however . . . consensus 
means erasing the contestatory, conflictual nature of the very givens of 
common life. (p. 44)
Ruitenberg was skeptical of using deliberative democracy’s 
idea of consensus as an aim for democratic education on the basis 
that (rational) consensus diminishes any real possibility for 
disagreement. By focusing on consensus, the essential conflictual 
nature of democracy is erased, and she therefore argued that 
consensus is unfit as an aim of a democratic education. One finds a 
similar example of an argument against consensus in Biesta (2011):
The prime task of democratic politics is not to eliminate passion  
from the sphere of the public, in order to render a rational consensus 
possible, but to mobile those passions towards democratic designs . . . 
The democratic subject, so we might say, is the one who is driven by a 
desire for democracy or, to be more precise, a desire for engagement 
with the ongoing experiment of democratic existence. (p. 151)
In this article, Biesta (2011) was hesitant about the aim of 
consensus on the basis that it can disrupt other vital aspects  
of democracy such as passion and “a desire to engage with ongoing 
democratic processes” (p. 151). According to this argument, 
striving toward consensus can inhibit the democratic process (of 
disagreement) and thus should not be the aim of democratic 
education. Instead, Biesta presented an alternative aim for demo-
cratic education and a pedagogical practice to go with it:
The political subject is not so much the producer of consensus as that 
it is the “product” of dissensus. It is not, therefore, that education 
needs to make individuals ready for democratic politics; it is rather 
that through engagement in democratic politics political subjectivity is 
engendered. (p. 150)
Instead of teaching future citizens specific skill sets used to 
reach rational consensus, a democratic education should focus on 
fostering “the desire to engage in democratic politics” (Biesta, 2011, 
p. 150), by letting individuals participate in practices of disagree-
ment and dissensus.
These two articles are perhaps the most explicit examples of 
how critical scholars within the educational field argue in terms  
of deliberative democracy’s ideal of consensus (for other examples, 
see Griffin, 2012; Ruitenberg, 2009; Waghid, 2005). Their criticism 
is (often) rooted in the view of radical pluralism, and their argu-
ments are therefore the same as those found in the field of political 
philosophy; the only difference is that they are now used to argue 
against the aim of democratic education.
Classroom Discussions and Consensus
Having shown how scholars of education for democracy argue 
against consensus as the aim for democracy and democratic 
education, I now turn to teachers’ criticism against consensus as an 
aim of (democratic) classroom discussions.
Empirical study
During the spring and autumn of 2014, I collected data for a 
research project investigating “education for deliberative democ-
racy.” Proponents in the field of education for deliberative  
democracy commonly assume that the skills necessary for 
deliberative participation, such as the ability to make arguments 
and give reasons, to listen to others, and so on, while at the same 
time being part of a collective will formation, are (best) learned 
through participation in democratic deliberation (Samuelsson & 
Bøyum, 2015). According to this argument, through participating 
in democratic deliberation, people will have the opportunity to 
participate in democratic deliberation and thereby become 
gradually and increasingly competent at it. Consequently, a main 
point of interest in this project was to conduct in- depth investiga-
tions of classroom discussions.
I visited three different schools located on the west coast of 
Norway. I accompanied one teacher at each school for approxi-
mately two weeks, observed their classroom practices, conducted 
formal interviews, and was involved in informal conversations. In 
addition, I conducted one formal interview with a fourth teacher, 
but without observing his classroom practices. The four teachers 
all taught various subjects, and they were all located at schools with 
different profiles. Susan, a teacher for over fifteen years, was 
teaching psychology, English, and religion to upper secondary 
students at a parochial school with a moderate degree of ethnical 
diversity. Evelyn was teaching English, social science, and math to 
students in grade six to nine at a school with a large degree of 
ethnical diversity and was engaged in activities related to the 
student council. Margaret, in contrast to the other three teachers, 
was the head of her own class, a fifth- grade class, and thus con-
ducted all of her teaching in that class, involving numerous 
subjects such as math, English, Norwegian, religion, and social 
science. Finally, Patrick, whose classroom I did not visit, was 
teaching at several different schools, at various grade levels, and in 
various subjects. None of the teachers were familiar with delibera-
tive democracy prior to participating in this study. This came as no 
surprise since deliberative democracy as a concept is absent from 
democracy & education, vol 26, no- 1  feature article 4
everyday conversations in Norway, as well as in newspaper articles 
and public politics. Furthermore, even though the Norwegian 
national curriculum includes democratic competence as an 
explicit aim, the deliberative conception is absent there as well 
(Samuelsson, 2013). The most important aspect in relation to this 
article, however, is that these teachers were all interested in 
democracy and education, and they were highly experienced in 
leading classroom discussions.
During the interviews, the central characteristics of demo-
cratic deliberations, and thus also for deliberative classroom 
discussions, were topics of conversation. The specific formulation 
used during the interviews was that of Englund (2006), which 
states that a deliberative (educative) discussion is one where  
(a) different views confront one another and arguments for them 
are articulated, (b) there is a tolerance and respect for the concrete 
other and participants listen to each other’s arguments, and, finally, 
(c) there are elements of collective will formation, a desire to reach 
consensus or at least a temporary agreement.1 The pedagogical 
assumption is that by participating in classroom discussions 
following these criteria, students will have the opportunity to 
practice making arguments, giving reasons, listening to others, and 
so on, while at the same time being part of a collective will forma-
tion process that strives toward agreement, and by this, gradually 
become more and more competent at democratic deliberation 
(Samuelsson, 2016, p. 3).2 Given the teachers’ experience, I was 
interested in listening to their thoughts of having classroom 
discussions structured around this ideal.
Pedagogical Criticism of Consensus
The four teachers were all positive to the idea of structuring 
classroom discussions around the deliberative ideals of (a) 
reason- giving (b) and reflection. However, they all expressed 
considerable resistance to the idea of having (c) classroom 
discussions aim at reaching consensus. In their opinion, aiming at 
consensus in classroom discussions was fraught with serious 
difficulties. Margaret said:
The teacher should not be evaluative. That is the hardest part, to 
actually hold back and to stop yourself from giving positive feedback 
when the students are saying something “really good.” You want to, to 
say, “Very good, that is interesting,” but you have to hold back and let 
the discussion flow among the students. That can be challenging, but  
if you want a safe classroom climate where the students really listen  
to each other, then aiming at consensus can be a tricky thing, it  
really can.
1  For a more thorough discussion concerning these criteria, see Samuels-
son (2016).
2  A common criticism of deliberative democracy is that public delibera-
tions often lead to extreme and polarized opinions (Sunstein, 2000). 
However, as argued in Samuelsson (2016), the fact that real- life 
deliberations are challenging only emphasizes the need for an educa-
tion for deliberative democracy. Furthermore, many argue that (public) 
schools are the ideal site for conducting such an education because, 
among other things, they contain a great diversity of opinions (Englund, 
2006; Hess, 2009).
Margaret presented an argument against consensus based on 
her experience that it can negatively affect the classroom climate. 
According to Margaret, striving for consensus would have to 
involve the evaluation of students’ opinions, which often creates an 
atmosphere in which students are afraid to express themselves. 
Furthermore, it also makes it more difficult to get them to listen to 
each other, and in the end, it may be difficult to establish a natural 
flow in the discussion.
Patrick argued against consensus on a similar ground: that it 
changes the pattern of communication in undesirable ways. 
However, he presented an alternative explanation for why. “If a 
classroom discussion aims at reaching consensus, students will be 
preoccupied with trying to get their way. If a classroom discussion 
is supposed to end with consensus, or come to a conclusion, it 
means that it can have winners.” In his experience, this fact makes 
students alter their approach and instead of listening and respond-
ing to each other, they end up trying to win an argument. The 
discursive pattern is thereby changed into a form of competition 
rather than one characterized by curiosity and respect.
Evelyn argued that having classroom discussions aim at 
consensus can force students into agreements:
(Interviewer) You said that everybody has to be able to have 
an own opinion (in a classroom discussion), but how does 
that relate to the aspect of trying to reach a collective will 
formation?
(Evelyn) That can be difficult . . . I do not want to force anyone 
in the classroom to agree that “this” is the only right 
thing . . . I think it is important that those who reserve the 
right to disagree should be given time and space to reflect 
on why they disagree but not be forced into making 
decisions then and there . . . I cannot really picture how 
those two are related because for me, in a classroom 
discussion, it is not a matter of life and death whether 
everybody agrees or not. I think agreement is difficult to 
achieve and striving for it only makes the discussion 
artificial.
According to Evelyn, consensual agreement is rare in class-
room discussions and because of this, having discussions end with 
consensus implies that some form of coercion has been used. She 
went on to explain why forcing students into agreements is 
problematic in classroom discussions:
I have students whose families are from countries where 
homosexuality has been banned. These students need to be allowed to 
have, and express, these opinions in a classroom in Norway. It is a big 
responsibility on my part that, as their teacher, even if I disagree with 
them, to provide them with the same opportunities for verbal 
expression as anybody else. I also have to make sure that they do not 
feel trampled on because of these opinions, because they are so young 
and they should not be burdened by the opinions they are carrying 
with them . . . I think that can be a pretty horrible thing in that age, to 
feel that others are laughing at you.
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Similar to Margaret, Evelyn argued that there is a problematic 
side to consensus, that striving for it has to involve challenging and 
valuing student opinions. She said this deprives some 
students— mainly those with unpopular opinions— of the oppor-
tunity to express themselves and that one needs to prioritize 
making students feel secure in classroom discussions. Further-
more, she explained that by challenging students and their 
opinions, and by forcing some of them to give theirs up in order to 
come to agreements, she would risk having students feel trampled 
on and would wind up placing them under emotional strain.
Susan, the teacher at a parochial school, contested the aim of 
consensus in a similar way:
(Susan) It is definitely within a framework of respect but there 
is not a will formation per se.
(Interviewer) Is it more an exploring of differences?
(Susan) It is an exploration, exactly, but never consensus, 
because I think that means to compromise and I am not 
going to compromise. I have spent a lot of time reading, 
being at school myself, thinking, and talking and I am not 
going to just throw that out to compromise. But I don’t 
expect them to compromise either, to give up something 
they hold dear just because it is against what the majority 
believes.
Susan expressed her skepticism toward the idea of having 
classroom discussions aim at consensus based on the view that 
consensus means to compromise. Compromising in classroom 
discussions is problematical, because in her view, it involves asking 
students to give up something they “hold dear.” She went on to 
explain the kind of negative consequences this might have:
(Susan) You know, here at a religious school, are you for or 
against abortion? We actually had a woman here from 
Oslo and she was talking from a Christian point of view 
about the protection of the unborn and the students were 
already confrontational after half an hour . . . None of 
them liked her, whether they were for or against. They 
thought she was close minded, that she was rude and so 
on . . . I realized that you have to back off and respect the 
students and that woman wasn’t doing that.
For example, if as a teacher she tried to convince her students 
to agree with her beliefs, she would likely provoke a confronta-
tional response. Subsequently, this could cause the students to lose 
respect for her. In her opinion, a teacher leading a classroom 
discussion should instead back off and respect the students and 
their opinions and not try to convince them to give those up.
The four teachers interviewed, all experienced in leading 
classroom discussions, presented pedagogical reasons for not 
aiming at consensus in classroom discussions. First, aiming at 
consensus can negatively affect the discussion itself. It can make it 
more difficult to get the students to express themselves, to get them 
to participate verbally, and to get them to really listen to each other. 
Thus, it can create undesirable patterns of communication. Second, 
aiming at consensus can also have undesired consequences beyond 
the context of a specific discussion, such as creating emotional 
strain in students, making them give up ideals, and making them 
lose some respect for the teacher.
Defending the Aim of Consensus
So far, I have presented two types of criticism against consensus in 
democratic education. The first, coming from scholars of educa-
tion for democracy, criticizes consensus as a democratic ideal  
and thus as an aim for democratic education as well, on the 
grounds that it fails to account for the conflictual nature of 
democracy and thereby disallows disagreements and dissensus. 
The second type, coming from classroom practitioners, criticizes 
consensus as a goal for classroom discussions because it alters the 
pattern of communication in undesirable ways and may have 
negative effects on the students. In this final section of the paper, I 
will articulate a defense of consensus on both accounts.
Scholars in education for democracy in their criticism of 
consensus ground their rationale in radical pluralism. They argue 
that by striving for consensus, one disallows disagreements, 
suppresses voices and opinions of marginalized people, and 
instead promotes the interests of those in power. Therefore, they 
argue that a democratic education should instead be based on the 
conflictual platform found in radical democracy and focus on 
teaching people how to live and cope with ongoing disagreements. 
By this shift in focus, they argue that their notion of democratic 
education better preserves the essential democratic aspects of 
pluralism, inclusion, and disagreement, and is thus more suitable 
as an aim for democratic education.
As an initial response to this criticism, one might posit that, 
based on the understanding that democracy is about making 
decisions together regarding a shared society, there has to be more 
to democracy than purely disagreement, confrontation, and 
disruption. Therefore, to focus solely on variants of dissent makes 
little sense (Dryzek & Niemeyer 2010, p. 93). Secondly, as Dryzek 
and Niemeyer (2010) argued, theories of radical democracy cannot 
promote unregulated forms of disagreement but also have to 
structure their ideas around some standards of regulation that 
control what is allowed and considered appropriate in public 
communication. Without such standards, “anything would go,” 
and for example, any substantive position would be worthy of the 
respect of others. However, this makes radical democracy open to 
the same criticism leveled at deliberative democracy and its ideal of 
consensus: imposing restrictions on moral positions and citizens. 
For example, anyone who fails to express “the desire for a particu-
lar mode of human togetherness” argued for by Biesta (2011, p. 141) 
would have to be regarded as “undemocratic.” Thus, it is not only 
deliberative democracy and its ideal of consensus that excludes 
certain types of citizens, behavior, and positions from democratic 
participation. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the criticism 
coming from scholars favoring the radical pluralistic view is 
slightly misplaced. However, their criticism of deliberative 
democracy and consensus have been more broadly accepted in the 
educational field than in the field of political philosophy, in which 
the defense presented above is frequently recurrent (see, for 
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example, Erman, 2009; Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2010; Knops, 2007), 
and therefore, to present this defense in an educational context 
might be considered relevant.
Defending Consensus as an Aim of Democratic Education
Based on the short discussion above, the more important question 
to ask is not whether a certain conception of democracy is for or 
against consensus or dissensus, since both are inevitable elements 
of any conception of democracy, but rather how to formulate a 
notion of consensus that takes pluralism, dissensus, and disagree-
ment seriously. Dryzek and Niemeyer (2010) made one such 
attempt in their typology of consensus. In this typology, they 
distinguished three different types of consensus: normative, 
epistemic, and preference consensus. Normative consensus refers to 
agreement on the values driving the decision process. Epistemic 
consensus refers to agreement on how particular actions relate  
to different values in terms of cause and effect, while preference 
consensus refers to agreement on the actual decision of “what to 
do.” Let us look at an example of what these types may look like in a 
classroom discussion.
The following example is from a discussion that took place in 
Margaret’s fifth- grade classroom. The class was planning a party 
and discussed various aspects of it, such as the time and date, 
possible activities, and what to eat and drink. Using the question of 
what to eat and drink as a starting point, I will elaborate further to 
show what the three different types of consensus could have looked 
like had the discussion gone that far. A preference consensus would 
mean an agreement on what food to serve, for example, tacos. If the 
class had agreed that tacos was the preferable food to serve, 
preference consensus would have been reached. A normative 
consensus, on the other hand, would imply an agreement on the 
value level. For example, what is the most important feature of  
the food? Is it that it tastes good or that it is inexpensive? On the 
other hand, maybe the most important values pertaining to  
the food to be served at a party for thirty twelve- year- olds are 
instead that it is easy to prepare, serve, and eat. Agreement on these 
types of questions would indicate normative consensus. Located in 
between these two positions is epistemic consensus. This would 
imply agreement about causal relations, for example, between a 
desired value and a suggested alternative. If the argument had been 
made that the food should be easy to prepare, serve, and eat, would 
tacos satisfy that objective? Maybe pizza would be easier to eat and, 
therefore, if that value was preferred, would be a better alternative. 
But then again, maybe tacos would be easier to make in large 
quantities? An epistemic consensus would mean an agreement 
regarding this type of “factual” question. The position taken earlier 
in the article is that democratic deliberations ultimately are about 
reaching agreements on how to act. Thus, the goal would be to 
reach a preference consensus and agree on what food to serve. 
However, a preference consensus does not necessitate a normative 
or epistemic consensus. The students do not have to reach a 
consensus on all levels in order to make a decision on what food to 
serve. If they had reached a preference consensus and decided to 
serve pizza, they would still have been allowed to disagree about 
the values underlying that choice (normative disagreement) and/
or what values that choice would fulfill (epistemic disagreement). 
In fact, according to Sunstein (1995), that is usually how people 
make decisions based upon deliberations. They value arguments 
and facts differently but are nevertheless able to agree on a course 
of action (what he called incompletely theorized agreement).
To make this typology more complex, Dryzek and Niemeyer 
(2010) added a “meta” counterpart to each type of consensus. 
Consensus at the meta- level means recognition of the legitimacy of 
the different positions: that they are seen (by the participants) as 
reasonable, credible, and valid. A normative meta- consensus means 
an agreement regarding the different values present in the discus-
sion and that they are seen as reasonable basis from which to argue. 
Epistemic meta- consensus refers to agreement on the credibility of 
disputed beliefs and of their relevance to the issue at hand. For 
example, different participants can disagree on which alternative 
best corresponds with a certain value, but a meta- consensus of the 
epistemic kind means that they all agree on the credibility and 
relevance of the relations being discussed. Finally, preference 
meta- consensus relates to the different possible outcomes and is 
reached when there is an agreement on the number of choices and/
or the validity of the different ways that those choices can be 
structured.
Returning to the example of what food to serve at the fifth- 
grade class party, had the class agreed that, for example, the aspects 
of price, taste, and how easy it is to make, serve, and eat were all 
reasonable and important values to take into consideration, a 
normative meta- consensus would have been reached. Further-
more, had they settled and agreed that the most import value was 
the easiness in relation to preparation, serving, and eating (reached 
a normative consensus at the simple level) and then moved on to 
discuss different types of food that possibly could fulfill that value 
and agreed that both the alternatives of pizza and tacos could do 
that, meaning they are both relatively easy to prepare, serve, and 
eat, an epistemic meta- consensus would have been reached. 
Finally, a preference meta- consensus would have been reached had 
they all, for example, agreed that the (only) available alternatives to 
choose among were in fact pizza and tacos. Even though the 
typology becomes more complex with the inclusion of the meta- 
level, its main function remains rather uncomplicated: to help 
structure the ongoing disagreement and to keep the discussion 
productive in a deliberative sense. By reaching consensus at the 
meta- level, participants are able to keep the discussion productive 
in their search for a conclusion. In addition, focusing on consen-
sus at the meta- level means making fewer demands on participants 
and is thus an additional way to address seriously the challenging 
aspects of pluralism, dissensus, and disagreement.
How does Dryzek and Niemeyer’s (2010) typology help us 
defend consensus as an aim in democratic education? Ruitenberg 
(2010), for example, expressed the view that “a strive for (political) 
consensus means erasing the contestatory and conflictual nature of 
the common life.” Thus, to use consensus as an aim in democratic 
education is problematic because students could fail to learn how 
to have and to allow others to have different opinions, coexist with 
people with different values, and participate in ongoing processes 
of disagreement (also emphasized by Biesta, 2011). However, as 
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shown with the typology, consensus does not mean that continued 
disagreement is deemed impossible. A preference consensus does 
not necessitate a normative or epistemic consensus. Thus, many 
different forms of disagreements can exist after a preference 
consensus has been reached. Furthermore, adding the underlying 
view of consensus as a regulative idea, rather than an endpoint 
needed to be reached, it can also exist merely in the form of an aim 
to be striving for. This combination of consensus as a multifaceted 
concept and as a regulative aim shows that it is possible for 
consensus and dissensus to coexist and that neither consensus nor 
deliberative democracy is in conflict with pluralism or disagree-
ment. On the contrary, disagreement lies at the very foundation of 
deliberative democracy and is what fuels the need to have a 
discussion in the first place, because if there is no disagreement, 
there is no reason to have a discussion. Furthermore, striving 
toward consensus does not mean that the aspects of pluralism and 
continued dissensus are not taken seriously either. The emphasis 
on trying to solve moral conflicts with the use of discussions is 
rather an explicit attempt to try to handle pluralism seriously (see, 
for example, Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). By encouraging 
citizens and representatives to seek solutions across different belief 
systems and to use arguments other reasonable citizens can accept, 
deliberative democracy argues for an increased acknowledgment 
of different moral positions. Furthermore, a preference consensus 
reached and a decision made is always temporary and an issue 
discussed is always open to further investigation (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2004). Continued disagreement is, therefore, always 
possible, even after a decision has been made. Consequently, I 
argue that deliberative democracy and its ideal of consensus are 
both suited as aims in democracy and democratic education and 
that neither constitutes a threat to pluralism and dissensus.
Defending Consensus as an Aim in Classroom Discussions
The more important question, though, in relation to the pedagogi-
cal assumptions embedded in this article, is the implications of the 
typology for the aim of consensus in classroom discussions. How 
will this typology answer the criticism raised by classroom 
practitioners, that consensus as a goal in classroom discussions 
creates several unwanted side effects, such as undesirable patterns 
of communication and emotional strain in students? Furthermore, 
is it possible to outline any pedagogical implications that will 
benefit the further discussion about education for deliberative 
democracy?
The answer to the first question is, on the surface, rather 
straightforward and has already been given: consensus is a 
multifaceted concept that, on its own, will not eliminate all 
possibilities for disagreement. However, if we use the typology and 
look at this criticism in greater detail, the answer is much more 
complex. First, the concern that consensus may cause emotional 
strain was raised by Susan and Evelyn based on the interpretation 
that striving for consensus implies having students give up their life 
values: “Students should not have to compromise and give up 
something they hold dear just because it is against what the 
majority believes,” and “They should not have to be burdened by 
the opinions they are carrying with them or risk having others 
laugh at them.” These teachers described a concern for having 
classroom discussions strive toward normative consensus at the 
simple level, or of trying to make all students agree on the values 
presented in the discussion. However, bearing the typology in 
mind, we can see that to strive for consensus does not have to mean 
to strive for agreement regarding values. Instead, for example, it 
could mean to strive for what has been termed preference 
consensus.
Using the same example as earlier to again illustrate this point, 
the fifth- grade class could have reached a preference consensus and 
agreed to serve pizza, without having reached a normative 
consensus. Some students could have favored this choice because 
they thought pizza tasted good while others may have favored it 
because they thought it would be the easiest food to serve. Thus, 
they could have agreed on what to do (preference consensus) 
without having agreed on the reasons for that choice (normative 
consensus) and consequently, a normative disagreement would 
still be possible. Thus, it is fully possible for a classroom discussion 
to strive toward consensus without having students give up their 
values, and thus, avoid causing emotional stress.
Granted, this example is less complex and controversial than 
the discussions the teachers are skeptical of conducting: These 
students are not expected to give up, or compromise, their values of 
life. However, it is perhaps precisely this insight the typology can 
provide. In a deliberative sense, democratic discussions are 
ultimately about making decisions about “what to do.” Thus, why 
someone prefers one alternative to another is, strictly speaking, 
irrelevant, while reaching an agreement about which alternative to 
choose is not. Therefore, in a deliberative educative sense, it might 
be more suitable to strive for a preference consensus because that 
would allow students to practice at the type of consensus delibera-
tive democracy is most interested in reaching. Hence, the typology 
shows that it is possible to strive for consensus in a classroom 
discussion without causing emotional strain, but it also allows us to 
outline a pedagogical implication: Perhaps the preferable consen-
sus to strive for, in a deliberative educative sense, is preference 
consensus.
The other main concern the teachers had with consensus was 
that it might negatively alter the pattern of communication in the 
discussion. Both Patrick and Margaret expressed this concern and 
argued that the (other) essential aspects of a good classroom 
discussion, such as reason- giving, reflection, listening, coopera-
tion, and so on, would be difficult to achieve if consensus was set as 
an aim: “If you want a safe classroom climate where students really 
listen to each other, then aiming at consensus can be a tricky thing,” 
and “Consensus makes students alter their approach and instead of 
listening and responding to each other they end up trying to win 
the discussion.” At the core of this criticism is a similar interpreta-
tion of consensus as that found in theories of radical pluralism, 
proclaiming that consensus leaves little or no room for any kind of 
disagreement. This interpretation is imbedded in both Patrick and 
Margaret’s quotes and can be rephrased: Consensus makes 
students focus on finding the right answer as given by the teacher, 
and consensus makes students become preoccupied with trying to 
get everyone to agree with their point of view. Hence, to answer 
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this criticism is, once again, to answer the question of whether it is 
possible to strive for consensus while at the same time preserving 
the aspect of disagreement. At the same time, though, the chal-
lenges voiced by Patrick and Margaret are challenges deserving of 
serious and lengthy discussions, to which the answer given above, 
about having classroom discussions aim at a preference consensus, 
is unsatisfactory.
To address Patrick’s and Margaret’s concern, we can turn to 
the meta- level of the typology. The main function of the meta- level 
is to help structure the ongoing process of deliberation and to keep 
the discussion productive in a deliberative sense. Thus, if the 
deliberative discussion is failing, it is always possible to take a step 
back and instead of focusing on the decision, try to understand 
(and possibly agree on) the different values and positions used in 
the discussion and their relevance to the problem at hand  
(Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2010). One can apply this principle in a 
classroom situation as well. If a classroom discussion has turned 
into a competition and the students are preoccupied with trying to 
win it, it is always possible to take a step back. By taking a step back 
and instead having them elaborate on the values and positions 
being discussed (a normative meta- discussion), or having them 
discuss the relevance of those positions to the issue at hand (an 
epistemic meta- discussion), or trying to get them to agree on the 
relevant alternatives (reaching a preference meta- consensus), it 
might be possible to get them to start listening to each other’s 
arguments again. Thus, by delaying the decision- making process 
and instead focus on the meta- level, the concerns raised by  
Patrick and Margaret could be avoided.
However, we can also use the meta- level to redefine this 
problematic situation as a possible deliberative learning situation. 
Aiming at meta- consensus makes participants focus on under-
standing and acknowledging different viewpoints, and encourages 
them to seek agreements across their differences. Thus, turning to 
the meta- level when a classroom discussion has turned into a 
competitive and conflictual discussion can provide students with a 
learning opportunity of how to turn a dysfunctional discussion 
into a productive democratic deliberation. Furthermore, once they 
have (re)established the deliberative pattern of communication, 
they can (again) gradually begin to move in the direction of a 
preference consensus or a meta- preference consensus. However, it 
is important to remember that not all disagreements are solved 
with deliberations. Sometimes a vote or a compromise is needed. 
Yet in a deliberative educative sense, one should not turn to these 
methods of decision- making too early. That would deprive the 
students the opportunity to practice turning the conflictual 
discussion into a deliberative discussion, and of how to use 
arguments presented in a discussion to accept an outcome 
determined by a vote or compromise. Thus, the meta- level of the 
typology allows us to defend consensus against the concern that  
it might cause undesirable patterns of communication. However, it 
also allows us to identify a potential deliberative learning situation, 
one where students are presented with an opportunity to practice 
turning a dysfunctional discussion into a productive democratic 
deliberation.
To conclude the defense of consensus against the second type 
of criticism in democratic education, the one claiming that it is 
unfit as a goal for classroom discussions, we can again turn to 
Dryzek and Niemeyer’s (2010) complex and nuanced formulation 
of consensus and argue that it is (fully) possible to strive for 
consensus in a classroom discussion without subjecting students to 
emotional stress and without having to give up the essential 
elements of reason- giving and reflection. Furthermore, we can also 
use the typology of consensus to outline two possible pedagogical 
implications— that preference consensus is perhaps the most 
important type of consensus to learn how to strive for in a delibera-
tive sense and that a conflictual classroom discussion can be seen 
as a potential (deliberative) learning situation.
Conclusion
The aim of consensus is essential to deliberative democracy. 
However, this aim has also been one of the most frequently 
criticized aspects within the field of political philosophy. 
Furthermore, as the idea of deliberative democracy has been 
transferred to an educational context, the aim of consensus has 
again been a target of criticism. In this article, two types of educa-
tional criticism against consensus have been presented: one 
criticizing it as an aim for democratic education on the grounds 
that it fails to account for the conflictual nature of democracy and 
thereby disallows disagreement and pluralism, and the other 
criticizing it as an aim in classroom discussions based on the idea 
that it affects classroom discussions in negative ways. I have refuted 
both objections.
The defense of consensus presented in this article is structured 
around the idea that consensus is a regulative idea and a multifac-
eted concept that allows for different types of agreements and 
disagreements to coexist in harmony with one other. Based on this 
idea, I argue that it is fully possible to strive for consensus in 
democratic education without dismissing all possibilities for 
disagreement, dissensus, or pluralism. Furthermore, it is also fully 
possible to strive for consensus in classroom discussions without 
risk causing emotional stress, without losing the essential discur-
sive tools of reason- giving, listening, and reflection, and without 
demanding that students give up their values. However, I do not 
argue that every classroom discussion must strive for consensus. 
There are, of course, other types of discussions valuable in a 
democratic educative sense, but my conclusion is still that consen-
sus should be regarded neither as a problematic aim in democratic 
education nor in (democratic) classroom discussions, even to 
those valuing disagreement and pluralism.
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”Education for Deliberative Democracy” 
 
Bakgrund och föremål 
Projektet har som föremålet att undersöka och diskutera den norska (demokrati)utbildningen. 
I praktiken handlar projektet om att se på, och studera trekk vid klassrumsdiskussioner, 
klassrumssamtal, samtal mellan elever, och samtal mellan lärare och elever.  
 
Projektet är situerat och finansierat av Universitet i Bergen, Institutt for pedagogikk. 
Huvudvägledare för projektet är försteamanuensis Steinar Bøyum och bivägledare är 
försteamanuensis Kariane Westrheim, båda vid Institutt for pedagogikk.  
 
Vad innebär deltagelse i studien? 
Studien består av klassrumsobservation, inkluderat informella samtal med elever och lärare, 
och individuella intervjuer med några av lärarna. 
 
Jag vill utföra löst strukturerade observationer, där jag är närvarande i klassrummet 
tillsammans med läraren och eleverna. Jag ska följa det dagliga upplägget som klassen/läraren 
är involverad i, i en period. Under observationen vill jag ha informella samtal med lärare och 
elever, när det är möjligt utan att det stör det vanliga upplägget. Det vill också kunna vara 
intressant att följa eleverna i friminutten för att se hur de interagerar och jobbar tillsammans 
där. Ramarna runt observationerna och de informella samtalen kommer att vara i 
överenstämmelse med både skolans och lärarnas riktningslinjer. Varken eleverna eller lärarna 
är fokus för projektet utan det är interaktionsmönstren jag vill fokusera på. Mot slutet av 
observationsperioden är det önskligt att utföra individuella intervjuer med lärare som 
undervisar i klassen. I intervjuerna önskar jag att prata med läraren/arna om saker jag har 
uppfattat som intressanta i observationsmaterielat; vad de tänker kring dessa situationer och 
vad de har att säga om dessa. I både observationsfasen och i intervjuerna önskar jag att 
använda lydopptaker. När det gäller de informella samtalen kommer jag i samband med dessa 
att fråga om det är okej för den/de aktuella personen/erna att samtalet tas upp.  
 
Vad sker med informationen om dig?   
Alla upplysningar kommer att behandlas konfidentiellt. Inga av eleverna vill vid något tillfälle 
av projektet förekomma med namn eller andra identifierbara upplysningar. Skolans namn, 
geografiska belägenhet, samt lärarnas namn kommer att upp bevaras separat från 
datamaterialet, och vidare behandlas anonymt. De kommer inte att kunna identifieras, spåras 
eller känns igen i förmedlingen av data; doktorsavhandlingen och artiklarna som produceras. 
Lydoptakken är det bara jag som kommer att ha tillgång till. Projektet avslutas under 2016 
och lydopptaken slettes i samband med detta.  
 
Frivillig deltagelse 
Det är frivilligt att delta i studien och du kan när som helst trekke ditt samtycke utan att uppge 
någon grund, eller att detta har konsekvenser för dig. Materialet kommer i sånt fall att slettes. 
Om du önskar att delta eller har andra frågor kring studien, ta kontakt med Martin 
Samuelsson, Stipendiat vid Institutt for pedagogikk på 55 58 39 80 eller 
martin.samuelsson@psyip.uib.no. Studien är meldt in till Personvernombudet for forskning, 




Samtycke till deltagelse i studien 
 




(Signert av prosjektdeltaker, dato) 
 
 
      Jag samtycker till att delta i observation 







I en period kommer det att pågå ett forskningsprojekt i klassen till ert barn. Projektet har som 
föremål att undersöka den norska demokratiutbildningen. I praktiken innebär detta att en forskare 
från Universitet i Bergen, Martin Samuelsson, kommer att vara närvarande i klassrummet 
tillsammans med läraren och eleverna för att observera dem i den dagliga verksamheten. Korta 
informella samtal med eleverna kan också förekomma.  
 
Ramarna runt projektet är i överenstämmelse med både skolans och lärarnas riktningslinjer. Inga av 
eleverna kommer vid något tillfälle av projektet att förekomma med namn eller andra identifierbara 
personupplysningar. Om ni önskar att reservera ert barn från deltagelse i denna studie kan ni kryssa 
av för det i boksen här under och lämna in detta ark till klassläraren.  
 
      Jag reserverar mig härmed mot att mitt barn skall delta i observationsstudien. 
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Intervjuguide 
 
De formella, individuella intervjuerna ska utföras mot slutet av de 3 veckorna. I intervjuerna 
planerar jag att prata med lärarna som undervisar i klasserna, för att få deras syner, tankar och 
perspektiv av klassrumsdiskussioner, klassrumssamtal och samtalen mellan elever. 
Intervjufrågorna och intervjuguiden kommer till stor del bygga på det som framkommer i 
observationerna. Jag vill veta vad de tänker kring de situationerna jag har bemärkt mig som 
intressanta, få höra hur de tänker kring dessa, hur de tänker kring mina tankar runt dem osv. 
Jag är också intresserad i att presentera mitt teoretiska grundlag, antagandet om att 
deliberativa diskussionsfärdigheter bäst lärs genom klassrumsdiskussioner, och få höra vad de 
tänker om detta, vad de har för tankar om genomförandet av denna typ av diskussioner i 
klassrum osv. Tanken är att ha 6-9 intervjuer, d.v.s. 2 - 3 individuella, semi-strukturerade 
intervjuer med 2 – 3 lärare kopplade till varje klass (lärarteamet). I intervjuerna vill jag 
använda lydopptaker.  
 
Fokus är det samma som för observationerna; det är interaktionsmönster och samtalsmönster i 
klassrummen jag är intresserad i, att undersöka hur dessa abstrakta kriterier kan tänkas se ut i 
ett klassrum. Skillnaden blir att det här är lärarnas uppfattning, förståelse och tolkning av de 
situationer och händelser jag har bemärkt som intressanta, som är i fokus. Intervjufrågorna 
kommer därför framförallt att ta utgångspunkt i beskrivelse av dessa situationer.  
 
T.ex.; vid ett tillfälle satt det tre elever och jobbade tillsammans med… Vad har ni för 
tankar runt denna situation? Hur hade ni beskrivit den? Vad präglades den av etc. här 
satt två elever och pratade med varandra, eller jobbade tillsammans med en uppgift. 
Vad var din upplevelse av denna situation?  
 
T.ex.; det är en situation där en elev skrattar åt en annan elev; detta skulle båda kunna 
vara ett tecken på att de inte visar varandra respekt eller ett tecken på en god relation 
och vänskap; vad tänker ni om denna situation? 
 
Tanken är här att få lärarnas perspektiv på hur det ser ut när eleverna lyssnar till varandra, hur 
det ser ut när de visar respekt för varandra i ett samtal, hur det ser ut när de jobbar 




Andra typer av frågor kommer att gå mer på beskrivelser av situationer ifrån deras håll; 
 
Kan du beskriva ett tillfälle där elever satt och jobbade tillsammans, löste problem 
tillsammans med hjälp av en god dialog? Vad var det som gjorde att detta fungerade så 
bra? 
 
Kan du beskriva ett tillfälle där elever satt och jobbade tillsammans, försökte 
sammarbeta och lösa problem tillsammans men inte helt fick det till? Vad var det som 
gjorde att detta inte fungerade bra? 
 
Kan du beskriva en situation där du la upp till en helklassdiskussion? Hur gjorde du 
då? Vilka strategier använde du för att få igång diskussionen? Vad hade du för mål för 
denna diskussion? 
 
Kan du beskriva en politisk diskussion ni har haft i klassrummet? Vad var det som 
gjorde denna politisk? Vad detta en demokratisk diskussion? Varför var det en 
demokratisk diskusison? 
 
Frågor av mer abstrakt karaktär kan formuleras så här; 
 
Hur arbetar ni med klassrumsdiskussioner idag? Vad har ni för erfarenheter och tankar 
ring detta?  Berätta! 
 
Uppföljning:  
Vad är svårigheter kring klassrumsdiskussioner? 
Vad är möjligheterna med klassrumsdiskussioner?  
Vad är det som diskutera/Vad är tillåtet/möjligt att diskutera? 
Vad tänker ni att elever kan lära sig av klassrumsdiskussioner?  
Vilken roll/funktion tänker ni att klassrumsdiskussioner fyller?  
Vad var det som gjorde att detta inte fungerade? 
Hur ofta är det klassrumsdiskussion? 
När finns det utrymme för klassrumsdiskussioner? 
Är det speciella timmar/fag avsatta till klassrumsdiskussion? 




Vad krävs av lärare, elever och klassrumsmiljö för att få diskussionerna till att fungera 
bra? 
Uppföljning: 
Har ni någon speciell situation där det varit en klassrumsdiskussion som har fungerat 
bra? 
Har ni ett exempel på det motsatta, en klassrumsdiskussion som inte fungerade bra? 
Berätta! 
 
Vidare; säg att lärarna inte har hört talas om deliberativ demokrati, om jag helt enkelt rakt ut 
frågor dem vad och hur de tänker detta låter, för att sedan se hur de tänker kring det i 
skolsammahag etc;  
 
a) där skilda synsätt ställas mot varandra och olika argument ges utrymme 
b) som alltid innebär tolerans och respekt för den konkreta andra; det handlar bland annat om att 
lära sig lyssna på den andras argument 
c) med inslag av kollektiv viljebildning, det vill säga en strävan att komma överens eller 
åtminstone komma till en temporär överenskommelse (även om icke-överensstämmelse 
föreligger)   
d) där auktoriteter och traditionella uppfattningar kan ifrågasättas 
e) utan direkt lärarledning, det vill säga argumentativa samtal för att lösa olika problem respektive 
belysa olika problem utifrån skilda synvinklar men utan närvaro av läraren (Englund 2007a:155-
156).  
 
Det hade varit väldigt intressant att få höra vad de tänker om detta. Kan det fungera? I så fall, 
hur och på vilka sätt kan man få det att fungera? Varför ser det svårt ut? Vilka antaganden 
menar de känns felaktiga? Etc.  
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Observationsguide 
 
En (central) teoretisk definition av deliberativ kommunikation är utarbetad av professor 
Tomas Englund. Han definierar fem kriterier för samtal för att de ska kunna kvalificeras som 
deliberativa. Dessa kriterier kan även användas för att se och utvärdera om deliberativ 
kommunikation har förekommit. Deliberativa samtal innebär samtal 
 
a) där skilda synsätt ställas mot varandra och olika argument ges utrymme 
b) som alltid innebär tolerans och respekt för den konkreta andra; det handlar bland annat om att 
lära sig lyssna på den andras argument 
c) med inslag av kollektiv viljebildning, det vill säga en strävan att komma överens eller 
åtminstone komma till en temporär överenskommelse (även om icke-överensstämmelse 
föreligger)   
d) där auktoriteter och traditionella uppfattningar kan ifrågasättas 
e) utan direkt lärarledning, det vill säga argumentativa samtal för att lösa olika problem respektive 
belysa olika problem utifrån skilda synvinklar men utan närvaro av läraren (Englund 2007a:155-
156).  
 
Fokus för observationerna är interaktionsmönster och samtalsmönster i klassrummen. 
Föremålet är att kvalitativt se på trekk vid klassrumsdiskussioner, klassrumssamtal, samtal 
mellan elever, och samtal mellan lärare och elever. Poängen med observationerna i detta 
projekt är att undersöka hur dessa abstrakta kriterier kan tänkas se ut i ett klassrum. 
Forskningsfokus blir alltså hur dessa aspekter kan se ut i ett klassrum, på en skola, mer än att 
evaluera om deliberativ kommunikation förekommer eller inte. T.ex. understryks det att man i 
en deliberativ diskussion ska lyssna på varandra, att man visar respekt, att man bygger vidare 
på det andra har sagt, att man jobbar tillsammans för att bättre förstå något etc. Men, hur kan 
dessa aspekter se ut i klassrumssituationer? D.v.s., hur ser det ut när elever bygger vidare på 
varandras argument? Det involverar ju någon tanke om att det som kommer från någon, ska 
tas in bearbetas och att man på bakgrund av detta kan nyansera sina egna argument 
ytterligare. D.v.s. att bara säga ”ok, men du har nog rätt”, eller bara repeterar det man tidigare 
at sagt, dessa är inte direkt nödvändigtvis tecken på att man har byggt vidare. Så hur ser dessa 
saker ut i klassrummen? Hur ser det ut när man visar någon respekt? T.ex. det att skratta åt 




kan vara ett tecken på en god relation och vänskap. På detta sätt blir fokus av studien i princip 
ett försök att operationalisera och verklighetsgöra deliberativa diskussioner i klassrum, eller 
deliberativt utbildande diskussioner. Det intressanta blir alltså hur dessa saker kan se ut, inte 




Ett möjligt sätt att skissera upp deliberativ kommunikation, i en observationslogg, är på det 
överstående sättet. Många teoretiker framhäver att för att diskuterat deliberativt krävs det, 
kunskaper rom temat, kognitiva färdigheter och värderingar. Här skulle sedan olika 
handlingar som korresponderar med de olika aspekterna, placeras in. Vidare, handlingar kan 
delas upp i verbala handlingar och icke-verbala handlingar. Frågan blir då; hur ser handlingar 
ut som visar deliberativ respekt, deliberativa färdigheter och eller kunskapar? Hur ser det ut 
när eleverna visar detta i verbal form? Hur ser det ut när de visar detta i icke-verbal form?  
 
Ett alternativt/utfyllande sätt att sätta upp observationsloggen är i ett semi-strukturerat matrix, 
avbildat nedanför. När och hur förekommer deliberativ kommunikation, och hur ser det ut när 
detta sker? Sätter läraren igång deliberativ kommunikation explicit, eller någon form av 
klassrumsdiskussion som kan sammanliknas med deliberativa kommunikation? Sätter lärare 
igång detta implicit och tänker att aktiviteten de håller på med handlar om något annat? 
Uppstår det spontant genom elevernas initiativ och i så fall hur ser detta ut, vilka strategier 







Det kan hända att det finns begränsat med fullklass deliberativa diskussioner, men det kan 
hända det finns upptrappningar till det, att det finns hintar av det i kommunikation i 
klassrummet, mellan elever sinns emellan etc. Sätter lärare någon gång igång klassen med en 
intention om deliberativ kommunikation? Kanske läraren gör detta fast kallar det något annat? 
Kanske förekommer det deliberativ kommunikation mellan eleverna utan att läraren hade 
tänkt det? Kanske läraren sätter upp grupparbeten som har hintar av deliberativ 
kommunikation etc. 
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